UNDERSTANDING INFORMATION SECURITY INCIDENT MANAGEMENT PRACTICES:A case study in the electric power industry by Line, Maria Bartnes
Thesis for the degree of Philosophiae Doctor
Trondheim, April 2015
Norwegian University of Science and Technology
Faculty of Information Technology,
Mathematics and Electrical Engineering
Department of Telematics
Maria Bartnes Line
UNDERSTANDING INFORMATION
SECURITY INCIDENT
MANAGEMENT PRACTICES
A case study in the electric power industry
NTNU
Norwegian University of Science and Technology
Thesis for the degree of Philosophiae Doctor
Faculty of Information Technology, Mathematics and Electrical Engineering
Department of Telematics
© Maria Bartnes Line
ISBN 978-82-326-1138-6 (printed ver.) 
ISBN 978-82-326-1139-3 (electronic ver.)
ISSN 1503-8181
Doctoral theses at NTNU, 2015:241
Printed by NTNU Grafisk senter
“The real voyage of discovery
consists not in seeing new landscapes,
but in having new eyes.”
— Marcel Proust

Abstract
With the implementation of smarter electric power distribution grids fol-
lows new technologies, which lead to increased connectivity and complexity.
Traditional IT components – hardware, ﬁrmware, software – replace propri-
etary solutions for industrial control systems. These technological changes
introduce threats and vulnerabilities that make the systems more susceptible
to both accidental and deliberate information security incidents. As industrial
control systems are used for controlling crucial parts of the society’s critical
infrastructure, incidents may have catastrophic consequences for our physical
environment in addition to major costs for the organizations that are hit.
Recent attacks and threat reports show that industrial control organizations
are attractive targets for attacks.
Emerging threats create the need for a well-established capacity for respond-
ing to unwanted incidents. Such a capacity is inﬂuenced by both organizational,
human, and technological factors. The main objective of this doctoral project
has been to explore information security incident management practices in
electric power companies and understand challenges for improvements. Both
literature studies and empirical studies have been conducted, with the par-
ticipation of ten Distribution System Operators (DSOs) in the electric power
industry in Norway.
Our ﬁndings show that detection mechanisms currently in use are not suﬃ-
cient in light of current threats. As long as no major incidents are experienced,
the perceived risk will most likely not increase signiﬁcantly, and following,
the detection mechanisms might not be improved. The risk perception is
further aﬀected by the size of the organization and whether IT operations are
outsourced. Outsourcing of IT services limits the eﬀorts put into planning
and preparatory activities due to a strong conﬁdence in suppliers. Finally,
small organizations have a lower risk perception than large ones. They do not
perceive themselves as being attractive targets for attacks, and they are able
to operate the power grid without the control systems being available. These
ﬁndings concern risk perception, organizational structure, and resources, which
are factors that aﬀect current practices for incident management.
Furthermore, diﬀerent types of personnel, such as business managers and
technical personnel, have diﬀerent perspectives and priorities when it comes
to information security. Besides, there is a gap in how IT staﬀ and control
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system staﬀ understand information security. Cross-functional teams need
to be created in order to ensure a holistic view during the incident response
process. Training for responding to information security incidents is currently
given low priority. Evaluations after training sessions and minor incidents
are not performed. Learning to learn would make the organizations able to
take advantage of training sessions and evaluations and thereby improve their
incident response practices.
The main contributions of this thesis are knowledge on factors that aﬀect
current information security incident management practices and challenges for
improvement, and application of organizational theory on information security
incident management. Finally, this thesis contributes to an increased body of
empirical knowledge of information security in industrial control organizations.
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Part I
SUMMARY OF STUDIES

1. Motivation and objectives
The electric power industry is currently implementing smarter distribution
grids. Increasing numbers of electric cars, higher peaks of power consumption
during the day, a need for storage of energy, zero buildings, and the demand
for local power production are the main reasons for the need for modernization.
Besides, the European Commission has stated its 20-20-20 climate and energy
targets for 2020: 20% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions, 20% improvement
in energy eﬃciency, and 20% increased use of renewable resources [3]. Further,
Norwegian authorities have stated the requirement of complete roll-out of smart
meters by 2019 [4], which concerns all Distribution System Operators (DSOs)
responsible for the electric power distribution grid and their customers. These
requirements imply functionalities such as monitoring, automatic failure detec-
tion, and remote control being implemented into the power grid, supporting
more eﬃcient operation and partly autonomous management. Introduction of
new technologies leads to increased connectivity and complexity, and “regular”
IT components – hardware, ﬁrmware, software – replace proprietary solutions.
These technological changes introduce threats and vulnerabilities that make the
systems more susceptible to both accidental and deliberate information security
incidents [5]. As industrial control systems are used for controlling crucial
parts of the society’s critical infrastructure, incidents may have catastrophic
consequences for our physical environment in addition to major costs for the
organizations that are hit [6].
Well-known attacks like Stuxnet/Duqu/Flame [7–10], NightDragon [11],
and the cyberespionage campaign by Dragonﬂy [12], as well as statistics
presented by ICS-CERT [13], demonstrate that industrial control organizations
are attractive targets for attacks. According to these statistics, 59% of the
incidents reported to the Department of Homeland Security in 2013 occurred in
the energy industry. ICS-CERT [13] expresses an explicit concern for vulnerable
control systems being accessible from the Internet and for unprotected control
devices. Hence, the technological changes in the industrial control systems
pose new challenges to the industry. It is however worth noting that the
reported incidents do not only occur in the control systems. Other parts of the
organizations are also susceptible to attacks, e.g., for exﬁltration of sensitive
information.
Diﬀerent kinds of information security mechanisms are of crucial importance
in order to prevent the great variety of incidents. Still, it is impossible,
and also economically infeasible, to prevent all incidents. Furthermore, new
threats may occur in the near future that are impossible to foresee. These
emerging threats create the need for a well-established capacity for responding
to unwanted incidents. Such a capacity is inﬂuenced by organizational, human,
and technological factors. Information security incident management is the
process of detecting and responding to incidents, including supplementary
work as learning from the incidents, using lessons learnt as input in the overall
risk assessments, and identifying improvements to the implemented incident
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Figure 1: The information security incident management process (ISO/IEC 27035 [1]).
management scheme. Further, preparatory activities such as establishing a
response team, deﬁning roles and responsibilities, documenting procedures,
and training are also included in the incident management process [1]. The
complete process is described by ISO/IEC 27035 – Information security incident
management [1] and illustrated in Figure 1. Beneﬁts from a structured approach
to information security incident management include an overall improvement
of information security, reduced impact of incidents, improved focus and better
prioritization of security activities, and better and more updated information
security risk assessment eﬀorts [1, 14].
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) pointed out
a lack of research and experience related to incident response in operating
environments where IT and control systems are closely integrated, as current
recommendations contain high-level requirements regarding governance, risk,
and compliance only [15], and ISO/IEC 27035 addresses corporate systems in
general and does not contain any considerations related more speciﬁcally to
industrial control systems.
51.1 Research questions and design
Due to the major technological changes to industrial control systems in
the near future and the lack of research and experiences related to incident
response in such environments, there is a need for investigations in this area. A
study of current practice and challenges is needed in order to identify potential
improvements. The main objective of this doctoral project was to explore
information security incident management practices in electric power companies
and understand challenges for improvements. The work was guided by the
following research questions:
RQ 1. Which factors aﬀect information security incident management
practices?
RQ 2. What are the challenges for improving information security
incident management practices?
Three literature studies and three empirical studies have been conducted,
and a total of ten Distribution System Operators (DSOs) in the electric power
industry in Norway have participated. The studies are summarized in Table 1.
The research method, the studies, and the industrial case context are further
elaborated in Chapter 3.
Table 1: Studies performed and the resulting papers.
Study Purpose Paper
Literature
studies
To survey information security challenges in smart grids, to
identify empirically documented incident management practices
and challenges, and to explore adaptive management strategies
for adoption to information security incident management.
P1, P2, P3,
P4
Study 1 To survey current practice for information security incident
management. IT managers, IT security managers, and con-
trol room managers in six large and three small DSOs were
interviewed.
P5, P6, P7
Study 2 To survey the level of cyber situation awareness in order to
analyze the level of preparedness in DSOs for targeted attacks.
The six large DSOs from Study 1 participated.
P8
Study 3 To understand challenges met during preparedness exercises
for information security incidents in order to provide recom-
mendations for future exercises. Observations were performed
in three large DSOs.
P9
1.2 Included papers
P1-P4 resulted from the literature studies performed in the early phase of
this doctoral project. P5-P7, P8, and P9 present results from Study 1, 2, and
3, respectively. Each paper is given a short introduction in the following.
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P1: Maria B. Line, Inger Anne Tøndel, and Martin Gilje Jaatun: Cyber
Security Challenges in Smart Grids, IEEE PES Innovative Smart Grid
Technologies 2011, ISSN 2165-4816, Manchester, UK.
Information security challenges for the smart grids are presented: increased
connectivity, new trust models, security management on several levels, software
vulnerabilities, consumer’s privacy, and human factors. The amalgamation of
power grids and information technology systems is discussed, and a parallel
from the oil and gas industry is drawn, where the same kind of evolution has
been going on with the so-called integrated operations. Moreover, diﬀerences
and similarities between traditional safety and information security are pointed
out, as they represent two diﬀerent cultures that need to cooperate closely as
a result of the implementation of smart grids. Finally, a roadmap for smart
grids is presented, which describes good practices to be applied and research
tasks ahead, and incident response is among these tasks.
Contributes to key ﬁndings: 1, 6.
P2: Maria B. Line: Why securing smart grids is not just a straightforward
consultancy exercise, Security and Communication Networks, ISSN 193-0114,
vol. 7, no. 1, p. 160-174, January 2014.
Concerns are presented that need to be addressed in order for the implemen-
tation of smart grids to succeed from an information security point of view.
These concerns include the need for a uniﬁed terminology, a cross-cultural
understanding, and a cross-disciplinary cooperation both in academia and
industry. Risk assessments, privacy, security architecture, and incident
management are quite detailed elaborated as challenges that may stand in the
way of a successful implementation of smart grids.
Contributes to key ﬁndings: 2, 6.
P3: Inger Anne Tøndel, Maria B. Line, and Martin G. Jaatun: Information
security incident management: Current practice as reported in the literature,
Computers & Security, ISSN 0167-4048, vol. 45, p. 42-57, September 2014.
A systematic literature review on current practice and experiences with incident
management is presented, covering a variety of organizations. Experience
reports and empirical studies were included in the review. Identiﬁed practices
are summarized according to the incident management process as described
in ISO/IEC 27035. Our ﬁndings show that current practices seem to be in
line with the standard. There are however some recommendations that are
challenging to follow in practice. Some inspirational examples are identiﬁed
that should be useful for organizations looking to improve their practices.
Besides, suggestions are provided for how challenges could be addressed, and
research needs within information security incident management are identiﬁed.
Contributes to key ﬁndings: 1, 3, 7.
7P4: Maria B. Line and Eirik Albrechtsen: Examining the suitability of
industrial safety management approaches for information security incident
management, forthcoming in International Journal of Information and
Computer Security, ISSN 2056-4961.
This paper addresses some of the challenges identiﬁed in P3 by applying
principles and theories from adaptive management strategies such as resilience
engineering to the ﬁeld of information security incident management. Three
areas are discussed in particular: plans, compliance, and situational adaptation;
training; and learning from incidents. Although there are several similarities
between them, these two ﬁelds have been the subjects of quite diﬀerent
research approaches and solutions, a phenomenon that might be explained by
four interlinked reasons: maturity, individual awareness, national regulations,
and traditions.
Contributes to key ﬁndings: 5, 7.
P5: Maria B. Line: A Study of Resilience within Information Security in the
Power Industry, IEEE Africon 2013, ISSN 2153-0025, Mauritius.
The main principles of resilience engineering and high-reliability organizations
(HRO) are presented in relation to each of the ﬁve phases of the incident
management process as described by ISO/IEC 27035. Preliminary results from
the interviews with large DSOs are discussed with respect to how well current
practices in large DSOs align with the principles of resilience and HRO. The
analysis indicates that there are lacks in current practices when it comes to
plans, training, learning from minor incidents and things that go right, and
systematic approaches to information security metrics. An increased focus on
these activities, which are key areas in the literature on resilience and HRO,
would improve resilience for information security incidents.
Contributes to key ﬁndings: 5, 7.
P6: Maria B. Line, Inger Anne Tøndel, and Martin G. Jaatun: Information
security incident management: Planning for failure, 8th International
Conference on IT Security Incident Management and IT Forensics (IMF) 2014,
Mu¨nster, Germany, ISBN 978-1-4799-4330-2.
Findings from the ﬁrst round of interviews are presented: current practice
regarding planning and preparatory activities for incident management in
six large DSOs. Similarities and diﬀerences between the two traditions of
conventional IT systems and industrial control systems (ICS) are identiﬁed.
The ﬁndings show that there are diﬀerences between the IT and ICS disciplines
in how they perceive an information security incident and how they plan and
prepare for responding to such. The completeness of documented plans and
procedures for incident management varies. Even if documentation exists, it is
not well-established throughout the organization. Preparedness exercises with
speciﬁc focus on information security are rarely performed. There is a need to
create a more uniﬁed approach to information security incident management
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in order for the electric power industry to be suﬃciently prepared to meet the
challenges following the implementation of smart grids in the near future.
Contributes to key ﬁndings: 1, 2, 3, 5, 6.
P7: Maria B. Line, Inger Anne Tøndel, and Martin G. Jaatun: Does size
matter? Information security incident management in large and small
industrial control organizations, submitted to International Journal of Critical
Infrastructure Protection, ISSN 1874-5482.
Planning and preparatory activities in small DSOs are presented and compared
to the practices in large DSOs, as described in P6. Further, activities in both
large and small DSOs from the remaining phases of the incident management
process beyond planning and preparations are presented and compared:
detection, assessment, responses, and lessons learnt. Signiﬁcant diﬀerences are
emphasized. Activities where the practices do not seem to be aﬀected by the
size of the DSOs are summarized, before recommendations to all DSOs are
provided. The recommendations are intended to improve preparedness for
information security incidents.
Contributes to key ﬁndings: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7.
P8: Maria B. Line, Ali Zand, Gianluca Stringhini, and Richard A. Kemmerer:
Targeted Attacks against Industrial Control Systems: Is the Power Industry
Prepared? 2nd Smart Energy Grid Security Workshop (SEGS) 2014, ISBN
978-1-4503-3154-8, Phoenix (AZ), US.
A new taxonomy for targeted attacks is presented and used for providing
insight into the importance of diﬀerent aspects of cyber situation awareness
for defending against such targeted attacks. Further, a systematic assessment
of cyber situation awareness in large DSOs is presented. Our ﬁndings indicate
that the electric power industry is very well prepared for traditional threats,
such as physical attacks. However, cyber attacks, and especially sophisticated
targeted attacks, where social engineering is one of the strategies used, have not
been appropriately addressed so far. By understanding previous attacks and
learning from them, our aim is to aid the industry in improving their detection
mechanisms and response capabilities. A list of prioritized suggestions for
theses DSOs is provided, which is intended to increase their cyber situation
awareness.
Contributes to key ﬁndings: 1, 2, 5.
P9: Maria B. Line and Nils Brede Moe: Understanding Collaborative
Challenges in IT Security Preparedness Exercises, International Conference on
ICT Systems Security and Privacy Protection (IFIP SEC), ISSN 1868-4238,
Hamburg, Germany, 2015.
Previous interview studies (P5-P8) have shown that information security
preparedness exercises are not prioritized by DSOs for a number of reasons.
Such exercises allow for reviews of written plans and procedures and practical
9training of personnel, which in turn lead to improved response capabilities
for an organization. We encouraged DSOs to conduct such exercises and
observed one tabletop exercise as performed by three diﬀerent DSOs. We
argue that challenges met during exercises could aﬀect the response process
during a real-life incident as well, and by improving the exercises the response
capabilities would be strengthened accordingly. We found that the response
team must be carefully selected to include the right competences and all parties
that would be involved in a real incident response process. Furthermore, the
main goal needs to be well understood among the whole team and a certain
time pressure during the exercise adds realism to it. Both the exercise itself
and existing procedures need to be reviewed afterwards. Finally, organizations
need to both optimize current exercise practices and experiment with new
ones, as there are many ways to conduct preparedness exercises.
Contributes to key ﬁndings: 3, 5, 7, 8.
1.3 Contributions
We have investigated current practices for information security incident
management in ten organizations in the Norwegian electric power industry and
identiﬁed challenges for improvement of these practices. The main contributions
of this thesis are:
Knowledge on factors aﬀecting current incident management practices.
The level of risk perception, organizational structure, and the amount of
available ﬁnancial and human resources have been identiﬁed as factors
aﬀecting current incident management practices. An understanding of
these factors is a prerequisite for enabling improvements with the goal of
ensuring eﬀective and eﬃcient incident response.
Knowledge on challenges for improving current incident management
practices. The importance of creating cross-functional and self-managing
teams for both training and real emergency situations has been demon-
strated. Further, the need for establishing a learning system has been
identiﬁed, as learning from neither training nor real incidents is cur-
rently suﬃciently performed. Challenges for improvements need to be
understood in order to achieve eﬀective and eﬃcient incident response.
Application of organizational theory to information security incident
management. Information security has traditionally been occupied mainly
by a focus on technical security mechanisms and compliance. This thesis
demonstrates application of organizational theory, including adaptive
management strategies, to information security incident management.
Organizational theory is needed to understand obstacles for implementing
practices and developing new practices.
Empirical knowledge on information security in industrial control organi-
zations. Major technological changes are currently being implemented
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in industrial control systems, leading to increased connectivity and com-
plexity, which require appropriate and suﬃcient information security
measures. This can only be achieved by a thorough understanding of
both technological and organizational matters. The amount of empirical
information security research studies in industrial control organizations is
currently rather limited. This thesis contributes to the body of knowledge
on information security practices and challenges in industrial control
organizations, and to increased awareness and knowledge of informa-
tion security in the organizations participating in our research and the
Norwegian electric power industry as a whole.
1.4 Outline
Part I is structured as follows: Chapter 2 presents background and related
work. Research methods and the industrial case context are introduced in
Chapter 3. Chapter 4 describes our ﬁndings, while Chapter 5 discusses these
ﬁndings in light of the research questions and proposes implications of the
results for both practice and research. Finally, Chapter 6 provides concluding
remarks.
Appendices are included in Part II, while Part III presents the scientiﬁc
papers that resulted from this PhD project.
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2. Background
Information security comprises the three attributes of conﬁdentiality, in-
tegrity, and availability, as deﬁned by ISO/IEC 27000 [16]:
Conﬁdentiality: the property that information is not made available or
disclosed to unauthorized individuals, entities, or processes,
Integrity: the property of safeguarding the accuracy and completeness of
assets, and
Availability: the property of being accessible and usable upon demand
by an authorized entity.
Data security, cyber security, and computer security are similar terms that
can be observed in diﬀerent contexts. However, throughout this thesis the term
information security will be used, as this is the most recognized and correct
term as deﬁned by ISO/IEC 27000.
Information security incidents and the incident management process are
presented in the following. Further, information security in the context
of industrial control systems is introduced. Then, the concept of cyber
situation awareness and the principles of resilience engineering are described
as concerning human factors in incident management. Preparedness exercises
are introduced as a means of improving the incident management process, and
ﬁnally, coordination in incident response is described, including the issues of
self-management, team knowledge, and joint decision-making.
2.1 Information security incidents
An information security event is deﬁned to be “an identiﬁed occurrence of a
system, service or network state indicating a possible breach of information
security, policy or failure of controls, or a previously unknown situation that
may be security relevant” [16]. An information security incident is then deﬁned
as “a single or a series of unwanted or unexpected information security events
that have a signiﬁcant probability of compromising business operations and
threatening information security” [16]. In this thesis, we use the deﬁnition
provided by ISO/IEC 27000 and include both intentional and unintentional
incidents, as both types might have major consequences for the information
security properties of both IT and control systems.
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2.2 Information security incident management
The information security incident management process and the ISO/IEC
27035 [1] that describes it, were brieﬂy introduced in Chapter 1. The process
comprises ﬁve phases:
1. Plan and prepare,
2. Detection and reporting,
3. Assessment and decision,
4. Responses, and
5. Lessons learnt.
The ﬁrst phase runs continuously, as opposed to the next four, which are
triggered by the occurrence of an incident. Plan and prepare includes activities
such as establishing a dedicated response team, deﬁning roles and respon-
sibilities, documenting procedures, and training of personnel and awareness
raising activities regarding incident management throughout the organization.
Detection and reporting is the ﬁrst operational phase of incident management
and involves detection of what might be an incident and reporting into an
incident tracking system. Deciding what kind of response is needed to cope
with the registered event belongs to the Assessment and decision phase. The
Responses phase then describes the actions taken to cope with the incident
and prevent further consequences, restore systems, collect electronic evidence,
and possibly escalate to crisis handling. The ﬁnal phase, Lessons learned, is
when the team analyzes whether the incident management scheme worked
satisfactorily and considers whether any improvements are needed on any level:
the scheme, policies, procedures, security mechanisms, or similar. The im-
provements are then implemented as part of the continuously running phase of
Plan and prepare. Similar recommendations are described by NIST [17], ITIL
[18], and ENISA [19] as well. Existing standards and recommendations in the
area of incident management provide a useful baseline for organizations about
to implement their own scheme or looking for inspiration for improvements,
and ISO/IEC 27035 should be regarded as the most comprehensive and inter-
nationally recognized documentation of what is currently the recommended
practice in this ﬁeld. The standard is used as a basis for the interview studies
performed in this project.
An eﬃcient and eﬀective approach for incident management is achieved
through a successful combination of various reporting capabilities, automatic
analysis and response, and process-oriented intervention [20]. Findings by
Ahmad et al. [21] indicated a narrow technical focus, where maintaining
continuous operation was the main goal, while strategic security concerns
tended to be neglected. Furthermore, according to the same study, post-
incident review processes tended to focus more on incidents with high impact
than so-called “high learning” incidents, i.e. incidents that have a potential
for being more useful from a learning perspective rather than having major
consequences. Scholl and Mangold [22] claimed that a “well-developed incident
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response process should be a driver for continuous improvement of enterprise
security” and that attending to small security events and early warnings can
prevent major security disasters.
Incident responders need a set of skills comprised by pattern recognition,
hypothesis generation, and cooperation [23]. Besides, incident response is a
highly collaborative activity, and the diagnosis work is complicated by the
practitioners’ need to rely on tacit knowledge and usability issues with security
tools [24]. Both technical, human, and organzational issues will be investigated
as part of our studies in identifying factors aﬀecting current practices and
challenges for improvements.
2.3 Information security and industrial control systems
Industrial control systems have traditionally been based on proprietary
technologies operating in closed networks. They have been designed to fulﬁll
speciﬁc purposes and have by many not been recognized as IT, even though they
are a combination of hard-, ﬁrm-, and software. The security objectives have
been limited, as availability has been the prioritized property. Conﬁdentiality
and integrity have not received the same attention, due to the nature of the
systems [25]. Traditional IT systems, on the other hand, consist of commercial-
oﬀ-the-shelf technologies operating on TCP/IP/Ethernet networks, and they
are usually designed to fulﬁll multiple purposes. Incidents aﬀecting power
systems may have severe consequences, both for business operations and the
society at large, including life, health, and the physical environment. Such
incidents tend to be more associated with safety than information security,
and hence the industrial control systems have been designed to meet safety
requirements. This is also what characterizes the mindset of the staﬀ operating
these systems [26].
The electric power industry is currently modernizing the power grids in order
to achieve the goal of smart grids. These changes concern new technologies,
such as introducing IT into control systems, higher connectivity, and more
integration, which increase the attack surface and the potential consequences of
attacks [27]. At the same time, current threat reports show that targeted attacks
are on the rise, and critical infrastructures are attractive targets [28]. This
calls for increased knowledge and understanding of information security in the
setting of co-functioning IT and industrial control systems: technical security
measures and organizational aspects, knowledge exchange and cooperation
between diﬀerent types of personnel, detecting and responding to incidents,
and understanding of threats and potential consequences of incidents. NIST
has provided several recommendations for securing industrial control systems,
including a comprehensive overview of vulnerabilities [29]. There is however a
lack of standards and recommendations for incident response in settings where
corporate IT systems and industrial control systems co-function and where
incidents might have cascading consequences, as mentioned in Chapter 1.
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In their study on incident management in the oil and gas industry, Jaatun et
al. [26] found that although integrated operations in the North Sea were highly
dependent on IT, there was still a great deal of mistrust between traditional
process control engineers and IT staﬀ. Further, there was a low level of
awareness among upper management of the importance of doing cyber security
training exercises due to both a low number of cyber security incidents and
limited systematic reporting of these. Some control system engineers even
refused to acknowledge that their systems contained vital IT components.
Finally, they found that existing reporting tools used for Health, Safety, and
Environment (HSE) incidents were poorly suited for reporting of cyber security
incidents.
Research on information security incident management in environments with
co-functioning IT systems and industrial control systems is currently limited.
There is a gap of knowledge and understanding of both current practices
and related challenges for incident management, and compliance to standards
and/or need for changes in standards. We will particularly investigate issues
related to knowledge and understanding, and communication and collaboration
between IT staﬀ and control system staﬀ in the participating organizations.
2.4 The human factor: cyber situation awareness and
resilience engineering
When technology fails, the human factor is of great importance. However, as
computer systems are ever-changing and new threats emerge continuously, it is
quite a challenge to educate all users to be well functioning perimeter controls
for an organization. Still, human system operators need to be able to interpret
alerts, put pieces of information together, and know about possible attacks and
understand their consequences. This ability is referred to as Cyber Situation
Awareness (CSA) and can, to some degree, be supported by automatic tools.
According to Barford et al. [30] situation awareness can in general be described
as a three-phase process: situation recognition, situation comprehension, and
situation projection. Tadda [31] provides an overview of metrics developed
for measuring the performance of CSA systems. He speciﬁcally points out the
need for research in measuring the level of situation awareness achieved by
human operators, and he indicates that it would require quite diﬀerent means
than measuring the performance of a computer system. Cyber situational
awareness for industrial control systems, and the power grid in particular, has
received attention lately [32]. Research areas include frameworks that comprise
collection and analysis of network traﬃc data, simulation systems, intrusion
detection systems. One example is Klump and Kwiatkowski [33], who proposed
an architecture for sharing information about incidents in the power system.
The concept of CSA relates to the ﬁeld of resilience engineering as both
regard abilities of understanding the current situation, potential changes, and
consequences thereof. Resilience engineering is a fairly recent development
within industrial safety and concerns an organization’s ability to succeed under
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varying conditions. It is usually explained by four principles [2], as illustrated
in Figure 2:
Actual: The ability to address the actual is knowing what to do, being
able to respond to changes and disturbances in an eﬀective and ﬂexible
matter.
Factual: The ability to address the factual is knowing what has happened,
being able to learn from past events and understand correctly what
happened and why.
Critical: The ability to address the critical is knowing what to look for,
being able to monitor what can be a threat or cause disturbances in the
near future.
Potential: The ability to address the potential is knowing what to expect,
being able to anticipate developments, threats or opportunities into the
future and imagine how they can aﬀect the organization through changes
or disruptions.
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Figure 2: The four basic abilities of resilience [2].
The degree to which an organization is resilient, is determined by how well
these four abilities are established and managed. A resilient organization is
prepared for dealing with the unexpected and able to adapt to the occurring
situations. Resilience is not a product that can be implemented in a day or a
week. It is an immanent property that can be developed over time, piece by
piece, and it touches upon individuals, teams, culture, and priorities.
In spite of the need for individual planning for each organization, training
is a common key factor when it comes to improving resilience. The more
experienced each worker is in anticipating and responding to incidents, the
better prepared will they be for recognizing and responding to unexpected
events. In fact, Parie`s, in Hollnagel et al. [34], states that it takes “a subtle
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balance between experience and opportunism, self conﬁdence and awareness of
limitations” to succeed in extreme situations.
2.5 Information security preparedness exercises
The purpose of an emergency preparedness exercise is to strengthen the
response capabilities of an organization by training personnel in responding
to situations that deviate from normal operations. Basic structures such as
well documented procedures and clear deﬁnitions of roles and responsibilities
need to be in place, but during an incident, there is a need for a more dynamic
process that requires coordination and improvisation, and where exceptions
and violations are managed, and experienced incident handlers are valued.
Relying on predeﬁned documentation is what Hale and Borys refer to as Model
1 in the use of safety rules and procedures [35], while allowing for rules to
emerge from practical experience is referred to as Model 2. Exercises are a way
of developing Model 2. Further, exercises provide a means for personnel to
train for making the right decisions under pressure [2]. Wrong decisions may
cause the incident to escalate and lead to severe consequences.
Both tabletop exercises and functional exercises prepare personnel for re-
sponding to an emergency situation [36]. Tabletop exercises allow for discussions
of roles, responsibilities, procedures, coordination, and decision-making, and
are a reasonably cost-eﬃcient way of reviewing and learning documented plans
and procedures for incident response. Tabletop exercises are usually performed
in a classroom without the use of any speciﬁc equipment, and a facilitator
presents a scenario and initiates the discussion. Functional exercises, on the
other hand, involve practical simulations of incidents with the use of physical
equipment and execution of procedures, such as alerting and reporting. Ac-
cording to NIST, both types of exercises should consist of the following four
phases:
1. Design the event by identifying objectives and participants,
2. Develop the scenario and guides for the facilitator and the participants,
3. Conduct the exercise, and
4. Evaluate by debrieﬁng and identifying lessons learned [36].
Tabletop exercises and functional exercises supplement each other: tabletop
exercises do not provide practical demonstrations of the eﬀects of an incident
or the emergency management’s true response capabilities [37], while this is
exactly what is supported by functional exercises.
In his study of preparedness exercises initiated by the Norwegian Water
and Energy Directorate (NVE)1, G˚asland [38] found that there is a positive
attitude for participating in exercises and an understanding that collaboration is
important in problem-solving processes. He still found that exercises compete
1http://www.nve.no
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with daily tasks for prioritization, and he considered it to be an obstacle
to learning if exercises are not used as a means of making improvements
afterwards. Further, he emphasized the importance of making exercises as
realistic as possible. However, creating realistic scenarios is challenging [39],
and even though a scenario is successfully responded to in an exercise, it does
not give any guarantees that a real emergency situation will be successfully
responded to [40].
2.6 Coordination in incident response
Coordination of work and making collaborative decisions are important
aspects of the incident response process and hence of preparedness exercises as
well. Responding to an information security incident usually implies personnel
from diﬀerent parts of an organization collaborating on solving complex prob-
lems. “Coordination is management of interdependencies between activities”
[41] and coordination mechanisms are the organizational arrangements that
allow individuals to realize a collective performance [42]. Interdependencies
include sharing of resources, synchronization of activities, and prerequisite
activities. Coordination challenges in incident response are functions of the
complexity of i.e. processes and technology.
Furthermore, responding to an information security incident is creative work,
as there might not be one correct solution and a number of uncertainties and
interdependencies need to be taken into account. In creative work, progress
towards completion can be diﬃcult to estimate because interdependencies
between diﬀerent pieces of work may be uncertain or challenging to identify
[43]. This makes it diﬃcult to know who should be involved in the work
and whether there is a correct order in which parties should complete their
own specialized work [42]. Further, in creative work it is essential to improve
the knowledge transactions between team members. This is captured in a
transactive memory system (TMS), a shared cognitive system for encoding,
storing, and retrieving knowledge between members of a group [44]. TMS can be
understood as a shared understanding of who knows what. The successfulness
of a TMS depends on the degree to which a team’s knowledge is diﬀerentiated.
Diﬀerentiated group knowledge is thought to be useful because it provides the
group with diverse, specialized knowledge that can be applied to the group’s
task.
Coordination can be either predeﬁned or situated [45]:
Predeﬁned coordination takes place prior to the situation being coordi-
nated and can be understood as what Hale and Borys refer to as Model
1 [35]. It typically consists of establishing written or unwritten rules,
routines, procedures, roles, and schedules; thus, it resembles an incident
response scheme as described by ISO/IEC 27035 [1].
Situated coordination occurs when a situation is unknown and/or unan-
ticipated, such as when an information security incident strikes, and can
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be understood as Model 2 [35]. Those involved in the situation do not
know in advance how they should contribute. They lack knowledge of
what to achieve, who does what, how the work can be divided, in what
sequence sub-activities should be done, when to act, etc. Consequently,
they have to improvise and coordinate their eﬀorts ad hoc. In most col-
laborative eﬀorts there is a mix of predeﬁned and situated coordination.
Involved actors may for instance already know the goal, but not who
performs what, or they may know who does what, but not when to do
it. To compensate for lacking predeﬁned knowledge of how the actual
unfolding of activities in an exercise will be, the participants must update
themselves on the status of the situation.
To handle a crisis, not only does the team need to coordinate their work,
they also need to take decisions together and be responsible for managing and
monitoring their own processes and executing tasks; they need to be able to
self-manage [46]. Flodeen, Haller, and Tjaden [47] studied an ad hoc group
of incident responders to see how a shared mental model for decision making
can be developed through training. Such a shared mental model increases the
performance during an incident handling process because the team manages to
cooperate with limited and eﬃcient communication. They would know where
the others are in the process, the next steps, and the information required to
complete the incident handling without wasting time on frequent recapture.
19
3. Research method
The research questions called for exploratory research and a ﬂexible design
[48]. We used an inductive research approach as we wanted to derive patterns
from our observations rather than evaluating existing hypothesis. Field studies
were performed and followed by the deriving of theories from observations,
which is also called theory-building research [49]. This method is in contrast
to deductive research, where a theory is developed initially, followed by
observations to evaluate it [50].
A case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary
phenomenon in depth and within its real-life context [51]. It relies on multiple
sources of evidence and beneﬁts from the prior development of theoretical
propositions to guide data collection and analysis. Case studies are well suited
for “development of detailed, intensive knowledge about a single ‘case’, or of a
small number of related ‘cases’” [48] and were thus chosen as the preferred
research strategy.
Qualitative interviews are a well-known and powerful tool for information
collection in qualitative research [52]. They allow for the researchers to view
the phenomenon from the interviewees’ perspective and understand why
and how they got that particular perspective [53]. To meet this objective,
qualitative interviews are driven by open questions, a low degree of structure,
and a focus on speciﬁc situations and experiences made by the interviewee. We
performed semi-structured interviews, which are based on a set of predeﬁned
questions, but allow for additional, unplanned questions or a change in the
order of questions [48]. Further, a document analysis, which is often used to
question or to verify data obtained from other data collection methods [51],
was performed in one of our studies.
Observations are typically used in an exploratory phase to ﬁnd out what is
going on in a speciﬁc situation, and participant observation is one common
approach [48]. The degree of participation may vary, depending on the purpose
of the observation. The complete participant conceals that she is an observer
and participates as if she was a full member of the group being observed, while
the participant as observer and the marginal participant need to be trusted by
the group members as her role as observer is known to them. The presence of
the observer might aﬀect the group being observed, and there are a number of
biases that need to be handled with care as well, such as selective attention,
selective encoding, selective memory, and interpersonal factors [48]. Still,
participant observation is powerful in dealing with complex situations.
The data analysis followed an integrated approach, which combines the
inductive development of codes with a start list of categories, i.e. groups
of codes, in which the codes can be inductively developed [54, 55]. A code
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is a descriptive label for a word, sentence, paragraph, or other chunks of
data [56], and coding is a means of organizing and interpreting qualitative data.
Validity issues need to be considered when designing a research project
and evaluated when analyzing the credibility of research results. Construct
validity concerns whether a study measures what it sets out to measure [48].
Both interviewees and the researcher may be biased, either consciously or
unconsciously [57]. Bias may be overcome by a number of strategies, such
as triangulation and member checking. Data triangulation means using
several methods for collecting evidence, such as interviews, document analysis,
and observations. This allows for studying a phenomenon from diﬀerent
perspectives and increases data quality [51]. Member checking involves
returning data material to the respondents for review and shows that their
contributions are valued. External validity refers to the degree to which the
ﬁndings from a study can be generalized to other settings [48]. Generalizability
is strengthened by increasing the number of studies. A description of the
industrial case context is of great importance when considering whether results
from qualitative studies are transferrable to a given setting. A discussion on
validity issues of our studies is provided in Chapter 5.
In the following, the studies performed in this doctoral project are presented
with respect to research design, data collection, and data analysis. Then,
the industrial case context with the participating DSOs is introduced, before
privacy and conﬁdentiality issues are described.
3.1 Data collection and analysis
Literature studies (P1-P4). Security challenges and research needs for
smart grids were studied in order to identify research questions for this thesis.
The studies are presented in P1 and P2. Identiﬁcation and evaluation of
empirical studies and experience reports on incident management practices
were performed as a systematic literature review [58] and documented in P3.
A literature study on theories and principles from resilience engineering was
performed to identify possible approaches to be applied in information security
incident management, as presented in P4.
Study 1: Current practice (P5-P7). This study was based on semi-
structured interviews and a document analysis. Requested documents included
existing plans and procedures and evaluation reports from past incidents.
Content of this documentation was mapped to ﬁndings in interviews and a
comparison between the participants’ views and documentation was performed.
Documentation was however not received from all participating organizations
due to conﬁdentiality restrictions.
ISO/IEC 27035 [1] was used as a basis for developing the interview guide.
The ﬁrst version of the interview guide that was used for large DSOs, is found
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as an appendix in P5. We revised this interview guide before interviewing the
small DSOs: some questions were added (6, 17, 30, 31, 33, and 34) and one was
removed. The removed question asked what the most important actions were
in the response phase, but the question was too vague and was interpreted very
diﬀerently by interviewees in the ﬁrst phase. The added questions mainly aim
at capturing the interviewee’s reﬂections on own practices: whether they have
practices that work particularly well, which challenges are worth emphasizing,
and how the fact that they are a small DSOs aﬀects the area of incident
management. The revised interview guide is included in Appendix II.
The interview guide was not distributed in advance, as we wanted to collect
experiences and practices from the employees directly, rather than having them
refer to a set of predeﬁned procedures. Three roles were interviewed in each
organization: IT managers, IT security managers, and control room managers.
In the small DSOs, the IT manager and the IT security manager was the
same person. In total, 19 interviews in six large and three small DSOs were
conducted. Each interview lasted for approximately one hour.
The start list of categories for coding was based on the ﬁve phases of
ISO/IEC 27035 [1], cf. Figure 1. Nodes were deﬁned in advance in a hierarchy
of two levels. One researcher conducted all the interviews and performed the
coding. The conﬁdentiality agreements signed with some of the participating
organization posed limitations on who may access the material revealed in
the interviews. Fellow researchers assisted in reviewing the coding categories,
discussing ﬁndings, and drawing conclusions, without compromising the
conﬁdentiality agreements. Nvivo [59] was used for coding and analysis of the
data material. The results were documented in P6 and P7. Additionally, P5
analyzed preliminary results in light of resilience engineering principles.
Study 2: Awareness (P8). This study was based on semi-structured
interviews. The interview guide was developed based on a categorization of
elements comprising cyber situation awareness (CSA). One fellow researcher
and one expert from a supplier of control systems assisted in evaluating the
questions. The interview guide is presented in Appendix II together with a
mapping between the CSA capabilities and the interview questions.
IT security managers for the control systems were asked to participate.
The interview guide was distributed in advance, so that the DSOs could
determine who would be the right participant(s). Two of the interviews
were performed as group interviews with three persons, while the other
four were individual interviews. A total of six interviews were conducted,
and the participating DSOs were the same large DSOs as in Study 1. Due
to this low number of interviews, extensive coding was not needed. A
summary of each interview was written, so that the fellow researchers
could discuss ﬁndings and contribute to the analysis. The summaries pro-
vided suﬃcient insight for writing up the results, which were documented in P8.
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Figure 3: The studies performed and the resulting papers. All papers contribute to both
research questions, except from P4 and P5, which address RQ 2 only; thus colored diﬀerently
than the others.
Study 3: Preparedness (P9). A holistic multiple case study [51] was
performed in Study 3. We contributed to planning the tabletop exercises in
each of the organizations and acted as a participant observer [48] studying
leadership, decision-making, and involvement. Further, we facilitated a plenary
evaluation after the exercise, where all participants reﬂected upon what worked
well and what could have been done diﬀerently. Three organizations were
studied, and they all used the same scenario as a basis for their exercise,
although they organized the exercise slightly diﬀerent from one another. The
participants did not receive any information about the exercise in advance,
other than the topic being an information security incident and the activity
being a table-top exercise.
For the data analysis, we described the tabletop exercises and evaluations
to achieve an understanding of what was going on during the exercises.
Interesting expressions and observations were categorized, and ﬁndings from
the diﬀerent organizations were compared. The results were documented in
P9.
The studies and the resulting papers are illustrated in Figure 3. P4 and P5
address RQ 2 only, while the others contribute to both research questions.
3.2 Industrial case context
In total, seven large and three small DSOs participated in our empirical
studies, c.f. Table 2. The large DSOs are among the top 15 largest DSOs in
Norway with respect to the number of energy subscribers, and they all serve
close to 100.000 customers or more. The small DSOs serve less than 10.000
customers each. There are approximately 150 DSOs in Norway in total, and
the majority of them have a few thousands subscribers.
Four of the large DSOs have outsourced the operation of IT systems and
networks to an external supplier, while the remaining two operate these in-
house. The three small DSOs rely on an external supplier as well. All the DSOs
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Table 2: Types of DSOs participating in our empirical studies.
Study Participating organizations
1 Six large and three small distribution system operators (DSOs)
2 The same six large DSOs as in Study 1
3 Three large DSOs; two from Study 2 and one additional
have dedicated personnel for maintaining their control systems. In addition,
they all have a service agreement with their supplier for the control systems,
which includes assistance in case of failures, annual reviews of the systems, and
critical patches whenever necessary.
3.3 Privacy and conﬁdentiality issues
All interviews in Study 1 and 2 were voice recorded and transcribed. They
were registered at the Data Protection Oﬃcial for Research2. All respondents
signed a consent agreement, cf. Appendix II3. Most DSOs required that the
researcher who performed the interviews, signed a non-disclosure agreement.
2Personvernombudet for forskning, www.nsd.uib.no/personvern/en/index.html. Equivalent to the US
Institutional Review Board (IRB).
3The consent agreement is in Norwegian. An English translation of the text is included in this
appendix as well.
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4. Results
The research questions were explored through literature studies (P1-P4)
and three empirical studies (P5-P9). Knowledge acquired through all studies
are synthesized into key ﬁndings, as presented in the following, cf. Table 3.
The key ﬁndings concern practices in the electric power industry.
Table 3: A summary of key ﬁndings and how they relate to the research questions.
No RQ Key ﬁnding Paper
1 1 Detection mechanisms are insuﬃciently applied. P1, P3, P6, P7, P8
2 1 The absence of major incidents limits preparatory activities. P2, P6, P7, P8
3 1 Outsourcing reduces preparatory activities. P3, P6, P7, P9
4 1 The risk perception among small DSOs is lower than among
large DSOs.
P7
5 2 Training for information security incidents is not prioritized. P4, P5, P6, P7, P8,
P9
6 2 IT and control personnel understand information security
diﬀerently.
P1, P2, P6, P7
7 2 Post-incident evaluations are not performed. P3, P4, P5, P7, P9
8 2 Business managers have diﬀerent perspectives and priorities
than technical personnel.
P9
4.1 Factors aﬀecting incident management practices
Figure 4 illustrates the key ﬁndings regarding current incident management
practices and the relationships between these ﬁndings.
Key ﬁnding 1: Detection mechanisms are insuﬃciently applied.
Detection mechanisms currently in use by DSOs are not suﬃcient in light of
current threats. Information security incidents in general can be detected in a
number of ways, such as security monitoring mechanisms, employees, system
administrators, external notiﬁcations, and log reviews [P3]. Current tools
have their limitations regarding accuracy and usability [P3]. Further, ﬁrewalls
and detection systems are best suited for detecting known attacks [P8]. New
attacks that are speciﬁcally tailored and targeted, will not be detected by such
mechanisms. Human and organizational abilities such as understanding early
signs of incidents and being prepared for responding to unexpected incidents are
therefore of crucial importance, in addition to automatic detection mechanisms
[P1, P3, P8].
DSOs do not have suﬃcient mechanisms for monitoring and detecting in-
cidents on the inside of the control systems [P8]. Detection systems are not
widely implemented, and none of the DSOs have systematic approaches to
following-up on logs and alerts, due to a lack of resources. Human operators
are relied on for detection of irregularities. DSOs do have ﬁrewalls for detecting
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Figure 4: Key ﬁndings regarding current incident management practices (RQ1) and how the
ﬁndings aﬀect each other.
suspicious traﬃc into the control systems, but if an attacker is able to pass
this level of security, he could operate on the inside without being monitored
or detected. None of the DSOs have ever experienced any targeted attacks in
the control systems [P8], although one of the large DSOs has had a malware
infection in a part of the system controlling windmills [P6]. This infection
was detected by one operator, who got a virus alert on his computer, as the
malware spread through shared disks.
Unauthorized access to power switches was stated by all respondents to
be the worst possible scenario [P6, P7, P8], far more severe than unavailable
control systems. A DSO is able to operate the power grid without control
systems for quite some time, while unauthorized control of power switches
might lead to immediate power outages and safety risks for human operators
at the premises. Therefore, several interviewees mentioned shutting down the
control systems to be the prime countermeasure in case of an attack [P6, P7,
P8]. However, this requires that the attack is actually detected.
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Key ﬁnding 2: The absence of major incidents limits preparatory
activities.
Current trends show that targeted attacks are on the rise and that the
electric power industry is among the attractive targets [P8]. Power outages and
other types of damage to control systems caused by hackers have been observed
already [P2], but the Norwegian electric power industry has not been hit until
the Dragonﬂy attack happened in 2014 [12]. Study 1 and 2 were carried out
before this attack, and the level of preparedness and the priority assigned
to incident management planning and preparatory activities among DSOs
were limited at that point, particularly compared to the recommendations by
ISO/IEC 27035 [P6, P7]. Nevertheless, the general feedback from the DSOs
was that things go well: information security incidents do not disturb DSOs’
business operations, and based on their experiences, they did not feel the need
to realize major improvements in this area.
The DSOs have experienced few incidents so far. One malware infection in
one part of the control systems and a number of minor malware incidents in
administrative systems were reported in the interviews, but they have been
manageable [P6, P7]. Even though the respondents have a realistic view of
potential attackers and possible threats [P8], one of the large DSOs stated:
“As long as there has been no major attacks against the power industry in
Norway, we consider the probability of an attack to be low. As soon as something
happens, we will consider the probability to be increased.”
— Control manager in a large DSO
(before the Dragonﬂy attack)
The above statement indicates that systematic approaches to several
incident management activities will remain lacking as long as things go well.
An attack against one DSO aﬀects the level of awareness in other DSOs. The
Dragonﬂy attack has lead to preparedness exercises for information security
receiving higher priority and to improved understanding of threats and of the
importance of monitoring and analysis of incidents [P7, P8].
Key ﬁnding 3: Outsourcing reduces preparatory activities.
Outsourcing of IT services relieves an organization of several practical tasks,
which are more eﬃciently solved by large-scale professional suppliers. However,
a number of challenges related to incident management arise in outsourcing
scenarios: common plans and procedures [P6], deﬁning responsibilities
[P3], and collaborative exercises [P7]. DSOs that have outsourced their IT
services to an external supplier, put less eﬀort into establishing plans and
responsibilities than other DSOs [P6]. They assume that their suppliers have
plans and are well prepared for responding to any types of incidents. One IT
security manager in a large DSO expressed that he expected their IT supplier
to perform training. Further, DSOs are conﬁdent that collaboration with their
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IT supplier will be smooth and successful in case of an incident, even though
collaborative plans and exercises are rare [P7].
“This I have never asked for, to see the procedures for responding to an infor-
mation security incident. Maybe I should.”
— IT security manager in a large DSO
One small DSO reported that they have a collaborative plan with their
supplier, but they had never seen the need for collaborative exercises [P7]. One
large DSO had agreements with one supplier about assistance in emergency
situations, but had never included this supplier in exercises [P9], and most
DSOs did not know whether their supplier had plans for incident response, or
whether they performed exercises on their own. Even though there is a lack of
formally deﬁned responsibilities, none reported on having experienced any
problems due to this. The reason might be the absence of major incidents so
far. Whether the conﬁdence the DSOs have in their suppliers is well-founded
or not, is impossible to answer without investigating practices among suppliers.
Key ﬁnding 4: The risk perception among small DSOs is lower than
among large DSOs.
Small DSOs do not see themselves as attractive targets, they can operate
for a long time without their control systems, and they are conﬁdent in their
own and their IT supplier’s ability to respond to the worst case scenarios even
though preparedness exercises for information security are never performed
[P7]. Small DSOs believed that the large DSOs are more attractive targets than
themselves, as they considered areas where authorities, major organizations,
and a large number of residents are located to be of more interest for attackers
wanting to achieve a certain impact and/or attention [P7]. Preparedness
exercises based on information security incidents therefore received an even
lower priority in the small DSOs than in the large DSOs. The large DSOs were
more aware of their own position as possible targets for worst case scenarios.
The small DSOs were asked whether they served customers that could be
attractive targets for attacks, which they conﬁrmed. This was an issue that
they had previously not considered.
Small DSOs considered the consequences of attacks against their control
systems to be limited, as manual operation would be manageable for a long
time due to a low number of substations and good knowledge about their
grid and the geographical area they serve. One small DSO stated that
their control systems consisted of one server that was not connected to any
other computer networks, hence the attack surface was rather limited [P7].
Large DSOs claimed to be able to operate the electric power grid without
control systems as well, but not for as long as the small DSOs reported [P6, P7].
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“It is crucial to us as a small organization to have a professional, large, and
competent IT supplier on which we can rely on in such situations.”
— IT/IT security manager in a small DSO
Small DSOs relied on their supplier to have the necessary plans, procedures,
exercises, competence, equipment, and the ability to respond appropriately to
incidents. Large DSOs showed the same tendency, but to a much lesser degree,
and they had more IT and information security competence in-house. Besides,
they realized the need for better preparations based on current and emerging
threats and attacks happening to similar organizations around the world.
4.2 Challenges for improvement
Figure 5 illustrates the key ﬁndings regarding challenges for improving
incident management practices and the relationships between these ﬁndings.
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Figure 5: Key ﬁndings regarding challenges for improving incident management practices
(RQ2) and how the ﬁndings aﬀect each other.
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Key ﬁnding 5: Training for information security incidents is not
prioritized.
Plans for incident response have limited value if they are not rehearsed
[P4]. Training drills allow for testing of existing plans and procedures and
identiﬁcation of improvements of such. Further, generic skills for dealing with
expected and/or unexpected events are improved [P4], i.e. situated coordination
or improvisation [P9], and the group develops self-management and grows team
knowledge [P9].
Training for information security incidents is considered less important
than a number of other everyday tasks, even though tacit knowledge and
experience are more relied on than documented plans during an emergency
situation [P5, P6, P7]. Training involves a certain cost, time, and workload,
which are perceived as hindrances. Besides, protecting the physical grid and
the production process from ﬁre and other physical damages is viewed as
more important than protecting the IT systems, as stated by an IT manager
in a small DSO [P7]. Finally, real incidents rarely occur, which adds to the
perception of training not being necessary, even though information security
policies require regular tests of emergency preparedness plans, including
IT/infrastructure issues [P6].
“There are too many other tasks, so we haven’t had the time for it. Maybe
that’s wrong, not to prioritize it.”
— Control system manager in a large DSO
Some of the large DSOs were working on documenting their plans for
incident response when Study 1 was carried out. They found it diﬃcult to run
preparedness exercises without having written plans as a baseline [P5, P6]. In
two of the three large DSOs from Study 3, existing documentation of plans
and procedures was not made available during the exercise. Although some
participants commented on this afterwards and wanted to have documentation
available in the next exercise, situated coordination is more important than
documentation during an incident response process [P9]. A certain baseline of
written documentation should be in place, but the ability to adapt to situations
and improvise could be trained for without this documentation being complete
[P4]. An IT security manager in a large DSO said that they lack practice and
established procedures in order to be well prepared for responding to the worst
case scenario. He still felt conﬁdent that they would be able to improvise [P6].
Minor incidents occur regularly in the administrative systems, which ensures
some training and to a certain degree keeps personnel alert. One IT security
manager in a large DSO stated that “fumbling and hubbub” constituted the
most useful training [P6]. There are however few incidents in the control
systems, which implies that control staﬀ does not receive this practical training
through everyday work. Four out of the six control room managers in large
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DSOs felt that training eﬀorts are not satisfactory [P6, P7, P8].
“The personnel operating the control systems would beneﬁt from training on
scenarios like ‘what do we do if the control systems break down?’”
— Control system manager in a large DSO
Key ﬁnding 6: IT and control personnel understand information
security diﬀerently.
Control systems and IT systems have traditionally been operated separately,
in both the electric power industry and similar industries. They have served
diﬀerent purposes and therefore, they have been the subjects of diﬀerent security
objectives [P2]. Further, while IT systems for a long time already have been
exposed to typical Internet threats such as malware infections and deliberate
hacker attacks, control systems have been operated in closed networks without
these kinds of threats [P2]. A common understanding of all networked systems,
threats they are exposed to, and potential consequences of incidents, is needed
in the future (if not already) where IT and control systems are interconnected
and dependent on each other [P1, P2].
There is a gap in knowledge and understanding of information security
between IT and control personnel. IT and IT security managers responded
quite uniformly when asked to deﬁne an information security incident and
provide examples of such [P6]. The control room managers, on the other
hand, were not able to provide a clear deﬁnition, although they did mention
relevant examples. Both types of personnel anticipated similar worst case
scenarios [P6], but control room personnel’s ability to recognize an incident is
questionable, based on their understanding, experience, and lack of suﬃcient
technical mechanisms for such [P8]. Further, compared to IT personnel, control
room personnel has quite limited experiences in responding to information
security incidents [P6, P7].
One of the ﬁrst questions asked to all interviewees concerned their
organization’s dependency on IT. Control room managers understood this
primarily as a matter of availability and reﬂected upon their ability to operate
the power grid without the control systems functioning. The properties of
integrity and conﬁdentiality were not mentioned in relation to the control
systems [P6]. IT and IT security managers considered all three properties for
the administrative systems: availability for invoicing systems in order to ensure
cash ﬂow, integrity for backups, and conﬁdentiality for customer databases [P6].
“The greatest challenge is that they don’t understand how IT intensive their
new world will be.”
— IT manager in a large DSO
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Key ﬁnding 7: Post-incident evaluations are not performed.
Learning improves the ability to anticipate future trends and events by
producing relevant understandings of what can happen in the future [P4]. Mo-
tivations for learning activities include keeping security practitioners updated
on current threats, getting new ideas on how to resolve challenging incidents,
discussing possible improvements of incident response activities, performing
trend analysis, identifying direct causes, identifying new security measures
needed, and updating risk assessments [P3]. Learning from incidents should
include systematic analysis, use of lessons learnt to make changes, and storing
and sharing information [P4].
Even though all respondents stated a need for thorough evaluations, such
evaluations of both preparedness exercises and real incidents are given low
priority by DSOs [P7]. Several DSOs said that they perform evaluations after
other types of incidents and believed they would do this after information
security incidents as well [P7]. As they have not experienced major information
security incidents, this assumption remains to be conﬁrmed. However, none
of the DSOs reported on using near misses and minor mishaps for learning
[P5], as Hollnagel stated as being just as important as learning from failures [34].
“We are not good in post-evaluating real incidents and consider them as training
exercises, we are too solution-oriented.”
— Corporate IT manager in a large DSO
The practices for registration of information security incidents varied, al-
though all DSOs reported to have some kind of reporting of exceptions and
mishaps [P7]. However, none reported to have a systematic approach to infor-
mation security metrics [P5, P7]. Reports and registration could form a useful
basis for evaluations, particularly in the absence of major incidents to learn
from.
Collaborative exercises make employees realize needs for improvements [P9].
An understanding of why the existing lacks have emerged, was however not
aimed for [P9]. Study 3 showed that evaluation was given higher priority and
more time was assigned to this because we requested and facilitated it. In two
of the DSOs the participants put more eﬀort into contributing than they would
usually do in internal evaluations, according to the internal facilitators [P9]. In
the third DSO we ran out of time for a thorough evaluation, which was therefore
replaced by a short around-the-table discussion. The internal facilitators carried
out a short written survey as well, asking the participants about their opinions
after the exercise. The questions did not concern improvements to practices
or documentation, only the exercise itself. The results from the evaluation
could have been richer and more useful if more time was used for a thorough
evaluation, as we experienced in the two other DSOs.
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Key ﬁnding 8: Business managers have diﬀerent perspectives and
priorities than technical personnel.
Information security involves more than IT personnel, as an incident might
have severe consequences for both the organization, its customers, and society
at large. In an emergency situation, the goal from a business perspective is
usually to maintain normal operations as continuously as possible. However,
there are diﬀerent strategies that may be used for this: to resolve the incident
with as little disturbances to the operations as possible, to understand why the
incident occurred, or to make sure that the incident will not reoccur. These
diﬀerent strategies require slightly diﬀerent approaches and priorities, and it is
therefore important that the incident responders have a common understanding
of the overall preferred strategy [P9].
One of the large DSOs we observed included their Emergency Management
Team in the exercise [P9], a team consisting of business managers. Their
participation revealed the diﬀerence in priorities between business managers
and technical personnel. IT personnel wanted to shut down the control systems
quite early in the exercise due to their fear of malware infections, while the
Emergency Management Team decided to let the systems run due to the high
costs of manual operations. They compared these costs to the consequences of
an uncontrolled breakdown.
Diﬀerent perspectives and priorities emphasize the need for collaborative
exercises that include all personnel that will be involved in a real incident: IT,
IT security, control room, networks/infrastructure, business representatives,
suppliers. A holistic view needs to be ensured in order to resemble a real
emergency situation [P9]. Members of management groups tend to have little
time for exercises. Therefore, exercises should be performed frequently, so that
all personnel receive regular training. The time spent on each exercise could
be limited to make it easier for key personnel to make time for it in a busy
schedule [P9]. Such a time limitation makes the exercise more realistic as
well, as real incident response processes require quick decisions to be made [P9].
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5. Discussion
Key ﬁndings were presented in the previous chapter and are now discussed
in light of the research questions. Then, implications for both research and
practice are stated before limitations are described.
5.1 RQ 1: Which factors aﬀect information security incident
management practices?
Incident management practices are aﬀected by the level of risk perception,
organizational structure, and the amount of available ﬁnancial and human
resources. Figure 6 shows how the ﬁndings presented in the previous chapter
relate to these factors. Detection mechanisms currently in use are not suﬃcient
in light of current threats. Organizations are therefore not able to monitor
malicious activities in all their systems, and they lack resources to following-
up on logs and alerts. As long as no major incidents are experienced, the
perceived risk will most likely not increase signiﬁcantly, and following, detection
mechanisms might not be improved. The risk perception is further aﬀected
by the size of the organization and whether IT operations are outsourced.
Outsourcing of IT services limits the eﬀorts put into planning and preparatory
activities due to a strong conﬁdence in suppliers. Finally, small organizations
have a lower risk perception than large ones. They do not perceive themselves
as being attractive targets for attacks, and they are able to maintain continuous
operations even without all systems functioning.
5.1.1 Risk perception
The level of perceived risk among DSOs does not capture the full set of
actual risks. Thus, a low priority is assigned to information security activities,
including preparations for incident management. Risk perception results
from psychological, social, and cultural factors [60], and individuals therefore
perceive risk diﬀerently based on their personal characteristics, experiences,
and knowledge. Both technical/formal risk assessments and personal risk
assessments, combined with perceptual factors such as fear will inﬂuence an
individual’s risk perception [61]. As individual risk perceptions aﬀect risk
behavior, they might also inﬂuence the risk perception in an organization [62].
The consequences of a power outage attack should be considered beyond
the eﬀects for one single DSO. It is reasonable to believe that attackers would
look for larger areas where major organizations within ﬁnance, energy, media,
and public authorities operate, in order for an attack to have a certain impact
and/or receive a certain amount of attention. However, cornerstone enterprises
and several military installations are located in smaller towns where the power
grid is operated by a small DSO. A small DSO may not be the target in itself,
but it might serve customers that are attractive targets for attacks, an issue
previously not considered by the small DSOs in our study. Besides, one small
DSO might not be attractive alone, but striking several small DSOs at the
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Figure 6: Key ﬁndings for RQ 1 relate to the following factors: organizational structure, risk
perception, and resources.
same time might be easier than attacking one large DSO, particularly as a
number of small DSOs have outsourced to a few suppliers, hence relying on
common technologies with common vulnerabilities. Attackers who would want
to harm the country as a whole, might consider striking several small DSOs,
possibly by attacking their supplier, as a strategy.
An attack might have other consequences than power outages. Industrial
espionage is a possible motivation for attacks against the power industry,
with the goal of obtaining access to conﬁdential corporate information. It
is reasonable to assume that striking larger organizations would be more
rewarding, as their contracts typically involve more money. A third main
motivation for attacks these days is collection of personal information [63]. The
probability of such a compromise depends on the level of protection of data
and ease of accomplishment rather than the size of the organization.
There is a large diﬀerence between unavailable control systems and minor,
undetected errors in the information provided by the control systems. The
degree to which a DSO claims to be dependent on the control systems was
apparently determined by the DSO’s ability to maintain continuous power
supply to their customers without the control systems. Availability was
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the only concern when we asked about their dependency on ICT. None
of the interviewees mentioned breaches of integrity or conﬁdentiality. We
believe that an integrity breach in the control systems could potentially have
severe consequences, as erroneous information could make operators perform
unfortunate actions and cause overload in the grid, possibly with physical
damages and human injuries as a result. Such minor errors can be invisible to
the human eye and only be detected by automatic monitoring systems, which
are not yet widely used for control systems, at least not among small DSOs.
“Only amateurs attack machines; professionals target people.”
— Bruce Schneier4
One explanation for a low risk perception is the low number of incidents
detected. Limited resources to following-up on logs and alerts further add up
to the impression that everything is going well. The probability of a major
incident striking tomorrow is however completely independent from past history
of incidents. Besides, the fact that a low number of incidents are detected does
not mean that attacks are not happening. There might be malicious activity
inside the networks that is not being detected due to insuﬃcient detection
mechanisms. DSOs should learn from incidents experienced by electric power
organizations in other countries and expect similar incidents to strike themselves
at any time.
We found that outsourcing reduces an organization’s risk perception, as
they have a high conﬁdence in their supplier. The existence of plans or having
a response team in place seems to have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the feeling of
preparedness according to Witchalls and Chambers [64]. Whether plans for
incident response exist or not at the supplier’s side has not been investigated.
It is thus the DSO’s conﬁdence that determines their risk perception rather
than the actual existence of plans.
5.1.2 Organizational structure
Outsourcing of IT services reduces internal eﬀorts in preparatory activities.
Further, small organizations put less eﬀorts into such activities than large ones,
while at the same time a small organization is more transparent than a large
one, which can be advantageous during an emergency situation.
Information sharing is easier in small organizations than in large ones. In
small organizations, key personnel have co-located oﬃces, which simpliﬁes
communication and collaboration. During a crisis it is important to have an
overview, understand relations between pieces of information, and make the
right decisions, which is easier in small organizations as personnel, particularly
4http://www.schneier.com
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administrative personnel, tend to have more than one role. In one of the small
DSOs in our study, one person had the following three roles: IT manager, IT
security manager, and ﬁnancial manager. This leads to a handful of employees
having insight into several areas and a more complete overview than employees
in larger organizations. Sharing, rather than ﬁnding, information was stated
as challenging by Ahmad et al. [21], but our ﬁndings indicate that this is
more prominent in large organizations than in small ones. Large organizations
are more likely to suﬀer from organizational dividing lines, a lack of dynamic
collaborations across these lines, and unclear responsibilities in some areas,
which supports Hollnagel’s claim that large high-complexity organizations with
centralized management structures have challenges with anticipating threats
and foreseeing consequences [2].
Despite the advantages of individuals having more than one role, some
limitations follow as well. There might not be enough time for one person in
a small organization to fulﬁll all his assigned roles satisfactorily. Some tasks
may hence be given low priorities due to other, more pressing tasks. As small
organizations perceive information security risks as being moderately low, tasks
regarding information security are given low priority, such as documenting
incident management procedures, performing preparedness exercises, stating
requirements to suppliers on procedures and training, and regular follow-up
meetings with suppliers.
We found that outsourcing of IT services makes both small and large
organizations put limited eﬀorts into incident management activities. They
are conﬁdent in their suppliers being well prepared and capable of responding
appropriately to information security incidents. Outsourcing of services seems
to result in outsourcing of responsibilities as well. One small DSO justiﬁed
their conﬁdence in their supplier by the fact that their supplier served several
similar organizations. Even though outsourcing relieves an organization of
several practical tasks, the organization still needs to be knowledgable about
threats to be able to formulate appropriate requirements to their supplier.
A small organization is however just one out of several customers for the IT
supplier, and they therefore feel that they are not in the position of making
demands.
As we have not investigated practices among the suppliers, we cannot state
that the suppliers do not have plans and procedures in place and that they
do not perform exercises. What we found, was however that DSOs were not
concerned about this matter and in many cases had not even asked the suppliers
to see existing documentation. It was just assumed to be in place, or DSOs
had not thought of asking for it. Such an ignorance is a way of not taking
the responsibility for own business operations. As long as no customers state
clear requirements related to incident management procedures and exercises,
the supplier will most likely not improve in this area. One explanation is that
suppliers are constantly driven by revenue and will not provide services that
39
will not pay oﬀ. It is thus important to remember that outsourcing does not
relieve the customer of their responsibilities.
5.1.3 Resources
The amount of resources available aﬀects the eﬀorts put into preparatory
activities for incident management and the abilities of following-up on logs
and alerts from detection systems. Outsourcing of services is used as a means
to ensure necessary competence, but as discussed in the previous section,
the outsourcing organization is still responsible for stating appropriate and
suﬃcient requirements.
Documenting the proﬁt of information security investments is a challenge, as
a success criteria of investments is the absence of incidents. Well functioning
security mechanisms will then be visible in the budgets as an expense, and the
absence of incidents will not be visible [65]. It is far more evident when security
mechanisms fail or are insuﬃcient, so that incidents have impact. Even then,
documenting the cost of an incident is diﬃcult. Besides, the current low risk
perception limits investments in detection mechanisms and other information
security measures.
Small organizations are regulated by the same directives as the large ones, but
they do not the same amount of ﬁnancial resources and personnel. According
to one of the small DSOs in our study, collaborations with other small DSOs
are valuable. Small organizations would greatly beneﬁt from Communities
of Practice (CoP) [66], which are informal groups of shared expertise where
knowledge and experience can be exchanged. Such a CoP is not established
by management; the members are self-selected and the group sets their own
agenda and establishes their own leadership. Management can only encourage
the establishment of CoPs and provide supporting infrastructure. A CoP for
information security incident response would be a means of sharing knowledge
and experiences across a number of organizations and thus compensate for the
lack of extensive capabilities in-house.
5.2 RQ 2: What are the challenges for improvement of
practices?
Diﬀerent types of personnel, such as business managers and technical per-
sonnel, have diﬀerent perspectives and priorities when it comes to information
security. Besides, there is a gap between how IT staﬀ and control system staﬀ
understand information security. To create good incident response teams there
is a need for cooperation of individuals drawn from various functional areas, i.e.
the team needs to be cross-functional [67]. At the same time, divergent interests
and points of view are inevitable when individuals from multiple functional
areas work together in a team due to their diﬀering orientations towards goals,
interpersonal relations, and key external constituents [67]. Furthermore, an
incident response team needs to be self-managing. In a self-managing team
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Figure 7: Key ﬁndings for RQ 2 sum up to the need for creating cross-functional teams and
learning to learn, which are challenges for improving incident management practices.
members have the responsibility not only to execute the task, but also to
monitor, manage, and improve their own performance [46]. They need to
learn how to improve their activities. However, training for responding to
information security incidents is currently given low priority and evaluations
after training sessions and minor incidents are not performed. Learning to
learn would make organizations able to take advantage of training sessions and
evaluations and thereby improve their incident response practices. Figure 7
shows how the ﬁndings for RQ 2 relate to the need for creating cross-functional
teams and learning to learn. These are challenges for improving information
security incident management practices, as discussed in the following.
5.2.1 Creating cross-functional teams
Incident response is a highly collaborative activity [24] and requires cooper-
ation of individuals drawn from various functional areas, with diﬀerent per-
spectives, to make the best possible decisions. To create good cross-functional
response teams, it is important to acknowledge that the team members might
have conﬂicting goals. Diﬀerent functional areas within an organization should
possess complementary goals that are derived from a set of general, organization-
wide goals. Consequently, in order for one functional area to achieve its goals,
another functional area may be required to sacriﬁce, or at least compromise,
its primary goals. Therefore, the cross-functional teams need superordinate
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goals. Superordinate goals will have a positive and signiﬁcant direct eﬀect
on cross-functional cooperation [67]. The team further needs to be able to
update its initial superordinate goals if the initial conditions change during
the incident response process, as stated by Bergstro¨m et al. [34].
The diﬀerence in understanding of information security goals that we found
between IT staﬀ and control staﬀ is in agreement with Jaatun et al. [26], who
studied incident response practices in the oil and gas industry. However, we
did not identify any signs of mistrust between IT staﬀ and control staﬀ, as they
found. Rather than feeling mistrust, both IT staﬀ and control staﬀ admitted
the need for exchanging information and learning from each other to become
better at both detecting and responding to incidents.
Not only does the cross-functional team need participants from various
functional areas within the organization, it also needs participation from,
or communication with, suppliers. The DSOs assumed collaboration with
suppliers to be well functioning, but acknowledged that this should be given
more attention, as common plans were rare and collaborative exercises were
not performed. Collaboration on information security incident response tends
to be challenging in outsourcing scenarios [39].
If a DSO is not able to establish a cross-functional team, the group will
be training for solving the task without having the necessary competence
available. One challenge of establishing cross-functional teams for exercises is
that handling incidents is creative work. Therefore, it might be challenging to
identify everyone that should be present in the training up front. In addition
to a cross-functional team having the right competence, the team members
need a shared understanding of who knows what is needed to solve a task,
such as a crisis, eﬀectively [44]. Exercises provide a means for growing shared
understanding of the team knowledge.
One challenge of having a good cross-functional team for handling incidents
is that you do not always know who is available and who should be part of the
team. Thus, for training an organization needs to set up diﬀerent conﬁgurations
of this cross-functional team, depending on the training scenario. Frequent
training is important because these teams exist only when an incident occurs.
5.2.2 Learning to learn
Learning from previous incidents, as well as preparedness exercises, is im-
portant for improving own practices for responding to incidents. Scholl and
Mangold [22] claimed that attending to small security events and early warn-
ings can prevent major security disasters. The organization needs to establish
an incident learning system, which was described by Cooke [68] as “the col-
lection of organizational capabilities that enable the organization to extract
useful information from incidents of all kinds and to use this information to
improve organizational performance over time”. Key enablers for learning from
incidents are the extent of management commitment and the willingness to
commit resources to facilitate learning. For management to be committed to
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Figure 8: Risk matrix (slightly revised from Hollnagel [2]).
learning, they need to have a realistic perception of actual threats and possible
consequences. In our research we found that training for incident response
and post-incident evaluations were not prioritized. One explanation is that
the risk perception among the organizations in our study was found to be
lower than it should be from the level of current threats. This is in agreement
with the research of Rhee et al. [69], who showed that management tends
to be optimistically biased in that they underestimate their organization’s
vulnerability and overestimate their ability to control the security threats.
A lack of post-incident evaluations could further be explained by the lack of
major incidents, as organizations tend to not bother learning from low-impact
incidents [21]. A problem with focusing on learning from high-impact incidents
only, is that they make up just a small portion of the total number of incidents,
c.f. Figure 8. There is a large number of incidents that do not have unfortunate
outcomes, but still could be used as learning material [2, 22, 70]. Systematic
registration of such would provide a certain basis for evaluation and learning.
False alarms should also be included in the learning process to improve incident
detection accuracy. Thus, as the organizations in our study claimed not to
experience major incidents, they should look more into minor incidents that
occur.
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In general, there are two main obstacles to organizational learning: embar-
rassing and threatening issues [71]. Information security incidents may be
embarrassing, such as malware infections caused by unauthorized or unintended
use of IT systems, and threatening in the sense that the incidents are considered
to be conﬁdential. Hiding embarrassing issues or ignoring threatening issues
can be viewed as impression management, which Morgan [72] describes as
giving the impression of being better than one actually is. These characteristics
create individual and organizational behavior that is counterproductive when
it comes to learning from unwanted incidents.
Study 3 conﬁrmed the importance of training, as it showed how training
enabled participants to link events occurring some time apart and to improve
the information ﬂow related to IT and IT security operations between diﬀerent
parts of the organization. There are several strategies for performing and
learning from preparedness exercises.
“The ability to deal with a crisis situation is largely dependent on the structures
that have been developed before chaos arrives. The event can in some ways be
considered as an abrupt and brutal audit: at a moment‘s notice, everything
that was left unprepared becomes a complex problem, and every weakness comes
rushing to the forefront.”
— Pat Lagadec [73]
When incidents become increasingly complex and ill-structured, the need for
learning increases, but so does the diﬃculty in carrying out eﬀective learning
as well [74]. The organization needs to learn how to carry out single- and
double-loop learning [75]. Single-loop learning is to change practice as problems
arise in order to avoid the same problem in the future, i.e. learning how to
handle one speciﬁc incident. Double-loop learning is about using the problems
being experienced to understand their underlying causes and then to take
some action to remedy these causes. One example is to understand whatever
caused the incident to happen. To learn to single-loop learn implies learning
to improve performance at an increasing rate: Are we doing things right when
solving the incident? To learn to double-loop learn implies learning to carry out
the reﬂection on and inquiry into the governing variables, values, and norms
underlying organizational action: Are we doing the right things when solving
the incident? According to Ahmad et al. [21], post-incident evaluations, when
performed, tend to adopt a technical focus rather than a strategic focus, which
indicates single-loop learning. A structured accident analysis methodology
can help identify the immediate and underlying causes, e.g., as described by
Kjelle´n [70], and should cover both organizational and technical issues, and
human factors.
A facilitator can promote team eﬀectiveness by helping team members learn
how to work interdependently in the speciﬁc team. The role of the facilitator
is not to dictate to group members the one best way to proceed with their
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collaborative work; it is about helping members learn how to minimize process
loss that happens in groups and how to consider how they might work together
to generate synergistic process gains. The facilitators in our study had the tasks
of leading their teams through the diﬀerent steps of the exercise and making
sure that the discussions were going well. They were also writing down ideas
for future improvements with respect to both procedures or technical measures.
The role of the facilitators appears immature compared to the description by
Hackman et al. [76], which states that a facilitator can help the members in:
1. Minimizing problems with coordination and motivation, and help them
build commitment to the group and its task and goal,
2. Avoiding inappropriate weighting of diﬀerent individuals’ ideas and con-
tributions, and help them learn how to share their experience to build
the group’s repertoire of skills, and
3. Avoiding failures in implementing their performance plans, and help
them develop creative new ways of proceeding with the work.
There are three times during the team’s lifetime when such coaching is
eﬀective:
1. At the beginning, when the group has just started to work and they are
more open to interventions that will help them perform well, which is
the stadium where the teams in Study 3 currently are at,
2. After they have gained some experience, as they will be open to inter-
ventions that help them reﬂect on the performance strategies, and
3. At the end, learning from their experience.
5.3 Limitations
Construct validity. The interviewees’ conscious or unconscious desire to
make their organization and themselves look good from the outside could cause a
certain bias, particularly as the topic of the interviews was information security,
which tends to concern business conﬁdential information. Our impression is
that the interviewees were being honest as several of the interviewees reported
weaknesses and lacks in a number of areas rather than a perfect situation.
Some even expressed their gratitude to us for performing these studies, as it
gave them an opportunity to discuss these issues internally. Being able to refer
to external, independent researchers, strengthened their message.
Time and resource constraints put a limitation on the number and selection
of interviewees. We have interviewed personnel from middle management.
Managers might provide information on how things ideally should be done, not
just on how things actually are being done. Technical personnel, who performs
a large part of the daily tasks concerning incident management, could have
provided a slightly diﬀerent perspective, and perhaps with more details, at
least on some of the questions. Further, suppliers have not been included in
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our studies. Their attitudes, awareness, and level of preparedness play an
important role in incident response.
We could have studied one or two organizations in depth and interviewed
more employees from each organization, including representatives from
suppliers. However, we wanted to investigate current practices in the
industry by studying a larger number of organizations of diﬀerent sizes and
characteristics.
Data triangulation. Interviews and documentation were intended to provide
two diﬀerent views on incident management, as the interviewees would describe
their practice as they know it, while documentation could show the planned
procedures. The documentation received was however sparse on information
about incident response. Some deﬁnitions and procedures were described, but
the interviews constituted the major part of the data material in our study
(Study 1: Current practice). Besides, conﬁdentiality issues prevented three
DSOs from sharing documentation, and non-disclosure agreements and en-
crypted electronic transfer were not suﬃcient instruments for overcoming these
issues. As information security researchers we should appreciate such caution
regarding sharing of conﬁdential documents, although it poses limitations to the
data triangulation. Kotulic et al. [77] pointed out this challenge of obtaining
sensitive data as limiting to research on information security management in
general and recommended focusing on a few selected companies. This opens
for building trust between the company and the researcher, which will ease
collection of sensitive data. Besides, the companies in focus can be more
involved in discussing and approving the results.
All interviewees in Study 1 and 2 and the facilitators of the exercises
in Study 3 were provided with a draft of the reports, and hence given the
opportunity to comment on the results. As one researcher did most of the
analysis in all three studies, this member checking for reducing researcher bias
was important.
External validity. Our studies are restricted to DSOs in the electric power
industry in Norway, and both the DSOs and the participating interviewees
were thoroughly described in the papers P5-P9. A brief presentation was
provided in Chapter 3 as well.
5.4 Implications for practice and research
The results from this case study lead to a number of recommendations for
practice and suggest directions from future research. The following recommen-
dations for practice are proposed:
Continuous evaluation of risks: Organizations need to develop and im-
prove their knowledge and understanding of current threats and potential
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consequences. Internal discussions between personnel from diﬀerent
functional areas is one means in this process, in addition to close com-
munication with suppliers and the use of experience reports and threat
reports from external parties. Continuously updated risk assessments
form the basis for balancing the eﬀorts put into information security
activities with the organization’s acceptable level of risk.
Preparedness exercises: More scenarios for preparedness exercises should
be developed. The newly established KraftCERT in Norway; a dedicated
incident response team for the electric power industry; the authorities, and
individual organizations are possible creators of such scenarios. Further,
organizations need to create cross-functional and self-managed teams for
incident response and perform exercises frequently in order to ensure
that all possible members of such a team receive training.
Learning to learn: A change of focus is needed, from learning from high-
impact incidents only, which rarely occur, to improved evaluations of
preparedness exercises and attention to minor incidents and near misses.
More openness is needed to overcome the challenges of embarrassing
and threatening issues. Double-loop learning rather than single-loop
learning has to be aimed for, as it makes the organization understand the
underlying causes of problems and initiate actions to solve them, hence
ensuring a long-lasting improvement.
Communities of practice: We would encourage representatives from both
small and large organizations to create communities of practice for infor-
mation security, and for incident response in particular. KraftCERT and
similar establishments in other industries have a potential of triggering
such communities of practice, although both the creation and operation
have to carried out by self-selected members. Sharing of knowledge and
experience is valuable, particularly for small organizations with limited
in-house resources.
Technical security mechanisms: Detection and monitoring mechanisms
for industrial control systems need to be improved to match the level of
current and emerging threats. Technical improvements alone are however
not beneﬁcial without the strengthening of capabilities of following-up
on logs and alerts as well, which requires both human capacities and
automated tools. Improved detection capabilities would give a more
correct impression of what is going on in the technical systems and
increase the probability of detecting attacks.
There is a need for longitudinal studies in individual organizations in order to
investigate actual incident management practices in more depth. This project
was based on interviews and preparedness exercises in several organizations
and gave insight into general practices. Direct observations of how personnel
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from diﬀerent functional areas cooperate in practice and how they respond to
minor incidents and near misses, would increase the understanding of both
factors that aﬀect current practices and challenges for improvement.
Further, there is a need for investigating in more detail how communication
and collaboration related to incident response are performed with third parties,
such as suppliers and authorities. They were not studied in particular in
this project, but they are part of the cross-functional teams responding to
information security incidents.
Finally, more empirical studies on preparedness exercises and organizational
learning should be carried out. It should be investigated how general prepared-
ness exercises are performed and how they could be adapted for information
security training. Besides, it should be investigated how the facilitator’s role
could be strengthened in order to increase the beneﬁt of the exercise. A better
understanding is needed of how to utilize minor incidents and near misses as
basis for learning.
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6. Concluding remarks
The main objective of this project was to explore information security
incident management practices in electric power companies and understand
challenges for improvements. Factors that aﬀect current practices have been
identiﬁed and discussed, along with challenges for improving practices. Impli-
cations of the results for both research and practice have been proposed.
We found that incident management practices in an organization are aﬀected
by the level of risk perception, organizational structure, and the amount of
available ﬁnancial and human resources. Currently implemented detection
mechanisms are not suﬃcient in light of current threats, thus organizations are
not able to monitor malicious activities in all their systems. Besides, they lack
resources for following-up on logs and alerts. As long as no major incidents
are experienced, the perceived risk will most likely stay unchanged, and orga-
nizations will not see the need for improving their detection mechanisms. The
risk perception is further aﬀected by the size of the organization and whether
IT operations are outsourced. Outsourcing of IT services limits the eﬀorts put
into planning and preparatory activities due to a strong conﬁdence in suppliers.
Finally, small organizations have a lower risk perception than large ones due
to their feeling of not being attractive targets for attacks and their ability to
maintain continuous operations even without all systems functioning.
Challenges for improving information security incident management prac-
tices concern creation of cross-functional teams and learning to learn. Good
incident response teams are cross-functional and self-managing: they include
individuals drawn from various functional areas and the members monitor,
manage, and improve their own performance in addition to executing a given
task. Organizations need to learn how to carry out double-loop learning in or-
der to take advantage of training sessions and evaluations and thereby improve
their incident response practices.
This thesis has demonstrated application of organizational theory to in-
formation security incident management. Adaptive management strategies,
cross-functional teams and learning to learn have been discussed in particular.
More organizational research on information security issues should be carried
out in order to increase the understanding and enable improved practices.
Well functioning incident response capabilities are an important part of the
overall information security management system in an organization. Creation
of cross-functional and self-managed teams, combined with the ability to learn,
will ensure eﬀective and eﬃcient incident response in a world where information
security threats are ever-changing and it is impossible to prevent all possible
incidents.
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Letter of consent (in Norwegian)
Forespørsel om deltakelse i intervjustudie: 
Håndtering av IKT-sikkerhetsbrudd i kraftbransjen 
Vi ønsker med dette skrivet å invitere til deltakelse i studien "Håndtering av IKT-sikkerhetsbrudd i 
kraftbransjen". Studien gjennomføres i regi av det treårige forskningsprosjektet Demonstrasjon og 
verifikasjon av intelligente distribusjonsnett – DeVID, som støttes av Norges forskningsråd. NTE er 
prosjektleder, og SINTEF deltar sammen med sentrale aktører i kraftbransjen. Resultatene fra studien 
vil også bli brukt inn mot et doktorgradsarbeid ved NTNU om håndtering av IKT-sikkerhetsbrudd i 
SmartGrids. 
Vi skal kartlegge hvordan IKT-sikkerhetsbrudd blir håndtert i kraftbransjen, spesielt med sikte på 
innføringen av Smart Grids. Målet er å kartlegge dagens praksis i bransjen, og identifisere mulige 
endringer/forbedringer i forhold til behovet som kommer med Smart Grids. For å få til dette, ønsker vi 
å intervjue et utvalg personer som arbeider med IT-systemer, IT-sikkerhet og styringssystemer i ulike 
nettselskap i Norge. 
Vi vil gjennomføre intervjuene ansikt-til-ansikt. Vi vil bruke lydopptaker og ta notater under 
intervjuet. Hvert intervju vil ta omtrent en time. Intervjuene gjennomføres i full fortrolighet. Alle 
opptak og notater fra intervjuene oppbevares og behandles konfidensielt hos SINTEF. Forskerne er 
underlagt taushetsplikt. 
Følgende personell vil gjennomføre intervjuene og bearbeide datamaterialet: 
o Maria B. Line, forsker/stipendiat, SINTEF/NTNU 
o Martin G. Jaatun, seniorforsker, SINTEF 
o Inger Anne Tøndel, forsker, SINTEF 
Resultatene fra studien skal publiseres gjennom vitenskapelige artikler. Ingen enkeltpersoner eller 
enkeltvirksomheter vil kunne identifiseres i publikasjoner. Ved prosjektets slutt, 31.12.2014, vil alle 
lydopptak bli slettet og øvrig datamateriale fra intervjustudien bli anonymisert og oppbevart hos 
SINTEF. Anonymisering innebærer at direkte personidentifiserende opplysninger slettes, og at 
indirekte personidentifiserende opplysninger fjernes eller endres. 
Studien er meldt til Personvernombudet for forskning, Norsk samfunnsvitenskapelig datatjeneste AS. 
Deltakelse i studien er frivillig, og du kan trekke deg som deltaker så lenge studien pågår uten å 
begrunne dette nærmere. 
Ta kontakt dersom du har ytterligere spørsmål. Vi håper du ønsker å delta i studien og bidra til å 
frambringe ny kunnskap om håndtering av IKT-sikkerhetsbrudd. 
Med vennlig hilsen, 
Maria B. Line 
maria.b.line@sintef.no 
Tlf. 452 18 102 
Jeg samtykker herved i å delta i intervjustudien Håndtering av IKT-sikkerhetsbrudd i kraftbransjen. 
Dato/sted:   Navn:    Signatur: 
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Letter of consent (translated from Norwegian)
Request for participation in interview study:
Information security incident management
in the electric power industry
We hereby invite you for participation in the study ”Information security
incident management in the electric power industry.” The study is conducted
as part of the DeVID research project – Demonstration and Veriﬁcation of
Intelligent Distribution Grids – supported by the Norwegian Research Council.
NTE is leading the project and SINTEF is participating together with a number
of important stakeholders in the electric power industry. The results from the
study will also be used in a PhD project at NTNU on information security
incident management in smart grids.
We are going to survey how IT security incidents are responded to in
the electric power industry, particularly in light of the implementation of
smart grids. The goal is to assess current practice and identify required
changes/improvements. We therefore want to interview a number of employees
working with IT systems, IT security, and industrial control systems in diﬀerent
distribution system operators (DSOs) in Norway.
The interviews will be carried out face-to-face. A voice recorder will be
used and we will make notes during the interview. Each interview will last for
approximately one hour. All recordings and notes from the interviews will be
stored and processed at SINTEF, according to conﬁdentiality requirements.
The researchers will respect the professional privacy of the information given.
The following personnel will be conducting the interviews and will analyze
the data material:
Maria B. Line, Research scientist/PhD student, SINTEF/NTNU
Martin G. Jaatun, Senior research scientist, SINTEF
Inger Anne Tødel, Research scientist, SINTEF
The results from the study will be published in scientiﬁc papers. No indi-
viduals or single organizations will be identiﬁable in the publications. By the
end of the project, 31 Dec. 2014, all recordings will be deleted and other data
material from the interview study will be anonymized and stored at SINTEF.
Anonymization implies that directly-identiﬁable information is deleted, and
indirectly-identiﬁable information is removed or altered.
The study is registered with the Data Protection Oﬃcial for Research.
Participation in the study is voluntary and you may withdraw as a participant
at any time without providing a reason.
Please contact us if you have any questions. We hope that you will want to
participate in the study and contribute to a better understanding of information
security incident management.
To be signed: I hereby consent to participate in the study Information
security incident management in the electric power industry.
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Interview guide for Study 1 (translated from Norwegian)
Individual
1 How many employees are there in your organization?
2 Which position and/or role do you have?
3 For how long have you had this position?
4 Which systems and procedures are within your responsibility?
5 Can you describe how your position connects to the work related to
security, ICT and automation systems?
6 According to the regulations for emergency preparedness, three roles are
mandatory for a DSO: Emergency preparedness manager, Emergency
preparedness coordinator, and IT security coordinator. How are these
roles assigned in your organization?
ICT security incidents
7 To which degree does the organization depend on ICT?
How much downtime can be endured for your systems?
8 How would you deﬁne an ICT security incident?
9 Can you describe your latest ICT security incident?
How was this incident responded to?
How well did the response work?
Why did the response work as it did?
10 What is the worst ICT security incident your organization could experi-
ence?
11 If you think about how the latest ICT security incident was responded
to, would this be suﬃcient to handle the worst possible ICT security
incident?
Would you have done the same if it was a targeted hacker attack?
12 How frequently do you experience ICT security incidents?
If you have never experienced ICT security incidents, what could
be the reasons for that?
13 What kind of ICT security incidents do you experience?
What kind of consequences are typical for this kind of incidents?
Responding to ICT security incidents
14 Which plans exist for ICT security incident management?
15 Are the plans used in practice?
If not, why not?
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16 Do you perform training on incident management?
If yes, how? (Scenarios, exercises, courses?)
Who take part in these training activities?
If not, why not?
17 Can you tell me about general emergency preparedness exercises that
you perform? (Who, how often, what kind of scenarios?)
How is ICT included in these exercises?
18 How are ICT security incidents usually detected? (Automatic tools?
Intrusion detection systems? Firewalls? Users? Manual audit of logs?)
19 How are ICT security incidents initially reported?
20 Who is involved in responding to ICT security incidents?
21 Do you experience challenges related to cooperation on responding to
incidents?
If yes, what kind of experiences? (Are they related to communica-
tion? Terminology? Responsibilities? Knowledge and experience?
Procedures?
22 What kind of supplementary work is performed when regular operation
is restored?
23 How are ICT security incidents registered and reported afterwards?
24 Is information on incidents reported to top management?
25 Is information on incidents disseminated to end-users, internally or ex-
ternally?
26 Do you report ICT security incidents to the police?
27 Are the experiences from ICT security incidents used as input to further
risk assessments and improvements of procedures afterwards? (Or is
incident response mainly ”‘ﬁreﬁghting”’?
If yes, which parts of the organization are involved in this process?
28 Do you have any numbers for the costs of ICT security incidents?
If yes: How frequently and how are these followed-up? Who is
responsible?
29 Did you establish any other indicators or measurements for ICT security
incidents? (E.g., downtime due to incidents, number of incidents per
month)
If yes: How frequently and how are these followed up? Who is
responsible?
Possible improvements and cooperation
30 Do you have any practices that work well, that you would like to recom-
mend to others?
31 What are the most challenging parts of ICT security management?
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32 Do you see any possible improvements to how you respond to ICT security
incidents?
If yes, which?
33 The fact that you are a small DSO, how would this aﬀect the area of
ICT security incidents?
34 Did you establish any cooperation with other DSOs - small or large?
35 Do you participate in any cross-organizational cooperation in the indus-
try regarding information security? (Work groups, seminars, regular
meetings?)
If yes, to which degree is ICT security incident management on the
agenda?
36 The Smart Grid leads to a closer integration of ICT and automation
systems in the future. How do you think this will aﬀect ICT security
incident management?
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Interview guide for Study 2 (translated from Norwegian)
Cyber situation awareness:
Targeted attacks towards industrial control systems
An information security incident is commonly deﬁned as something that
compromises conﬁdentiality, integrity, and/or availability of information. In
this interview we are focusing on targeted attacks rather than technical failures.
Furthermore, only the industrial control systems in the DSO are in question.
The administrative IT systems are outside the scope of this study.
General
1 What is your role in the organization?
2 How many operators work in the control room?
3 How many power subscribers do you serve?
4 Can you estimate the number of computers and running applications?
5 Did you ever observe an attack to your control systems? Or malware?
(a) Would you consider any of them as targeted?
(b) Are you aware of any successful attack in your control systems?
(c) How were these detected?
(d) Were you able to identify the attacker(s)?
6 Do you think that anyone could be interested in attacking your systems?
Who could this be?
7 Do you have any customers that could be potential victims for targeted
attacks?
(a) Could such an attack also hit your organization?
8 What is the worst possible consequence of a targeted attack?
Policies
9 Have you performed any criticality assessment of resources (computers,
applications, information items, other) in the control systems?
(a) Do you know about dependencies between certain resources?
(b) Do any resources become more critical at speciﬁc points in time, or
do they always keep the same level of importance?
(c) Do you feel that the level of protection for the most critical resources
is appropriate?
(d) How is the IT defense diﬀerent for the critical resources vs. non-
critical ones?
10 Do you perform regular cyber security assessment?
11 How do you deal with the reported vulnerabilities; what kind of patching
regime do you have?
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12 Do you have any documentation of the technical security mechanisms on
the control systems?
13 How are the control systems connected to the administrative network in
your organization (i.e., one-way ﬂow of data, VPN, no connection at all)?
14 How do you deal with employees and/or external consultants bringing
their own computer, or other devices like USB memory sticks and similar,
into the control room?
Preparedness
15 Do you have response procedures for cyber attacks?
(a) How are they diﬀerent from other failure response procedures?
(Graceful degradation, restoring backups, limiting access, removing
malware?)
16 Are control room operators made aware of the threats that they can
encounter in their day-to-day job?
17 Have you ever performed exercises based on a scenario of targeted attacks
towards the control systems?
(a) Why/why not?
(b) If any, were they table-top exercises or more realistic action-based
exercises?
(c) Do you have regular simulated attack practices?
(d) Do you practice the worst-case scenarios?
18 What would be a beneﬁcial way of training for responding to targeted
attacks towards your control systems?
Technical security mechanisms
19 Do you encrypt critical data items while in transfer and stored?
20 Do you have oﬀ-site backups?
21 Do you only have network-edge defenses (e.g., IPSes), or do you also
have detection mechanisms that can detect malicious activity inside the
network?
(a) Are such defenses host-based (antiviruses) or do they look at network
traﬃc too?
22 Which speciﬁc defenses do you have? For each mechanism, use the
following keywords to guide the conversation:
(a) What is the purpose of this mechanism?
i Does it detect attacks?
ii Does it prevent attacks?
iii Does it react to attacks?
iv Does it predict attacks?
v Does it give more information about an attack that has already
happened?
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(b) Input
i Which type(s) of input is needed (e.g., network, OS, service, or
organization level logs)?
ii Where does the input come from (e.g., is it automatically de-
duced by the device, entered manually, or the output of another
device)? Is input needed initially or continuously? How often is
it entered? How many man-hours per week are required? How
sophisticated is the input? Does it need to be conﬁgured, or is
it a black-box system?
iii How high-level is the input? Is it human readable or raw?
(c) Output
i Which type(s) of output is generated (i.e., attack alerts, net-
work/OS/service/organization level logs)?
ii Where does the output go (i.e., to a human analyst or to another
system)?
iii How high-level is the output? Is it human readable or raw?
What is the size of the output?
iv Is the output actionable? Is it connected to an automated
system? Does the action need human intervention?
(d) Integration with the workﬂow and organization missions
i Is the system constantly running, do you run it when something
happens, or is it run periodically?
ii Does the system need a human analyzer to be run, or do you
run it and leave it be? If the system needs human conﬁgura-
tion/input/intervention/analysis, how often does it happen? Is
there a position/duty in the organization associated with it?
iii Is the tool/technique applied to the organization‘s most critical
resources or to the whole organization? Are the most critical
assets more protected, or monitored more often? How is the
application of the tool diﬀerent for a not-so-important resource
and a mission-critical resource?
(e) Internal model
i Is the model static or dynamic? Does it learn and change
through time? Does it need initial/ongoing conﬁguration? Does
it learn (supervised/unsupervised; i.e., does it need human
intervention for learning or does it learn on its own?)?
ii Does it learn the systems normal behavior? Does it learn the
attacker’s goals? Does it predict the next steps of the attacker?
(f) Eﬃciency
i Does it work satisfactorily, or do you see any needs for improve-
ments?
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ii What is the amount of information that a security administrator
(or all of them) should look at manually and daily? (Either in
bytes, or lines, or pages)
iii What is the amount of information generated daily by the
security logging tools?
iv What is the number of attacks reported daily/monthly/annually
(either false positive or true positive)?
v How many of them, after manual inspection, turn out to be true?
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The Cyber Security Awareness Mapping
The questionnaire was purposely designed to cover in-place defenses
and policies, incident response capabilities, and cyber situation awareness.
Table 4 shows the relation between these areas and the questions. Each row
represents one of the capabilities under-study and the numbers in each row are
the number of the questions that are trying to evaluate the associated capability.
General: general information about the organization
CSA-Comprehension: comprehension of the current situation
CSA-Impact: impact assessment
CSA-Evolution: understanding how attacks evolve
CSA-Behavior: attacker behavior analysis
CSA-Causes: attack causal analysis
CSA-Conﬁdence: conﬁdence in the acquired information
CSA-prediction: prediction of future attacks or future steps of an attacker
Defenses: the technology-based cyber defenses in place
Policies: the policy-based cyber defenses in place
Response: the incident response capability.
Table 4: Mapping between CSA capabilities and the questions in the interview guide.
Category
General 1 2 3 12
CSA-Comprehension 4 5 21 22
CSA-Impact 8 9 10 22
CSA-Evolution 22
CSA-Behavior 6 7 16 22
CSA-Causes 22
CSA-Conﬁdence 22
CSA-Prediction 22
Defenses 5 9 13 14 19 21
Policies 9 10 11 14 17 19 20
Response 11 15 16 17 18
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ABSTRACT
The long-term vision for modernization of power management and control systems, smart grid, is rather complex. It
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1. INTRODUCTION
Smart grids will result in increased instrumentation for
monitoring and control in the low voltage distribution grid,
distributed generation (micro wind turbines, solar panels,
etc.), energy storage, and electric vehicles. The parts of
the grid that include generation and high-voltage transmis-
sion of power are already modernized and do not need such
large-scale investment in order to meet future demands.
The distribution grid is the part of the power grid that
transmits power from substations to end users such as
companies and private households. Figure 1 shows the
power grid value chain from the generation, via the trans-
mission and distribution grids, to the end users [1].
The deployment of advanced metering infrastructures
(AMIs) is the ﬁrst big leap in the direction of the smart grid
vision. This allows for automatic reading and gathering of
customers’ power consumption. The distribution system
operators (DSOs) may use this data for both billing and
grid management purposes. The customers can be charged
more correctly than before; as the prices vary each hour
throughout the day, the customers may be rewarded for
using less power during the most costly hours. They may
receive tariff information through the smart meter as a
means to control their own power consumption. This
pricing mechanism may contribute to reducing the con-
sumption peaks that are expensive to both the customers
and the DSOs. The DSOs will receive close-to-real-time
information on power demand and consumption that they
can use for managing production and response.
In addition to smart meters, the households may also be
equipped with consumer appliances with web interfaces
and remote control. The introduction of AMI will contri-
bute to improving the utilization of the power grid,
reducing restoration times, and giving users more control
over their consumption and bill.
Several countries have started to roll out AMI. In Italy,
the large DSO Enel SpA has rolled out AMI to more than
30 million customers, which makes this the largest AMI
deployment so far. Canada, the UK, and the Netherlands
are other countries that have started, and also, in Norway,
there are demonstration and research activities in this area,
especially through Demo Steinkjer (Nord-Trøndelag
E-verk; www.demosteinkjer.no) and Smart Energy Hvaler
(Fredrikstad Energi AS; www.smartenergihvaler.no).
With the AMI comes two-way communication between
the DSOs’ back-end systems and the customers’ smart
meters. This implies a tighter coupling between power
automation systems and general information and commu-
nication technology (ICT) systems.
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Power automation systems have traditionally been
based on proprietary technologies operating in closed net-
works. They have been designed to fulﬁll quite speciﬁc
purposes and, by many, have not even been recognized
as ICT, even though they are indeed a combination of
hardware, ﬁrmware, and software. The information secu-
rity objectives have been limited as connectivity and
availability have been the most prioritized properties; con-
ﬁdentiality and integrity have not received the same atten-
tion. The attack surface has been quite limited as well,
mainly because the systems have operated without network
connections and they have not been connected to the
Internet. Incidents usually occur as a result of hardware
failures, and lack of monitoring may make it difﬁcult to
identify the exact location of the failure.
Information and communication technology systems,
on the other hand, consist of commercial-off-the-shelf
technologies operating on TCP/IP networks, and they are
usually designed to fulﬁll multiple purposes. Such technol-
ogies are widely used, they frequently have quite open and
accessible interfaces, and attackers ﬁnd it attractive to
exploit known and unknown vulnerabilities and cause
minor or major damage. Incidents usually occur as a result
of software failures, directly or indirectly, and complexity
makes it difﬁcult to avoid and detect such failures.
The vision of smart grids imposes the meeting of the
two cultures of power automation and ICT.
This paper discusses information security challenges
ahead and investigates how well current research addresses
these challenges. Technical aspects as well as human and
organizational aspects are covered, as the success of smart
grids depends not only on technological innovations but
just as much on changes in work processes, competence,
and understanding. Future research and development needs
are also pointed out.
The multitude of concepts and terminologies in this
discipline is discussed in the following section, before
reﬂections on culture and traditions within both power
automation and ICT are provided in Section 3. Special
considerations required during risk assessments for smart
grids are presented in Section 4, and privacy issues arising
with the AMI roll-out are described in Section 5. Existing
recommendations for smart grid security architectures are
provided in Section 6. Section 7 discusses information
security incident management from a smart grid point of
view, and examples of real-life information security inci-
dents are provided. Section 9 looks beyond the limitations
that information security usually poses and shows expected
positive effects of smart grids, before further work is
described and concluding remarks are given in Section 9.
2. CONCEPTS AND TERMINOLOGY
As the power industry is heading towards smart grids, more
branches of science and engineering must be involved. There
will be a need for new expertise, products, and solutions
within ﬁelds such as communication infrastructures, hard-
ware and software products and services, and information
security solutions. Hence, there is a broad spectrum of
Figure 1. The power grid value chain.
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professionals addressing the topic of power automation
systems. However, their approaches differ as they represent
different traditions with different world views, cultures,
terminology, work processes, and methods. To ensure a
common understanding and efﬁcient integration processes,
a common terminology has to be established.
Thereafter, there needs to be a common understanding
of the business processes and priorities in the power indus-
try. Professionals being new to this industry must be open-
minded and willing to learn about its traditions and, at the
same time, bring in their own knowledge and experience,
to enrich the industry. An efﬁcient cooperation can then
take place when this succeeds, when the main priorities
are agreed upon and all professionals manage to contribute
with their own specialties.
2.1. The system—which system?
There will be a tighter coupling between the power auto-
mation systems and ICT systems. But what does this really
mean? Which systems are covered by the term power
automation systems? And is this term the most appropriate
and correct term to use? There are several terms denoting
this kind of system; power automation system is one;
others are process control systems, control systems, super-
visory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems,
distribution management system, energy management
system (EMS), and production systems. Professionals
working in this domain, performing monitoring and
management of these systems in a control room, know
what is meant by each of these terms and are able to
explain the differences. However, ICT professionals who
are now entering the power industry are usually not familiar
with such systems, especially not to the level of detail needed
in order to be able to “speak the language,” which is an
essential prerequisite for an efﬁcient collaboration.
Ericsson [2] mainly uses the term power control systems,
but he also mentions SCADA/EMS and power system commu-
nication systems. The latter refers to the fact that power con-
trol systems have been more integrated lately; SCADA
systems and substations are now interconnected with other
systems, and both a dedicated line and the Internet are used
for communication. He does not distinguish between SCADA
and EMS, but denotes them together, SCADA/EMS, without
explaining what kinds of systems each of them refers to.
Wei et al. [3] use several terms, such as power grid
automation systems and power grid automation networks,
automation and control systems, SCADA, and power
automation systems, but they mainly use the latter. They
also include a ﬁgure illustrating how the different compo-
nents and systems are connected. For the purpose of
clariﬁcation, a similar ﬁgure is also presented in this paper
(Figure 2). It shows a typical architecture for power auto-
mation systems, all systems related to monitoring and
operation of the power grid. SCADA/EMS denotes the part
of the system that is operated from a control room. One
control room can manage several substations and also be
connected to other control rooms. The upper part of the
ﬁgure shows the corporate systems, which consist of what
is usually denoted as regular ICT systems.
Figure 2. A typical power automation system. SCADA, supervisory control and data acquisition; EMS, energy management system;
HMI, Human Machine Interface; IED, Intelligent Electronic Device.
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Datta Ray et al. [4] speak of industrial control systems
(ICSs), power grid control information systems, and power
grid operation systems. They distinguish between opera-
tions technology (OT) and information technology (IT),
and also denote these two systems as control systems and
IT systems, and legacy systems and corporate IT systems.
Their message would be clearer if they could stick to one
set of terms and, if necessary, mention alternative terms
in the beginning. At least, they state early in the paper that
they will use the terms OT and ICS interchangeably. Khan
et al. [5] speak of SCADA and distributed control system,
but do not explain the differences or connections between
these two.
For an ICT professional, it may seem like distribution
management system, EMS, and SCADA are all parts of
the larger power automation systems. However, it is not
quite clear how they are connected and/or integrated.
Process control systems and production systems are
general terms used in several industries. Hence, they
denote similar systems as the term power automation
systems, but the latter is industry speciﬁc. Therefore,
throughout this paper, the term power automation systems
will be used to denote all systems and functionalities
operated from the control center and substations related to
management of the power grid, in accordance to Figure 2.
The terms administrative systems and corporate
systems are often used as a counterpart to the power auto-
mation systems. They include all ICT systems needed to
operate the corporate parts of the DSO: project manage-
ment, contracts, ﬁnancial information, human resources,
and the like. Usually, the terms ICT and IT are used inter-
changeably, where both denote systems that are based on
TCP/IP/Ethernet technologies. The term ICT systems will
be used throughout this paper.
2.2. Security comes in many ﬂavors
The term security is subject to several different interpreta-
tions depending on who are the sender and the receiver of
the message. In the ﬁeld of computer science, security
usually means information security; although it could also
denote the more limited concepts of computer security or
network security. The term cyber security is used in some
contexts, usually related to automation and control systems.
This is a term that is not explicitly deﬁned by International
Organization for Standardization/International Electrotech-
nical Commission (ISO/IEC) 27000:2009 [6], which is the
standard deﬁning the most relevant terms within information
security. However, in the literature, it seems like cyber
security is a constructed term that mixes the ﬁelds of cyber-
netics and computer security, and hence, is widely used to
denote ICT security in control systems.
Information security comprises the three attributes of
conﬁdentiality, integrity, and availability [6]. Also, the
properties of non-repudiation, authentication, audit, and
privacy are associated attributes, without them being part
of the well-established deﬁnition. An information security
event is deﬁned to be an identiﬁed occurrence of a system,
service, or network state indicating a possible breach of
information security policy or failure of controls, or to be
a previously unknown situation that may be security rele-
vant [6]. Then, an information security incident is deﬁned
as a single or a series of unwanted or unexpected informa-
tion security events that have a signiﬁcant probability of
compromising business operations and threatening infor-
mation security [6].
A related term to security is dependability, which
usually describes the inability of a system to affect its envi-
ronment in an undesirable way. The main purpose of
dependability mechanisms is to protect life, health, and
the environment from damage. It is also regarded as
protection against random incidents [7]. Security, on the
other hand, can be seen as the inability of the environment
to affect the system in an undesirable way [8], or as protec-
tion against intended attacks. However, an incident compro-
mising a system’s security can lead to the system acting in an
unfortunate way, and a security breach can cause a depend-
ability breach. The two properties dependability and security
are closely connected and need to be addressed accordingly.
Traditionally, the power grid has been more concerned with
dependability than security. With the introduction of smart
grids, where ICT systems will be a critical component, secu-
rity issues need to be considered.
The ﬁelds of dependability and security have different
terminologies. As an example, a dependability breach
may be denoted as a fault or an accident. Security
breaches, on the other hand, may exploit what are denoted
as errors or bugs. A safety hazard may correspond to a
security threat. Avizienis et al. [9] thoroughly present con-
cepts and taxonomies of dependability, which they see as a
property that includes safety reliability, availability, integ-
rity, and maintainability. They compare these to the ﬁeld
of security, which they see as quite related, but still differ-
ent from, dependability, as it includes conﬁdentiality,
availability, and integrity, as also deﬁned by ISO/IEC
27000 [6]. There are substantial differences when it comes
to methods and methodologies between the two ﬁelds of
dependability and security. Please refer to Line et al. [8]
for an overview of common methods within each of the
ﬁelds, including an analysis of similarities and differences.
Power security, on the other hand, is a quite different
concept from information security. It usually refers to the
ability of providing energy to customers. There is a certain
parallel to the property of availability for ICT systems, but
these two should still not be mixed up. It is therefore
important to specify what kind of security one refers to.
In this paper, information security is the main concern,
and it will be denoted as information security, not just
security, to make sure that confusions are avoided.
2.3. Current standards and guidelines
Several standards and guidelines exist that deal with different
aspects of information security. Governmental organizations,
academic institutions, industry, and interest groups are
among the publishers. Two of the most recognized
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publishers are ISO (www.iso.org), cooperating with the IEC
(www.iec.ch), and the National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST; www.nist.gov) at the U.S. Department
of Commerce.
The ISO/IEC has published a set of standards and
documents on information security matters in their 27000
series. Topics include information security management
system, risk management, measurement and metrics, inci-
dent management, and network security. Cyber security
and application security are two of the topics that are planned
for the near future. It is natural to assume that the area of
smart grids should be well suited for such joint standards.
Among the broad collection of documents from NIST,
it is worth mentioning their Computer Security Incident
Handling Guide [10], Guide to Industrial Control Systems
Security [11], and Guidelines for Smart Grid Cyber
Security [12–14]. As such, NIST considers security
requirements for automation systems from an information
security point of view, which is an important contribution
in bringing information security expertise into the world
of automation. In a survey of 104 energy security profes-
sionals [15], more than 70% of the respondents stated that
security has not been adequately addressed in smart grid
deployment and that smart grid security standards move
too slowly to keep pace with smart grid deployment.
The aforementioned set of standards give directions on
how information security could be organized, and a set of
baseline requirements to both organizational and technical
aspects. The general information security standards should
indeed be adapted to a smart grid setting.
3. CULTURE AND TRADITIONS
Power automation systems and ICT systems have tradi-
tionally been operated separately. There have been limited,
if not zero, logical connections between them, and they
have served quite different purposes. The staff operating
the two systems tend to have different backgrounds: elec-
tric power engineering and computer science. The technol-
ogy bases are different and so are management routines.
Wei et al. [16] point at four major differences between
the power automation systems and ICT systems:
• Security objectives: whereas ICT aims at integrity,
conﬁdentiality, and availability, in that order, power
automation is ﬁrst and foremost concerned about
human safety, before continuous operation and protec-
tion of physical components.
• Security architecture: whereas ICT has the central
server with the highest security level in the middle of
the network, power automation needs to protect all edge
nodes just as well as the central control systems.
• Technological base: the variety of systems in use in ICT
is limited compared with the number of proprietary sys-
tems and technologies used in power automation.
• Quality-of-service requirements: whereas rebooting is
a common way of ﬁxing an unstable ofﬁce computer,
this is not accepted in the power automation system as
it results in disruption of operation, which usually has
potentially huge ﬁnancial consequences.
Power automation systems were built to run continu-
ously without interruptions in quite speciﬁc operating
environments. Information security measures were not
among the requirements as there were no relevant threats
in that category. Authentication, encryption, and detection
of incidents are therefore usually not implemented in
typical automation systems nor is the hardware designed
with enough memory and processing capacity to support
such mechanisms [17], which calls for new information
security mechanisms that are speciﬁcally designed to ﬁt
the technical properties of power automation systems and
still let them fulﬁll their operational requirements.
Incidents affecting power automation systems may
however have severe consequences, both to business
operation and even to life, health, and the environment.
Such consequences are usually more associated with safety
than security, and hence, the systems have been designed
to meet safety requirements. This is also what characterizes
the mindset of the staff operating power automation and
distribution systems.
Fabro et al. [18] stress the need for understanding of
cyber security as a fundamental condition for successful
implementation of smart grids:
“(. . .) Without properly understanding
the inherent risk in the Smart Grid, we
risk either abandoning an exceptionally
promising solution for energy issues or
deploying a system that could be the
Achilles heel of any industrialized
nations critical infrastructure.”
3.1. Information security culture
Power automation staff are used to their proprietary
systems not being connected to any external network and
hence not used to think about the outside world as a possi-
ble threat towards their systems. They do not even neces-
sarily recognize their systems as actually being ICT.
ICT staff are used to computers failing from time to time,
needing a reboot before they work all right again. Down-
time is unfortunate, but sometimes necessary, and does
not always have large ﬁnancial consequences, especially
not if it is planned. Testing and installing patches are quite
common. In power automation, testing and installing
patches are extremely difﬁcult as they most probably lead
to some downtime. If it works, do not touch it, is a tacit rule
of thumb, which results in large parts of such systems
being outdated and unpatched, and hence, vulnerable to a
great number of known attacks.
Recognizing an information security incident is difﬁcult
if one is not trained for it. Experiences from the oil and gas
industry show that a computer may be unstable for days
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and weeks without anyone recognizing it as a possible
virus infection [19]. Ensuring that the organization detects
and handles such an incident is a cultural challenge just as
much as a technical one.
Even vendors of hardware and software within the
domain of automation and control have a challenge ahead
regarding information security culture. Information secu-
rity needs to be a fundamental property of all products
entering a networked environment, and vendors must
accept their responsibility in these matters. They should
ensure that their engineering processes include information
security features from the beginning. In addition, they need
to learn to appreciate feedback that they may have on
vulnerabilities and bugs. Govindarasu and Hahn [20]
discuss what the power industry has to learn about such
vulnerability disclosure. There are some competent com-
puter analysts out there testing software systems for ﬂaws
and vulnerabilities, merely because they think it is chal-
lenging and fun. Their purpose is usually not to misuse
the weaknesses they might discover; they rather notify
the system owner or system developer and give them the
chance to ﬁx the problems within a reasonable time frame
before they eventually publish information on it to the
public. This method is usually referred to as “responsible
disclosure” [21]. Vendors should embrace such feedback
rather than ignore it, as it is better to know about the
vulnerabilities and be able to ﬁx them, than experiencing
directed attacks where the vulnerabilities are exploited.
3.2. Academia—islands of disciplines
In academia, there are quite clear divisions between depart-
ments such as computer science, electrical engineering,
cybernetics, and electric power engineering, all of which
need to be actively participating in the smart grid
evolution. Such divisions are reﬂected in organizational
structures, research projects, scientiﬁc publications, and
teaching. When students graduate, they carry with them
this mentality of isolated scientiﬁc traditions, and their
future employers are most likely organized like the univer-
sities, with the same types of clear divisions. Also, there
are differences between the disciplines regarding termino-
logy, culture, and methods. Obviously, this challenges
the success of smart grids, which depends on successful
scientiﬁc and professional cooperation.
The industry is forced to integrate experts from different
areas and minimize these established divisions. They have
already realized that they will not succeed with their smart
grid deployment without such collaboration. Academia,
both universities and research institutions, needs to strive
to overcome their existing divisions as well and overcome
the multidisciplinary challenges to take part in the smart
grid evolution.
Both computer scientists and electrical engineers
contribute with papers within the domain of information
security in smart grids. The authors’ background has a
great inﬂuence on which terminology is used in a paper.
In many cases, it seems like the audience is assumed to
be from within the same scientiﬁc area as the author.
Authors should rather take into account that readers may
have a different background than themselves and that
several terms and concepts may have different meanings
within different scientiﬁc ﬁelds. Within the topic of smart
grids, experts from a broad range of scientiﬁc ﬁelds share
the interest of reading each other’s work. Papers should
be written for a broader audience; hence, one should
always specify concepts and terms to make sure that there
will be no misunderstandings or room for personal inter-
pretations, as discussed in Section 2.
Several scientiﬁc papers claim to present information se-
curity challenges or research related to smart grids. However,
in many cases, the results are not really smart grid-speciﬁc.
The authors just state that the results are applicable for the
smart grid domain as well as the domain that was originally
the objective of the research. This might very well be true
but needs to be thoroughly justiﬁed. As the smart grid area
is still quite new, papers that try to adapt well-known results
from one area into this new one can be quite useful. As time
goes by, it is expected that more research will be carried out
with smart grids as the main focus. Results from this research
will have more impact and provide more value than many of
the papers published up till now.
4. RISK ASSESSMENTS
Several methods and tools exist to support risk assess-
ments, some lightweight and some more comprehensive.
Performing a comprehensive risk assessment may seem
like an ordeal; therefore, it is usually a good idea to start
with a high-level assessment to have a ﬁrst impression of
the system and the main threats and vulnerabilities. Then,
some of the most interesting ﬁndings could be further elab-
orated through a more detailed assessment. The ﬁrst phase
of any risk assessment is to clearly deﬁne the object of con-
sideration: which parts of the systems should be assessed
and which parts should be left out.
Figure 3 [22] shows a conceptual model of the AMI,
where the smart meter in a private home communicates
directly with the front-end system at the DSO or via a
concentrator in a substation. Different communication
technologies can be used, depending on what is available
and most suitable in the speciﬁc geographical area. Such
a ﬁgure is a sufﬁcient starting point for a high-level risk as-
sessment. The next steps include identifying technical
interfaces, possible technologies, participating actors, and
preferably a set of scenarios or use cases for the system
in focus. Thereafter, the assets of the systems (the values,
what is to be protected) should be identiﬁed before threats
(what can cause an incident) and vulnerabilities (what
makes the system susceptible for the threats) are described.
Possible consequences from an incident should then be
documented. The resulting risk is then a product of the
consequences and the probabilities of occurrence of un-
wanted incidents. This describes a regular risk assessment
for any ICT system in general.
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4.1. Cross-sectorial interdependencies
For each ICT system, there are usually some characteristics
that need special attention. For the smart grids, there is the
property of dependence. The power supply will depend just
as vitally on ICT systems as ICT systems already vitally
depend on power supply. As an example, an information
security breach to the power automation systems may cause
power outage. This outage may also affect the same power
automation systems and put them out of function. Naturally,
there should be extra power supply available, but it is quite
important that this redundant supply last long enough to
ensure availability for the power automation systems during
a crisis. This two-way dependence must be recognized as it
requires some extra thought when performing risk assess-
ments. Methods exist that support such cross-sectorial
assessments, as Kjølle et al. describe in [23].
Datta Ray et al. [4] discuss risk management
approaches speciﬁcally tailored for smart grids. They
recognize the challenges of studying ICT systems and
power automation systems combined and provide a set of
methods for modeling threats and vulnerabilities. They
refer to the well-known models STRIDE for classiﬁcation
of the following threats [24]:
• spooﬁng,
• tampering,
• repudiation,
• information disclosure,
• denial of service, and
• elevation of authority or privilege;
and DREAD; for classiﬁcation of the following vulnera-
bilities [24]:
• damage potential,
• reproducibility,
• exploitability,
• affected community, and
• discoverability.
However, they still point out the need for more research
in the area of risk assessments for smart grids in order to
obtain adequate support for viewing ICT systems and
power automation systems in a correlated manner.
4.2. Measuring risks
The total cost for information security includes both invest-
ments on preventive mechanisms and ﬁnancial conse-
quences of unwanted incidents, both damage, and repair
and recovery. These two need to be balanced. Standardized
methods for calculating risks would help in determining
where to put the investments. ISO/IEC 27004 [25] pro-
vides guidance on assessment of the effectiveness of an in-
formation security management system and controls. The
Figure 3. Advanced metering infrastructure [22]. SCADA, supervisory control and data acquisition; DMS, distribution management sys-
tem; DSO, distribution system operator; GPRS, general packet radio service; UMTS, Universal Mobile Telecommunications System;
PLC, Power Line Communication; DB, Database; GSM, Global System for Mobile Communication.
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standard supports the requirements described in ISO/IEC
27001 [26]. It describes how attributes can be quantiﬁed
and converted into indicators tailored for decision making.
Some research effort has been put into the topic of
measuring risk and modeling vulnerabilities in smart grids
as well. Hahn and Govindarasu [27] present a framework
for analyzing the exposure of cyber attacks in a smartgrid.
Their framework is based on access graphs, which relate to
attack trees and attack graphs—techniques that are com-
monly used in vulnerability modeling. Each component
and interface of a system is represented as nodes, and the
edges represent possible ways for an attacker of entering
and leaving nodes. Each edge is weighted, and the weight
is set based on the level of effort that is needed to compro-
mise that edge. The weights can be recomputed after a
change to any security mechanism is performed to see
how this change affects the total vulnerability of the sys-
tem. Determining the weight, however, is no exact
science, but some estimates would at least show which
edges are more prone to be exploited than others. A general
problem with access graphs, just like attack trees and
attack graphs, is that it is almost impossible to include all
possible attack vectors. Also, only known vulnerabilities
can be used for modeling, which leaves out zero-day
vulnerabilities, existing vulnerabilities that are not yet
discovered. Zero-day vulnerabilities represent a great
problem, as it might be attackers that make the ﬁrst discov-
ery. Ten et al. [28,29] have done quite extensive research
in the area of measuring risk using both generalized
stochastic Petri nets and attack trees for modeling vulnerabil-
ities in and attacks to SCADA systems. Negrete et al. [30]
present a method for evaluating the ﬁnancial impacts of
cyber attacks. They use a four-layer structure: physical
network, communications/control, commodity market,
and cyber security. The latter is the top layer, representing
investment alternatives and upgrades to the security on the
communications/control layer. It does not seem obvious
why the cyber security layer is the top layer, as it might
relate closely to the ﬁrst two layers. Still, the authors show
how the impacts of attacks change depending on different
levels of security investments. The impacts may also be
time variant, as an attack at noon may have different
consequences for the market than an attack at midnight.
Research approaches like these are praiseworthy
attempts on using metrics for evaluating information
security in smart grids, which is indeed a challenge.
However, theoretical models and methods may seem like
great ideas when initially described, but there is a lack of
scientiﬁc papers thoroughly evaluating the actual use of
such metrics more extensively than just as a proof-
of-concept. There are some fundamental challenges that
need to be overcome in order to make measurements
work in practice. In some areas, estimating probabilities
of occurrence of unwanted incidents is a mathematical
or statistical exercise. For ICT systems, this is a complex
and often impossible exercise [17]. Attackers’ possible
goals and strategies should be thoroughly considered,
but it can be quite hard to grasp all their capabilities
and motivations. The probability of someone wanting
to attack a nation’s power system may change from
one day to the next because of political circumstances.
Smart grids are just as complex as ICT systems
alone—complex interdependencies in infrastructure
combined with (quite often) incomplete documentation
of systems and several possible threats. Probability esti-
mation based on an experienced gut feeling may actually
be the best possible alternative.
Another issue is ease of use. Implementing yet-another-
process requiring personnel resources, documentation, a
management system and attention from top management
can be quite difﬁcult to go through within an organization.
Lightweight, not time-consuming, efﬁcient, giving value,
these are all properties of importance when designing the
optimal measurement protocol.
4.3. ICT security threats—what’s new?
In general, threats to ICT systems are well known, and there
exist several well-known and well-functioning countermea-
sures. Limitations of these countermeasures are also well
known, as well as how they still can be quite successfully
implemented. If this was not the case, large-scale hacker
attacks would succeed every day, resulting in totally unus-
able ICT systems and a major slowdown in efﬁciency in a
large part of industry and public services worldwide.
Well-known threats and attacks are however continu-
ously improved (from the attackers’ point of view) to hit
new types of computer systems, such as automation and
control systems. The trend of connecting such systems to
the Internet makes them vulnerable to attacks that can be
remotely executed. With ofﬂine systems, the attacker needs
to have physical access to the target systems in order to
execute an attack. With online systems, targeted attacks
can be executed from anywhere in the world. Also general,
untargeted attacks may hit all kinds of systems as long as
they are online.
Implementing all possible information security measures
is never an optimal solution. This is quite costly and will
not beworth the investment. Obtaining 100% security should
therefore not be a goal but rather determining an appropriate
level of security and implementing the measures needed to
obtain this is far more realistic. Determining an information
security level corresponds to determining what are the
acceptable risks, and then being prepared to manage
unwanted incidents.
5. PRIVACY
With the old metering technologies in place, each household
reads their meters quarterly or monthly and reports to the
utility company for billing.With the new smart meters imple-
mented, the utility companies will automatically receive
measurements collected much more frequently, several times
a day. For billing purposes, hourly readings are needed, but
for grid management purposes, the DSOs can make use of
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per-minute readings or even per-second readings. These are
huge amounts of data related to each household. Usage data
must be kept conﬁdential as they can tell a lot about the life-
style and habits of the speciﬁc household. In its most simple
form, it will clearly show when someone is at home and
when the house is empty [31].
One week of readings will give quite clear indications
on when the house will be empty during the next week,
which is interesting information for someone planning rob-
beries. More detailed readings can reveal information on
which activities take place inside the house, as many
household appliances have unique signatures that can be
read from ﬁne-grained metering data [32]. Such information
can be of interest to house robbers looking for a speciﬁc TV
or other speciﬁc household appliances; to commercial adver-
tisers, who can personalize their messages and products
when they know their receivers’ habits; to the police, as
certain criminal actions such as growing cannabis plants will
leave their own ﬁngerprint in the usage data; to employers
wondering whether their employees are skipping work; and
to insurance companies doing research on their customers
before paying compensations. There is no doubt that usage
data must be protected from unauthorized inspections, and
there must be clear rules and guidelines in place describing
what this data may be used for and who should have access,
as there is for other similar large-scale collections of personal
information, such as money transactions, phone calls, and
broadband usage.
Much research is being carried out within the area of
privacy in the smart grid, and then especially related to
smart metering, as this is the area where the main privacy
challenges arise.
5.1. Protection of consumption data
Non-intrusive appliance load monitoring techniques [32,33]
can be used for decoding energy consumption data into
which individual household appliances are in use. A
reading frequency of 15min can identify some of the most
common appliances. An increase of the reading frequency
will increase the accuracy of appliance identiﬁcation.
Efthymiou and Kalogridis [34] suggest a method for over-
coming this privacy issue by giving each smart meter two
different IDs: one anonymous ID, which is used for the
most frequent metering reports used for management and
network control purposes, and one known ID, which is
associated with the household and used for billing
purposes. Assuming that the anonymizing process inclu-
ding key and certiﬁcate exchanges and the suggested
escrow third party can be trusted, this method will contrib-
ute to preservation of privacy, as the most frequent
readings will be anonymized and hence not possible to
track back to a speciﬁc household.
However, the utility companies are interested in knowing
more than just the total energy consumption from eachmeter.
For production planning and grid management, they ﬁnd it
quite useful to know what kind of household each meter
reading belongs to. Fhom et al. [35] address this privacy
issue by suggesting a different approach, introducing a
user-centric privacy manager that allows each individual cus-
tomer to control which and how much information is dis-
closed to which other smart grid parties. A smart energy
gateway (SEG) should be the node connecting each home,
including smart appliances and the meter itself, to the power
supplier, distribution network supplier, billing provider, and
other relevant actors. Each purpose, or functionality, will be
represented by a corresponding software agent on the SEG,
and the security architecture of the SEG should support se-
cure multiplexing access to physical resources so that the dif-
ferent software agents would not interact in unfortunate and
unsecure ways. Introducing such a privacy manager would
give the end users access to inspect what kind of data is actu-
ally collected and by whom, including the possibility of hav-
ing a certain amount of control over this data collection. This
would provide a degree of transparency, which is not present
today.
It should be carefully considered whether users would
be interested in controlling their own privacy. Some should
rather be protected from themselves, from being able to
perform unfortunate choices. The majority of end users
will most probably not be able to understand their privacy
exposures and even less able to understand how to mitigate
them. The services provided must therefore be privacy-
preserving and trusted by default; the principle of
privacy-by-design should be followed at all times during
development and in operation, such that the customers do
not have to be concerned about their own privacy.
In June 2011, the European Data Protection Supervisor
(www.edps.europa.eu) provided an Opinion on the
Commission Recommendation on preparations for the roll-
out of smart metering systems [36]. He recommends that con-
sumers should not be forced to install a smart meter if they do
not want the advantages of time-of-use tariffs. Alternatively,
the functionalities of granular readings and the remote on/
off control should be disabled as a default setting, and an in-
formed consent must be given before they are enabled.
This idea follows the privacy-by-design principle and
lets the consumer choose whether he allows a privacy-
invasive method being used for correct billing or accepts
the risk of paying higher bills than strictly necessary. The
DSOs would however still want to have more accurate
readings than today in order to ease and increase the
quality of grid management. Two methods to consider in
this matter are to keep the reading frequency lower than
every hour; it might sufﬁce to read once or twice a day.
If more detailed readings are strictly needed, meter data
should be anonymized and preferably aggregated in order
to preserve the privacy of the consumers.
5.2. Use of consumption data
Legislation on protecting personal information varies in
different countries. In some countries, it is sufﬁcient to
notify the owner when the terms or purposes of use
change, as opposed to ask for consent. The US-based NIST
has provided guidelines for privacy and the smart grid [13],
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where they discuss the concept of privacy and how smart
grids may pose privacy challenges. The guidelines contain
recommendations for mitigations of smart grid privacy
issues as well, and the intended readers include all entities
that are involved with personal information related to smart
grids in some way. A European Union (EU)-initiated Task
Force on Smart Grids has also identiﬁed recommendations
for data handling, data security, and data protection [37].
They provide an overview of the European legislation,
identify potential risks in the handling of personal data,
discuss data and access rights, and analyze how such issues
should be handled. They also criticize the NIST report and
state that it is too much based on end users’ consent; the
task force would rather see clear regulations on what kind
of data may be collected and for which purpose.
In Norway, the Personal Data Act [38] is quite clear in
stating that personal information may only be collected for
speciﬁed purposes, and the owner of the information shall
be informed and asked for consent if the collected
information is to be used for other purposes than ﬁrst
planned. The data owner has the right to refuse, and an
acceptance needs to be actively granted, as opposed to a tacit
acceptance. The Norwegian Data Inspectorate has provided a
guide speciﬁcally related to personal data in connection with
smart metering [39]. This guide is intended to help the DSOs
to fulﬁll the requirements stated in the Personal Data Act.
The European Data Protection Supervisor is looking into
whether further legislative action is needed on an EU level.
He would speciﬁcally like to see more guidance on retention
periods and recommends that the use of privacy-enhancing
technologies and similar techniques for data minimization
is made mandatory. He also points out that each consumer
should have direct access to their energy usage data.
Guidelines and recommendations from institutions like
NIST and EU-initiated working groups, in addition to data
protection supervisors and data inspectorates, are indeed
necessary for helping DSOs and other parties in preserving
consumers’ privacy when implementing smart metering.
Privacy is an important principle that should not be sacri-
ﬁced for the interest of efﬁciency and new technological
possibilities and solutions, and having the consumers’ trust
is essential for smart grids to be a success.
Large amounts of personal information have been
stored for a long time by several actors; securing such
storage can be obtained without large research efforts.
However, research is needed to fully investigate how the
privacy-by-design principle can be followed in practice
when developing smart meters and implementing an
AMI. The development and use of privacy-enhancing
technologies, anonymization, aggregation, and possibly
new and still unknown techniques are indeed required.
6. SECURITY ARCHITECTURE
A thorough modernization of the aging power grid infra-
structure implies the need for an appropriate information se-
curity architecture. In each device, the communication
channels and the interfaces between them need to be
secured, privacy issues for the consumers must be addressed,
the strategy of defense-in-depth should be obeyed, and the
large geographical spread of the network must be carefully
taken into account. Both a high-level holistic view and in-
depth focused investigations are needed in order to decide
on an appropriate information security architecture.
The operational requirements governing power automation
systems today cannot be circumvented. Performance must be
maintained; continuous operation as well; and the properties
of hardware and software already in use must be regarded
when designing new mechanisms, as described in Section 3.
The worldwide approved ISO standards represent the best
starting point. They could be supplemented with the compre-
hensive documentation published by NIST—a set of guide-
lines on smart grid cyber security strategy, architecture, and
high-level requirements [12]. Their architecture includes a
set of domains, a high-level view on actors, and a logical
reference model for the smart grid, in addition to a thorough
list of high-level information security requirements. The
Advanced Security Acceleration Project has provided a more
focused document, describing a security proﬁle for AMI
[40]. It addresses the complete AMI from the smart meter
at the consumer’s side to the meter data management system
at the DSO’s side. This documentation is also quite compre-
hensive and is aimed for organizations developing or imple-
menting AMI solutions. These reports describe current good
practice, although local adaptations of the recommendations,
based on risk assessments and actual incidents, if any, are
needed when they are put into use.
Ericsson [2] describes how the power automation grid
started out as “islands of automation” and became more
integrated as time went by. The utility companies have been
asking for more openness—commercial-off-the-shelf pro-
ducts and more integrated systems. This seems to be the fu-
ture for the power industry. Ericsson suggests to decouple
the operational SCADA/EMS system from administrative
systems to ensure an appropriate information security level.
This, however, is a step backwards and does not appear as
a future-oriented solution. He then discusses the approach
of studying SCADA/EMS systems in terms of domains,
where business operations are grouped together and each do-
main has an information security policy, a set of require-
ments, mechanisms, and one responsible “authority”. It is
claimed that this will ensure a minimum security level for
all systems within the same domain.
Wei et al. [16,3] propose a novel security framework
for power grid automation systems. This is designed to
meet the requirements of integration in a non-intrusive
fashion, performance in terms of modularity, scalability,
extendibility, and manageability, and also alignment to
the Roadmap to Secure Control Systems in the Energy
Sector [41]. The framework consists of three layers (power,
automation and control, and security), and the three major
conceptual components in the framework are as follows:
• Security agents: protection at the networked device
level, ﬁrmware or software, access control, and IDS.
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• Managed security switch: for protection of bandwidth
and prioritizing of data, used across the automation
network.
• Security manager: in the center of the power automa-
tion network, a security agent master; obtains and
downloads patches to security agents, and collects
data from agents.
Test results show that the security agents did not imply
signiﬁcant reduction of performance on SCADA commu-
nication, some vulnerabilities were mitigated or partially
mitigated, and the IDS reported some ﬁndings.
Boroomand et al. [42] address the topic of deciding the
optimal level of automation in a SCADA setting, thereby
mitigating cyber security risks. The authors motivate
their work by pointing out the new security challenges
following the implementation of smart grids, where
security and reliability are not always aligned. The concept
of varying the level of automation based on current
threat level is intriguing, and ﬁnding the optimal balance
between human responsibilities and automatic processes
also related to incident detection and response is an inter-
esting idea. However, it is not always the case that a
system based on human decisions and actions is more secure
than fully automated systems, as it seems to be assumed by
the authors. Humans make mistakes, and the higher
complexity of the system and tasks, the higher probability
for wrong decisions or at least minor mistakes, which in the
worst cases may have quite severe consequences.
Proving that certain information security mechanisms
do not affect SCADA performance is a rather hard exer-
cise. Performing tests and evaluations in smaller lab facili-
ties may show good results, but the real world is usually a
bit more complex than what we manage to set up in the lab.
Also, some of the stated operational requirements are
difﬁcult to test extensively no matter how realistic the test
facilities are.
7. INCIDENT MANAGEMENT
Potential computer break-ins, industrial espionage, malware
attacks and denial-of-service attacks are some of the threats
to ICT systems that companies face today. As smart grids
are complex systems consisting of complex power grids that
interact with equally complex ICT systems, these threats will
in the near future also be highly relevant for the power indus-
try as well. The ability to appropriately prepare for, and
respond to, information security incidents is essential for
companies that need to ensure and maintain continuous
operation of their systems.
Incident management is the process of detecting and
responding to incidents, including supplementary work as
learning from the incidents, using lessons learned as input
in the overall risk assessments, and identifying improve-
ments to the implemented incident management scheme.
ISO/IEC 27035 incident management [43] describes the
complete incident management process. This is a fairly
new standard (2011) but is based on a technical report that
was produced in 2004. The process comprises ﬁve phases:
plan and prepare, detection and reporting, assessment and
decision, responses, and lessons learned. The guideline is
quite extensive and will indeed be costly to adopt to the
letter, but it is a collection of practical advice, key activi-
ties, and examples, and is indeed useful for companies
establishing their own security incident organization. The
ISO standard addresses corporate systems in general and
does not contain any considerations related to power auto-
mation systems. There is a need to delve into the standard
and adopt it for a smart grid setting, where corporate
systems and control systems are connected in different ways.
In their Guidelines for Smart Grid Security (NISTIR
7628), NIST describes a set of high-level requirements
for incident response for a smart grid information system
[12]. All requirements are however on the governance,
risk, and compliance level, and are therefore more high
level than what the ISO standard provides. They contain
no practical advice; hence, they are more useful in a plan-
ning process than during business operation. They also
contain no speciﬁcs related to the cooperation of corporate
systems and control systems. In part 3 of their Guidelines
[14], NIST however points out the need for research on
incident response for the cross-domain of ICT and power
systems. More speciﬁcally, the issues of response and
containment, intrusion detection and prevention, and event
and impact prediction are emphasized.
NIST 800-61 [10] addresses computer security incident
handling, whereas NIST 800-82 [11] contains several
recommendations for securing ICSs, including a compre-
hensive overview of vulnerabilities. The security proﬁle
on AMI [40] that contains a large number of security
concerns, guidance, and controls related to AMI also
includes a separate section on incident response. The
requirements are quite high level, similar to those listed
in the ISO standard and NISTIR 7628 as well, but at least,
they are directly addressing AMI, which is an important
part of smart grids.
There are not many scientiﬁc papers describing real-life
experiences regarding incident management. The Annual
FIRST Conference Forum for Incident Response Teams
(www.ﬁrst.org) brings together such expertise worldwide,
and one or two presentations each year seem to cover
real-life experiences. These presentations are however not
publicly available afterwards. A large amount of available
publications from relevant venues are concerned with the
technical reporting systems in use, vulnerability registra-
tion, establishing response teams, and computer foren-
sics—topics that are indeed relevant but not as interesting
as experience papers would be. Metzger et al. [44] present
their real-life experiences, covering the complete process
from detection, response, reporting, and even some short
notes on how lessons learned were used in the improve-
ment process at the end of the incident handling cycle.
Hennin described in 2008 the Cyber Attack Alert Tool
project [45] that aimed at developing an industry standard
protocol for sharing information about control system
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cyber incidents across all critical infrastructure sectors. The
project idea seemed promising, as it was going to focus on
early warnings, as opposed to the Repository of Industrial
Security Incidents (www.securityincidents.org) database,
which contains reports written in the aftermath of incidents
and where a quite costly membership is required to gain
access. However, it has turned out to be difﬁcult to ﬁnd
papers describing results from the Cyber Attack Alert Tool
project, so it is not known whether the project led to a
breakthrough.
Although standards and recommendations exist on the
area of incident management, also with respect to smart
grids, there is a lack of documented research and experience
related to managing incidents in an operating environment
where automation systems and ICT systems are closely inte-
grated. An efﬁcient incident management process is just as
important as technical information security measures when
continuous operation is a governing requirement.
7.1. Real-life incidents
Information and communication technology security
incidents are indeed not science ﬁction, they are already
happening. During the last 10 years, there have been
several examples of power outages or other types of
damage to automation and control systems caused by hack-
ers, untrusted employees, or software failures. The most
famous attack up till now is Stuxnet [46–48], which
appeared during summer 2010 as an advanced piece of
malware created to target ICSs. Such systems have been
attacked before, but not with this kind of speciﬁcally
designed malware. Stuxnet is important mostly because it
demonstrated that it is indeed possible to perform attacks
against critical infrastructure and even infrastructure not
connected to the Internet. Quite recently, it was announced
that the USA and Israel were behind Stuxnet, and the inten-
tion was to attack Natanz, an Iranian power plant [49].
Natanz was indeed attacked, but a minor bug in the Stuxnet
exploit made Stuxnet go “in the wild” and hit several other
systems worldwide.
Another recent attack, Night Dragon [50], was identiﬁed
in November 2009 as an attack targeted at the energy sector.
The goal was harvesting of sensitive information related to
competitive proprietary operations and ﬁnancial details
regarding ﬁeld bids and operations. A similar attack was also
discovered in Norway 2 years later [51]; 10 large companies
within defense, oil, and energy experienced industrial espio-
nage attacks where communication were being monitored,
and the goal was to capture sensitive information. These
two cases did not speciﬁcally target automation and control
systems, but it shows that the energy sector is an attractive
target for attackers, and smart grids imply that the attack
surface increases; there will be more ways of attacking a
company or the industry as a whole, subsequently causing
damage that impact larger parts of the society.
Duqu and Flame are two pieces of malware that have
similarities to Stuxnet, and researchers therefore believe
that all three of them were created by the same authors
[52-54]. They were detected in September 2011 and May
2012, respectively, but they are both believed to date from
2007. Duqu is a reconnaissance tool, and Flame is an espi-
onage tool, and both have Iran’s nuclear program as the
main target, just like Stuxnet did. Flame has hit private
companies, academic institutions, governmental systems,
and home users, not automation and control systems
speciﬁcally. It has been around for a long time without
being detected; antivirus suppliers have therefore not
provided any functionality for detecting nor removing a
Flame infection [?].
Flame and its relatives represent the kind of threats that
the power industry need to be prepared for. A planned and
directed attack towards the industry should be assumed to
comprise attempts to cause physical damage together with
attempts to gather conﬁdential information.
8. NOTJUSTNEGATIVEPROSPECTS
Information security is more often seen as a limitation than
an enabler. This might be due to the nature of security;
there is usually a trade-off between security and properties
such as functionality, user-friendliness, performance, efﬁ-
ciency, and cost. Still, the fact is that many services cannot
be set to life without at least a basic level of security. In the
case of smart grids, which is a critical infrastructure, or
more correctly a combination of two critical infrastructures
(power and ICT), information security issues must be
addressed appropriately.
When critical information security challenges are
overcome, the smart grid represents a huge potential for
the industry. It will provide for more efﬁcient management
of the grid, real-time monitoring of demand response,
efﬁcient error detection and repair, and the possibility of
affecting end users’ energy consumption in such a way that
a major investment in upscaling the grid capacity may be
avoided, or at least postponed. End users may contribute
to environmental advantages if they are able to exploit
the smart grid in the right way; with more correct
billing—a clear connection between consumption and the
bill—they might reduce their total consumption, and they
may take part in power production by having their own
windmill, solar panel, or the like, and hence contribute to
increasing the amount of renewable energy.
It is easy to point out many challenges, both security-wise
and other, when talking about smart grids. However, when
two or more scientiﬁc ﬁelds meet, there are great possibilities
ahead. Cross-discipline cooperation makes people see their
own ﬁeld in new ways, which can lead to results and innova-
tions that otherwise would not be discovered.
9. CONCLUSION AND
FURTHER WORK
Successfully adapting good ICT security practice to power
automation, distribution, and control systems, while at the
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same time fulﬁlling the current requirements for power grid
operation, is a huge step in the direction of successfully
securing the smart grid. Local adjustments are however
needed in order to comply with existing solutions and local
laws and regulations. Still, there are smart grid-speciﬁc
challenges that need to be addressed that are not possible to
solve through existing measures.
Technical measures are not sufﬁcient for obtaining secure
smart grids. Increased understanding, knowledge, and aware-
ness are needed among both ICT staff and power automation
staff. They need to cooperate more extensively than today,
and they need to understand each other’s mindsets, terminol-
ogy, needs, and information security objectives. The whole
organization needs to be onboard, and organizational and
cultural changes cannot be bought. Neither should they be
expected to have a “quick ﬁx”; a careful and long-term
approach is required. Otherwise, there is a risk of ending
up with two opposites—the ICT people and the power auto-
mation people—both ﬁghting for their views and their prior-
ities, and both being afraid of being redundant. The top
management must recognize organizational and cultural
measures as a major priority area and lead the way by truly
showing that collaboration and mutual understanding is
needed in order for smart grids to be a success.
Securing the smart grids is therefore not just another secu-
rity project. It takes more than time and money to succeed.
A large part of smart grid research today concerns AMI
speciﬁcally, even though there are many uncertainties
ahead regarding smart grids: are the smart meters a kind
of a smart grid, will there be more to it, when will the
concept of smart grids be achieved, who will do it, what
are the beneﬁts, and so on. AMI is just the beginning of
the smart grid roll-out. While the industry fully focuses
on implementation of the AMI, researchers should contrib-
ute looking forward to what comes next.
We plan to study how ICT security incidents are being
detected and responded to—both by technical measures
and by human actions—and how the aftermath is han-
dled—information sharing, lessons learned, and how experi-
ences are transferred into the overall work with information
security in companies operating power automation and
control systems. This must be studied with respect to both
ICT systems and the power automation and control systems
in order to identify cooperation, possible synergy effects
from future cooperation, and the management system in
general. This will require a socio-technical approach, as the
ﬁeld of research is neither only technology nor man but
indeed a combination of the two. It will be impossible to
improve anything without addressing both. The results of
this work will hopefully contribute to efﬁcient and successful
incident management in smart grids environments, where the
worlds of ICT and automation meet.
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identiﬁed research needs within information security incident management.
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1. Introduction
Today, Information and Communication Technology (ICT)
plays an important role in all organisations. ICT has brought a
lot of beneﬁts to our society. At the same time, it has made us
vulnerable to failures and attacks that come via the ICT sys-
tems. As organisations have become more and more depen-
dent on ICT, the threats towards these systems have become
more prominent. The current situation can be summarised by
the following quote by Ahmad et al. (2012):
“It is inevitable at some stage that organisations will suffer
an information security incident. Such an incident may
result in multiple negative impacts, such as loss of com-
pany reputation and customer conﬁdence, legal issues, a
loss of productivity and direct ﬁnancial loss.”
Although a lot ofmeasures can be taken in order to prevent
information security incidents from taking place, it is not
economically feasible to fully protect all systems (Anderson
et al., 2012). Thus organisations need to prepare for what to
do in case of incidents in their ICT systems.
The main motivation of this paper is to provide a
comprehensive overview of current practice and experiences
documented in the literature on information security incident
management. A further motivation is to identify the chal-
lenges organisations experience when trying to follow exist-
ing standards.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: In
Section 2 we describe our researchmethod. Section 3 provides
an overview of the most recognised and well-known stan-
dards and guidelines related to information security incident
management, and Section 4 presents ﬁndings from relevant
studies and experience reports. We summarise current
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practice, present inspirational examples, and discuss aspects
that are particularly challenging, as well as future research
needs, in Section 5. Section 6 offers concluding remarks.
2. Research method
The work presented in this paper has been organised as a
systematic review and conducted based on recommendations
by Kitchenham and Charters (2007). The goal with performing
the systematic review was to identify current practice for in-
formation security incident management, and in particular
experiences made. The research questions that guided the
review were thus:
 Q1. How is information security incident management
performed in practice?
 Q2. What experiences are reported in literature on infor-
mation security incident management; what works well,
what is difﬁcult?
In the analysis work we also aimed at answering the
following research question:
 Q3. To what degree does current practice resemble rec-
ommended standards and guidelines?
We limited our study to literature documenting real-life
experiences and practices, either in form of experience re-
ports or in form of empirical studies. Furthermore, we only
included literature published after 2005.
Relevant literaturewas identiﬁed through a Scopus2 search
using search terms intended to identify all literature that
covered incident management of information security in-
cidents: (“incident management” OR “incident response” OR
“incident reporting” OR “computer emergency response” OR
“computer emergency management”) AND (“information se-
curity”OR “cyber security”OR “ict”OR “computer security”OR
“information technology”).
The identiﬁed literature was then manually included or
excluded in the study by one researcher. A ﬁrst Scopus search
was performed in March 2012, and then a second search was
performed in August 2013 in order to identify any literature
published since the ﬁrst search. In addition,wemanuallywent
through the publicly available information from the Terena3
and FIRST4 conferences, whitepapers etc. from CERT/CC,5
publications from SANS6 and the latest IMF7-conference.8
When going through the literature that was included in the
study, we studied the references in order to identify additional
literature. We added one study from a local university.9
One of the papers was analysed by two researchers. The
other papers were analysed by one researcher. In the analysis
the reported practices and experiences were identiﬁed and
related to one of the incident management phases described
in standards. We particularly identiﬁed the experiences and
practices that were related to communication and collabora-
tion during incidentmanagement, as this was a topic that was
considered important in several of the identiﬁed papers and
spanned all phases.
3. The incident management process
An information security event can be deﬁned as an “identiﬁed
occurrence of a system, service or network state indicating a possible
breach of information security, policy or failure of controls, or a
previously unknown situation that may be security relevant” (ISO,
2011). An information security incident is then a “single or se-
ries of unwanted or unexpected information security events that
have a signiﬁcant probability of compromising business operations
and threatening information security” (ISO, 2011).
ISO/IEC 27035 “Information security incident manage-
ment” (ISO, 2011) and NIST Special Publication 800-61 “Com-
puter Security Incident Handling Guide” (Cichonski et al.,
2008) stand out as two of the main standards and guidelines
related to information security incident management. Both
offer a structured approach to incident management,
including planning and preparing for incident response, what
to do when incidents strike, and how to extract lessons learnt
afterwards. SANS (Kral, 2011) and ENISA (ENISA, 2010) have
also provided guidelines for incident handling, which
resemble the structure offered by ISO/IEC and NIST. The guide
from SANS is quite short and contains just an overview of
which activities belong to each phase. ENISA has excluded the
preparations phase and just focused on the activities per-
formed by a response team in case of an incident. ITIL
(Brewster et al., 2012) describes the incident management
process as consisting of six components; Incident detection
and recording, Classiﬁcation and initial support, Investigation
and diagnosis, Resolution and recovery, Incident closure, and
Ownership, monitoring, tracking, and communication during
the progress of the incident handling. Activities related to
planning and preparations are included in other parts of ITIL
and hence not presented as part of the incident management
process itself. FIRST provides a couple of guidelines on how to
set up an incident response team within an organisation.
These are speciﬁcally concerned with planning and prepara-
tions, and do not cover the complete incident management
process. CERT/CC describes comprehensive guidelines for
establishing and operating an incident response team in their
CSIRT handbook (West-Brown et al., 2003). Furthermore, they
describe their CERT/CC Incident Handling Life Cycle process.
2 http://www.scopus.com.
3 Trans-European Research and Education Networking Associ-
ation, www.terena.org.
4 Forum for Incident Response and Security Teams, www.ﬁrst.
org.
5 www.cert.org.
6 www.sans.org.
7 IT Security Incident Management and IT Forensics.
8 The proceedings from this conference were not available at
Scopus at the time of the search, and was included because
relevant material had been published at previous IMF
conferences.
9 This study was in form of a student thesis and would thus not
be available in a Scopus search. Furthermore, we have performed
a search for related student work from other universities, but
without results (this may be because such student papers may be
difﬁcult to access outside the respective universities).
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This resembles the processes described by ISO/IEC and NIST;
an incident is detected and considered in a triage before a
report is generated. Then there are the states of analysis,
obtaining contact information, providing technical assistance,
and coordinating information and response, before the inci-
dent is ﬁnally resolved. Fig. 1 provides a synthesis of the
incident management process as described by ISO/IEC and
NIST. As can be seen from the ﬁgure, the main recommen-
dations are similar. The ISO/IEC 27035 standard stands out as
the most recognised, as it is developed by international
consensus by experts worldwide. We therefore explain the
recommendations in the ISO/IEC 27035 standard in more
detail in the following.
ISO/IEC 27035 divides the incident management process
into ﬁve phases: 1) plan and prepare; 2) detection and
reporting; 3) assessment and decision; 4) responses; and 5)
lessons learnt. The standard lists the following key activities
that organisations should do in order to plan and prepare for
incidents:
 Produce information security incident management policy
and gain senior management commitment to that policy
 Update information security and risk management pol-
icies, so that they include incident management
 Deﬁne and document a detailed incident management
scheme, including a classiﬁcation scale used to grade in-
cidents, information security incident forms, procedures
and actions to use the forms, and operating procedures for
the Information Security Incident Response Team (ISIRT)
 Establish an ISIRT
 Establish and preserve relationships and connections with
appropriate internal and external organisations
 Establish, implement and operate technical and other
support mechanisms10, and document responsibilities and
operating procedures for the operations support team
 Design and develop an awareness and training program
 Test the information security incident management
scheme
For the detection and reporting phase, ISO/IEC 27035 includes
activities that aim for detection of security vulnerabilities and
events, collection of information on the events and vulnera-
bilities detected, and reporting on the events and vulnerabil-
ities. Detection, collection of information, and reporting, may
happen manually or automatically. The standard speciﬁcally
mentions:
 Alerts from security monitoring systems such as Intrusion
Detection Systems (IDS) or Intrusion Detection and
Fig. 1 e The incident management process.
10 This includes audit mechanisms, vulnerability management,
technology watch, intrusion detection systems (IDSs), network
security devices, protection means and monitoring tools, anti-
malicious code software, audit log records and log monitoring
software.
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Prevention systems (IDP), antivirus software, honeypots,
log monitoring systems, security information manage-
ment systems and correlation engines
 Alerts from network monitoring systems such as ﬁrewalls,
network ﬂow analysis, and web ﬁltering
 Analysis of log information from various systems and
devices
 User reports, notiﬁcations from the help desk, and external
notiﬁcations from third parties
After detection, information on the event should be
collected. All activities in this phase should be documented,
any electronic evidence should be gathered and stored
securely and the incident should be registered in an Incident
Table 1 e Overview of included papers.
Paper Type of organisation studied Incident management aspects
covered
Data collection method
Ahmad et al. (2012) Financial institution (FinanceOrg) Main emphasis on the learning
phase, although other phases are
covered as well
Interviews (2 incident responders,
and 2 that should be informed
about incidents) and document
study
Cadavieco et al. (2012) University (University of Oviedo) Types of incidents experienced Document study (study of incident
reports e 3 years)
Cusick and Ma (2010) International publisher and digital
information services provider
(Wolters Kluwer)
All phases. Cover experiences after
18 months of running ITIL incident
response.
Experience report
Hove and Tårnes (2013) Three large Norwegian companies
(one government owned, one
non-commercial, one IT
service provider)
All phases Interviews (5 in total e IT security
manager from all companies,
supply chainmanager, department
manager), document study and
survey (n¼ 41, participants from all
three companies)
Ismail et al. (2011) Organisations in Malaysia Forensics Survey (Malaysian forensic experts
(n ¼ 2), and desktop support
specialists and project managers
(n ¼ 2 e in addition 5 more
reported that they were not
qualiﬁed to answer the
questionnaire))
Jaatun et al. (2009, 2008) Norwegian petroleum industry All phases, but emphasis on
planning and learning activities
Interviews (9, and some additional
interviews at a selected offshore
installation), document studies,
workshops (5þ)
Johnston and Reust (2006) Not speciﬁed Initial response and its impact on
forensic examination
Not speciﬁed. Studied the response
to an incident that compromised
over 50 computers, some with
personal data
Koivunen (2010) National CSIRT (CERT-FI) Reporting Documentation study (6 incidents)
Kurowski and Frings (2011) Two large organisations Documentation needs and systems Electronic survey (n ¼ 20 e IT
security managers)
Line (2013) Norwegian power industry
(6 Distribution System
Operators (DSOs)
All phases Interviews (19 e Head of ICT, Head
of ICT security, Head of control
room/power automation system)
Metzger et al. (2011) Academic CSIRT (Leibniz
Supercomputing Centre (LRZ)
which operates the Munich
Scientiﬁc Network)
All phases Experience report
M€oller (2007) Academic CSIRT for Grid
environments (DFN-CERT)
Setting up a CSIRT Experience report
de Souza et al. (2011) Large scale IT service delivery
organisations
Information needs Electronic survey (n > 200 e system
administrators working on
incident management)
Werlinger et al. (2008) Large academic institution Challenges of deploying and
maintaining an IDS
Interviews (9 security
practitioners) and participatory
observation
Werlinger et al. (2010) Organisations (9) from
several sectors
Practices related to diagnostic
works during incident response
Interviews (16, security
manager/specialist/practitioner))
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Tracking System, with time and date for detection, observa-
tions, and contact information (optional). Any change control
regimes should be maintained, keeping relevant databases
up to date. Incidents may be escalated11 at this stage.
In the assessment and decision phase, the information on
security events is assessed and it is decidedwhether or not it is
an information security incident. The standard suggests that
the Point of Contact (PoC) performs an assessment to deter-
mine whether it is a false alarm or an incident. Then the ISIRT
conducts an assessment to conﬁrm the PoC's assessment and
todecideonhow the incident shouldbedealtwith,who should
do it, and with what priority. To support the assessment and
the decision made, organisations should have agreed on a
classiﬁcation scale for incidents, based on impact on affected
assets and systems. Then next steps involve distributing re-
sponsibility for the different activities and providing formal
procedures for each notiﬁed person to follow. Documentation
is important. All activities should be logged, and the standard
lists activities on using guidelines for documentation, and for
updating relevant databases. Incidents may be escalated if
necessary for further assessments or decisions.
In the responses phase the incident is dealt with as planned
in the assessment and decision phase. As for the previous
phases, logging of actions and documentation is important.
Key activities from ISO/IEC 27035 that are speciﬁc for this
phase are:
 Determine if the incident is under control
 Assign internal resources and identify external resources
 Conduct forensic analysis, if required
 Communicating with internal and external people or
organisations
Incidents may be escalated, and the incident rating may be
changed as more information is available. When the incident
has been successfully dealt with, the incident should be
formally closed. This phase does not only include immediate
actions, such as cutting off or shutting down systems or net-
works, but also later responses as restoring the system and
preventing similar incidents from happening again.
The lessons learnt phase happens after an incident has been
resolved. Several activities may be performed at this stage,
and the ISO/IEC 27035 standard particularly mentions:
 Performing further forensic analysis, if required
 Identifying lessons learnt
 Reviewing, updating and improving the implementation of
security controls, the security incident management pol-
icy, and the organisations' existing risk assessment results
 Reviewing the effectiveness of the response process and
procedures, as well as the reporting format and the
organisational structure
 Updating incident and vulnerability databases
 Sharing review results within a trusted community
As Fig. 1 shows, the activity “Using collected incident data
over time” is suggested by NIST only, and not by ISO/IEC. This
activity means recording metrics related to each incident, to
keep track of the number of incidents being handled, the time
spent per incident, and objective and subjective assessments
of the incidents. The ISO/IEC states that experiences from the
incident should be used for improvements, but puts the focus
on subjective assessments and does not speciﬁcally suggest
the use of metrics.12
4. Reported experiences in the literature
The ﬁrst Scopus search returned 263 papers, and the second
Scopus search (covering 2012 and 2013) returned 47 papers.
146 and 27 papers, respectively, were excluded based on title
only, then another 92 and 7 were excluded based on title and
abstract. Most of these were considered irrelevant because
they proposedmodels, methods or tools, but did not report on
real-world experiences. Some papers were excluded because
they covered information security work in general (protect the
system), and not what to do in case of a breach. Some were
excluded because they were concerned with incident man-
agement in other areas, not speciﬁcally related to information
security. However, papers that reported on experiences on
incident management related to ICT in general (not only se-
curity incidents) were included if they considered security
incidents.
From the two searches, 25 and 13 papers were identiﬁed as
potentially relevant for this literature study. After a closer
examination of the papers a total of 14 papers were included.
One paper from IMF 2013 and a student thesis from a local
university were included as well. An overview of all included
papers can be found in Table 1. As can be seen from the table,
the included papers differ in scope and focus. They cover
different aspects of incident management, consider a variety
of organisation types, and the data collection methods vary.
As a result of these differences, it is not possible to compare
the studies to say which practices aremore common or which
are lacking. Instead, the studies together provide broad insight
to how information security incident management can be
practised, and identify experiences.
In the following we summarise ﬁndings from these studies
and experience reports according to the phases of ISO/IEC
27035, together with ﬁndings related to collaboration and
communication in incident management. We note that not all
the identiﬁed practices are easy to implement, as we discuss
further in Section 5.3. In the following summaries of practices
for each phase, we mark practices that many ﬁnd difﬁcult to
implement with an asterix (*).
4.1. Plan and prepare phase
Jaatun et al. (2009) studied the petroleum industry and iden-
tiﬁed the need for a short and common plan for incident
response. A ﬁnding from that study was that there were often
11 Escalation may imply that more actors are involved and that
the organisation decides to use more resources to handle the
incident than what is usually done for other incidents.
12 It should however be noted that ISO/IEC in other standards
recommends the use of metrics and provides a separate standard
on how to use and implement information security metrics.
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several plans that impacted incident response, and that the
current approach could appear scattered and randomly
structured. The three Norwegian companies studied by Hove
and Tårnes (2013) all had incident management plans in
some form. This included plans and guidelines for handling
(speciﬁc types of) security incidents, established routines,
incident management handbooks for the incident response
team, and plans for communication during incidents. Con-
tingency plans could also cover major IT incidents. One of the
companies had identiﬁed a lack of an established check-list to
use during incident response. In the power industry (Line,
2013) plans for incident management were not widely
established.
One of the main recommendations based on the experi-
ences at LRZ-CSIRT (Metzger et al., 2011) is the establishment
of a security incident response process. This implies speci-
fying roles, responsibilities and tasks related to incident
response. At LRZ-CSIRT, incident response is divided into six
phases: classiﬁcation, escalation, analysis, diagnosis, solu-
tion, and closing. The phases have been documented in
different formats, with a short summary for administrators
and service managers, a detailed description of the process
(more than 20 pages) for the CSIRT team, as well as a ﬁve-page
checklist that summarises the important steps. The short
summary contains contact details, themost important data to
be reported, and a few best practice recommendations, while
the detailed descriptions contain descriptions of re-
sponsibilities, tasks, and the detailed workﬂows, and provide
links to other documents and workﬂow descriptions. Solters
Kluwer (Cusick andMa, 2010) used a response script with nine
basic steps. In their experience, having a simple response
script was useful, as it could be quickly explained and fol-
lowed without difﬁculty. However, the script offered limited
assistance on the technical aspects.
Experiences from LRZ-CSIRT result in the recommendation
that organisations clearly deﬁnewhat a security incident is, so
that a security incident is distinguished from other issues
such as system misbehaviour due to conﬁguration errors.
Ahmad et al. (2012) and Hove and Tårnes (2013) found that the
deﬁnition of impact ratingswas important, as this determined
how incidents were handled.
Note that although plans and processes are important as a
basis, some organisations consider experienced incident
handlers to be of much more value during an emergency sit-
uation (Hove and Tårnes, 2013). Frequent training, including
courses, table top exercises, and more realistic exercises,
makes the organisation better prepared for unexpected in-
cidents, as it is impossible to plan for all eventualities.
Ownership to the routines is important, if they are to be use-
ful. Hence, one IT manager considers the construction of a
holistic plan to be the most challenging part of incident
management (Hove and Tårnes, 2013).
Incident handling may include a number of different roles,
e.g. system administrators and users, network administra-
tors, the public relations department, management, and law
enforcement authorities (Metzger et al., 2011). Deﬁning re-
sponsibilities is thus important. This is particularly important
in cases where IT has been outsourced (Hove and Tårnes,
2013). At LRZ-CSIRT a Security Incident Coordinator (SIC) is
selected on a case-by-case basis and is granted extended
decision-making power. The SIC is then responsible and can
coordinate the whole process (Metzger et al., 2011). In Finan-
ceOrg (Ahmad et al., 2012), the response to high-impact in-
cidents is coordinated by a High-impact Incident Response
Coordination Team, while other incidents are handled by a
Network Incident Response Team more independently. Two
of the companies surveyed by Hove and Tårnes (2013)
construct teams based on the incident, and one of them has
a speciﬁc team that is involved for major incidents. None of
the distribution system operators (DSOs) surveyed by Line
(2013) had established their own CSIRT within the
organisation.
The studies and experience reports provide an overview of
a lot of technical measures taken to prepare for incident
detection and response. Both Werlinger et al. (2010) and
Metzger et al. (2011) explain the importance of proper tools for
monitoring, and also the need for centralised tools that can
integrate input from several monitoring tools to gain a proper
overview of the situation. Incident response teams often
perform proactive activities (Ahmad et al., 2012; Hove and
Tårnes, 2013; Metzger et al., 2011; Werlinger et al., 2010) like
vulnerability assessments and penetration testing, and these
also require the use of tools. As stressed by Werlinger et al.
(2010), proper use of such tools often requires very speciﬁc
knowledge about the network and the type of trafﬁc to expect.
This is rarely documented, and is thus difﬁcult to obtain.
Furthermore, they found that security practitioners tend to
combine tools in unique ways to maximise their utility, and,
due to usability and budget constraints, practitioners quite
often created their own tools in form of shell scripts.
Metzger et al. (2011) explain their success with automating
part of the incident response process, something that has
made it possible to achieve adequate response in spite of
limited personnel, and also outside normal business hours. As
of now, more than 85 percent of all incidents are (at least
partially) automatically processed. One of the reasons why
this is possible is their deﬁnitions of Standard Security In-
cidents. These are speciﬁc types of security-related incidents
that occur frequently and that are considered to be of low risk.
As a consequence they allow certain simpliﬁcations of the
process, compared to other incidents.
“Awareness training and ofﬁcial statements of the man-
agement” is mentioned byMetzger et al. (2011) as important in
building a culture where incidents are reported. The study by
Ahmad et al. (2012) identiﬁed a positive reporting culture at
FinanceOrg where those who reported incidents were not
punished, something that was an advantage for incident
management. This was also the case for the power companies
surveyed by Line (2013). One of the recommendations from
Metzger et al. (2011) is that possible reporting ways have to be
deﬁned and each user has to be aware of these ways. At LRZ-
CSIRT they used a group telephone number and a mailing list
for these purposes. M€oller (2007) points at the importance and
challenge of making the CSIRT and its services known to its
constituency, and the establishment of trust so that the CSIRT
is trusted with conﬁdential data.
In the study of the petroleum industry (Jaatun et al., 2009) it
was found that individual awareness related to information
security should be improved. Furthermore, scenario training,
that was commonly used for HSE and other loss prevention
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areas, was not used for ICT incidents. The three companies
studied by Hove and Tårnes (2013) perform awareness raising
activitiese not necessarily on a regular basis, but from time to
time. They also train on incident management. The other
studies did not document any general awareness raising and
training activities in the organisations.
Motivations for performing training activities include
increased awareness among managers, staying familiarised
with routines, and having well-established roles and efﬁcient
coordination. The companies have used rehearsals to identify
areas of improvement. Conducting rehearsals is however
considered challenging; particularly ensuring that partici-
pants train on the right things, that the scenario is realistic
and that it is useful for real situations. Training activities may
include external suppliers, customers and government. In
general, rehearsals are not used for low-impact incidents
(Hove and Tårnes, 2013).
Summary of reported practices in the plan and prepare
phase:
 Create an accessible, short plan for incident response for
the entire organisation (*)
 Deﬁne what is a security incident
 Explicitly deﬁne the security response process with
assigned responsibilities
 Perform incident response training
 Raise awareness (*)
 Use proper tools (*).
4.2. Detection and reporting phase
At LRZ-CSIRT (Metzger et al., 2011), incidents were detected in
three different ways:
1. By local system and service administrators reporting in-
cidents manually by phone or email
2. From automatic security warnings from DFN-CERT or re-
ports from other third party services
3. Through local security monitoring mechanisms
From their experience, the manual approach was essential
and the most frequently used. The compromise studied by
Johnston and Reust (2006) was detected locally by system
administrators that received a suspicious error message. In
the studies and experience reports, most attention is however
given to the local securitymonitoring tools in use. In the study
by Werlinger et al. (2010), common detection activities iden-
tiﬁed were monitoring the organisation's IT system with
various tools such as antivirus and IDS, and sending and
receiving notiﬁcations. Metzger et al. (2011) report on using
IDS, as well as added monitoring mechanisms in custom NAT
gateways, mail monitoring mechanisms, and analysis of
netﬂow data. All DSOs surveyed by Line (2013) have IDS/IPS,
antivirus solutions, and ﬁrewalls13 in place for their admin-
istrative ICT systems. The tools currently in use however have
their limitations. The three companies surveyed by Hove and
Tårnes (2013) also report on using automatic monitoring sys-
tems. This study however points to the role of users in
detecting and reporting abnormal and suspicious system
behaviour.
Werlinger et al. (2010) report on a lack of accuracy in tools,
resulting in high false positive rates. Furthermore, usability of
tools is a concern, and often there is a need to write custom
tools or make adjustments to existing tools (Metzger et al.,
2011; Werlinger et al., 2010, 2008). In addition, the most com-
mon tools may not be applicable or typically used for all types
of systems. DSOs (Line, 2013) reported that new power auto-
mation systems might have detection systems in place, while
in most cases they relied on manual detection by operators
that experienced abnormalities or unexpected behaviour from
the system. In some cases control room managers did not
know if there were any detection systems in place or not.
Some organisations (Hove and Tårnes, 2013) had outsourced
the responsibility for network monitoring and detection of
incidents to third parties.
Efﬁcient detection often requires intimate knowledge
about the organisation's systems and services, and due to
complexity and lack of resources teams often rely on notiﬁ-
cations to detect incidents. Notiﬁcations could come from
various stakeholders, including users and other IT pro-
fessionals. One of the observations by Koivunen (2010) was
that, of the incidents studied, none of the victims of the se-
curity breaches seemed to have discovered the incident on
their own. External reports were required to get information
that an incident may have happened, or to complement the
victims' limited understanding of the true scope of the inci-
dent. In each of the incident cases studied, the incident was
discovered by someone with no apparent dealings with the
compromised party. Intermediaries were needed in order to
pass on the information, and often not all affected parties
were included in the information sharing. Koivunen (2010)
claims that “victims of many internet threats are among the last
ones to learn about the information security incidents affecting
them”. Some incidents aremore difﬁcult to detect. In the study
by Hove and Tårnes (2013), one of the interviewees claimed
that it is almost impossible to detect security incidents caused
by disloyal employees.
Receiving and handling notiﬁcations were challenging in
some cases. Lack of involvement from suppliers and service
providers was observed in the study of the petroleum industry
(Jaatun et al., 2009). Werlinger et al. (2010) found that the no-
tiﬁcations often resulted in a need for more communication
among the stakeholders. Metzger et al. (2011) experienced that
some administrators did not report incidents, either because
they did not know that they should or because they expected
that the reporting would result in “worst-case consequences”
as they were responsible for the system and therefore
considered themselves fully responsible for the incident.
The case study performed by Hove and Tårnes (2013)
included a survey of regular employees. In general, it was
found that few of the employees knew to whom security in-
cidents should be reported, and that they were not sure which
incidents to report. Reporting channels commonlymentioned
were the immediate supervisor, the local or central IT-
manager, or the security manager. For all companies the IT-
manager suspected underreporting of incidents. This was
13 A ﬁrewall is not a monitoring mechanism in itself, but is a
natural place to put monitoring functionality.
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also supported by a quote from one of the employees: “I have
the impression that it's probably more situations that should have
been reported than that are actually reported” (Hove and Tårnes,
2013). Some studies found that security events and incidents
were reported through existing help desk functions (Ahmad
et al., 2012; Hove and Tårnes, 2013).
Several of the studies and experience reports explain a lot
about the way incidents are registered, and it seems from the
cases that current practice is that documentation beginswhen
incidents are reported (Metzger et al., 2011). Ticketing or
incident tracking systems are mentioned in several studies
(Ahmad et al., 2012; Cusick and Ma, 2010; Metzger et al., 2011).
In some cases, aspects of the collection and reporting process
are automated (Cusick and Ma, 2010; Metzger et al., 2011). For
LRZ-CSIRT (Metzger et al., 2011) standardised XML-based no-
tiﬁcations from DFN-CERT made it possible to automatically
process such alerts. Furthermore, the use of a central system
for collection, correlation, and analysis of all data related to
security incidents was recommended.
Even when a ticketing or incident tracking system is in
place, some studies report on challenges with having all in-
cidents registered in the system. Cusick and Ma (2010) report
that some issues are observed but not logged, typically when
the case is considered to be non-critical. Kurowski and Frings
(2011) found that only 17% of the IT Security Managers sur-
veyed claimed that all cases were registered in the system. As
many as 50% reported that cases are received by email and
telephone without being added to the ticketing system. Hav-
ing complete tickets is challenging. Cusick and Ma (2010)
found that engineers often only included the minimum
amount of information required, i.e. just an initial description
and time of resolution.
Summary of reported practices in the detection and
reporting phase:
 Allow for detection through automatic tools, intra-
organisational collaboration and manual reporting
 Communicate with stakeholders and suppliers (*)
 Start documentation as soon as incidents are discovered
 Document all incidents (*).
4.3. Assessment and decision phase
At LRZ-CERT (Metzger et al., 2011) the incident reports are
supposed to include the contact details of the incident re-
porter, description of the identiﬁed security issues, evaluation
of the sufﬁciency of the data and an initial classiﬁcation.
Werlinger et al. (2010) found that typical activities for
analysing an anomaly was to conﬁrm, often with alternate
data sources, that a compromise had actually occurred, esti-
matingmagnitude and consequences, and tracking the source
of the anomaly. The diagnosis work relied on various security
tools, as well as key personal skills: “Pattern recognition, hy-
pothesis generation, communication, bricolage (i.e. dynamic inte-
gration of security tools in novel, unanticipated ways), and tacit
knowledge about their organisations and systems” (Werlinger
et al., 2010). Veriﬁcation that an incident in fact has occurred
may require collaboration with external organisations.
Furthermore, it requires expertise and knowledge of what is
normal in the system. The sameway, tracking of the source of
the anomaly often required speciﬁc technical expertise and
knowledge of attack patterns. If it was difﬁcult to ﬁnd the
source, it was considered useful to interact with other spe-
cialists that could offer novel perspectives as theywere new to
the investigation or had a different background. Simulations
of the incident could be performed. According to the study by
Kurowski and Frings (2011), the professional experience of
employees is most relevant for performing analyses of in-
cidents, followed by documentation of past incidents and help
desk systems.
Koivunen (2010) points to the problem of verifying the
validation of reports received from externals. It eases the
process if there is already a trust relationship between the
reporter and the organisation (such as the one that exists
between CERT-FI and F-Secure). However, his study identiﬁed
a considerable demand for the incident discoverers to retain
their anonymity, and it was the experience of CERT-FI that the
ultimate recipients of these reports were best being kept se-
cret from the reporters. As a result, reports from incident-
reporting clearing houses had an important role in three of
the six incidents studied.
Classiﬁcation of incidents is central in several of the cases
described, although the approach may vary slightly. Finan-
ceOrg (Ahmad et al., 2012) considers the criteria for incident
rating to be sensitive, but explain that incidents are classiﬁed
into two categories e low-impact and high-impact e based on
their impact on the organisation. All three companies sur-
veyed by Hove and Tårnes (2013) classify incidents based on
impact/severity (typically high, medium or low). One com-
pany additionally categorises based on type of incident and
the service or system affected. LRZ-CSIRT (Metzger et al., 2011)
uses four priorities e low, medium, high and very high. Their
classiﬁcation is based on aspects such as the number of
affected systems and services, whether internal or customer-
operatedmachines are affected, which services and SLAsmay
be impacted, additional dependencies on other services,
where the assumed attacker is located, and what type of
attack has been observed. A cross-correlation with other open
and resolved security incidents is also performed. SLAs and
themaximum reaction time that has been negotiatedwith the
affected customers are particularly important. In the study by
Werlinger et al. (2010), some organisations explained that the
potential cost of the incident was communicated tomanagers,
who then decided whether to proceed.
The classiﬁcation of an incident is important for what
happens next, in particular it may impact who is involved
(Ahmad et al., 2012; Hove and Tårnes, 2013). In the study by
Werlinger et al. (2010), it was however identiﬁed that in some
circumstances incidents that did not qualify as high-risk ac-
cording to the organisation's criteria were still investigated by
the security team in order to protect their systems.
Decisions on how to handle an incident can be particularly
challenging when IT operations are outsourced and there are
several suppliers involved. In the study by Hove and Tårnes
(2013), this is pointed out both by the company that have
outsourced IT operations and companies that act as suppliers.
In one of the companies, incidents are normally handled by a
team from one supplier, say Supplier A. In cases where the
incident concerns systems from other suppliers, Supplier A is
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responsible for reporting the incident to them. Problems arise
if none of the suppliers take responsibility for the dealing with
the incident. Furthermore, assigning priorities for incidents
may be a challenge in outsourcing environments, i.e. “when a
particular server is down, what does it mean for the customer?” (de
Souza et al., 2011).
Summary of reported practices in the assessment and de-
cision phase:
 Deﬁne details to be contained in incident reports
 Conﬁrm incidents
 Classify incidents
 Take special care in outsourcing scenarios (*).
4.4. Responses phase
Hove and Tårnes (2013) identiﬁed differing purposes for the
response phase. One company stated that although it is
important to get the systems up and running as fast as
possible, it is important to make sure that the incident is
properly resolved before restoring normal operations, and to
determine whether the system is vulnerable to more attacks.
One of the other companies, on the other side, stated that
their main purpose is to ﬁnd a temporary solution to the
problem so that they can retain normal business operation
and minimise business impact. This is important as they are
evaluated by their customers based on the availability of the
services they deliver.
Kurowski and Frings (2011) identiﬁed hardware and soft-
ware documentation as the most important type of informa-
tion for dealing with IT incidents. Second came
documentation of past incidents. Ahmad et al. (2012) highlight
the need for communication and cooperation in the responses
phase. The organisation's incident tracking system facilitates
communication between technical teams. This is important
for documentation and provides a timeline of activities and a
chain of evidence for incident handling. As such it is impor-
tant for monitoring and logging the progress of the incident
handling. For high-impact incidents, the collaboration process
is characterised as “highly mature”. Both technical and busi-
ness staff is involved, with one conference call set up for each.
In the business conference call, progress is explained in a non-
technical way, to ensure that the business gets relevant and
understandable information about the incident. Phone, email,
and the helpdesk system are used for communication,
particularly towards the technical personnel at the Network
Incident Response Team.
Metzger et al. (2011) provide more insight into the types of
responses a CSIRT typically performs. Immediate responses
may include removal of affected systems from the network,
creating backups and disk images, performing basic IT fo-
rensics, escalating the incident, and documenting all steps.
Themain goal in these early stages is to keep in touchwith the
individual that reported the incident and to ﬁnd a way to
restore the affected system. At the University of Oviedo, about
35% of the incidents required staff to go and study the com-
puter involved (Cadavieco et al., 2012).
A challenge experienced by Metzger et al. (2011) is the lack
of sufﬁcient personnel with expertise in using forensic tools.
Thus they do not use speciﬁc or custom-built forensic tools for
this, but instead rely on general-purpose tools and mecha-
nisms that are part of the default system conﬁguration.
Limited expertise on forensics is also reported by Ismail et al.
(2011) and Hove and Tårnes (2013). Companies in some cases
rely on third parties or the police for forensic investigations
(Hove and Tårnes, 2013; Johnston and Reust, 2006).
For common and less severe incidents the LRZ-CSIRT
response is performed in a fully automatic manner (Metzger
et al., 2011), where examples of automatic actions include
forwarding of information to responsible on-site adminis-
trator, suspension of the offending machine's internet access,
and notiﬁcation of the CSIRT team. Later responses, such as
re-activation of blocked IP addresses are currently a manual
task. After a solution has been implemented, the system is
monitored extensively for a period of up to 14 days.
The companies studied by Hove and Tårnes (2013) are
aware of potential privacy implications of response work.
They explain that user-owned ﬁles are accessed in compli-
ance with privacy legislation, and one of the companies has a
central security advisor that is involved in cases concerning
employees' privacy.
Summary of reported practices in the responses phase:
 Deﬁne response priorities
 Collaborate with technical and business staff
 Remain in contact with reporter of incident
 Automate where possible.
4.5. Lessons learnt phase
The study of the petroleum industry (Jaatun et al., 2009)
showed that learning from incidents was considered impor-
tant, but that organisations found it difﬁcult in practice. Ac-
tivities aimed towards learning seems however to be common
in the surveys and experience reports we have identiﬁed. At
LRZ-CERT (Metzger et al., 2011), reviews are performed after
each major incident, as well as periodically. In one of the or-
ganisations surveyed byWerlinger et al. (2010), recent security
incidents are discussed weekly. At FinanceOrg (Ahmad et al.,
2012), the goal is to review each high-impact incident within
24 hours of the system services being restored, resulting in a
post-incident report. There is no structured process for
reviewing low-impact incidents, however the team involved
still attempts to learn from such incidents and identify areas
of improvements. Most DSOs surveyed by Line (2013) have
routines for regular meetings or for evaluations after an inci-
dent had occurred, but still there are some DSOs that do not
perform regular reporting or evaluations, neither in the team,
norwith topmanagement. All companies studied by Hove and
Tårnes (2013) perform post-incident activities for major in-
cidents. Additionally, one of the companies performs reviews
of incidents where the incident handling was not considered
efﬁcient.
The motivation for performing learning activities include:
keeping security practitioners updated on current threats
(Werlinger et al., 2010), getting new ideas on how to resolve
challenging incidents (Werlinger et al., 2010), discussing
possible improvements of the incident management process
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and its activities (Hove and Tårnes, 2013; Metzger et al., 2011),
performing trend analysis (Hove and Tårnes, 2013; Metzger
et al., 2011), identifying direct causes (Ahmad et al., 2012;
Hove and Tårnes, 2013), identifying security measures that
can prevent future incidents (Ahmad et al., 2012; Hove and
Tårnes, 2013; Metzger et al., 2011), and updating risk assess-
ments of involved systems (Ahmad et al., 2012). At FinanceOrg
(Ahmad et al., 2012) compliance requirements through Basel II
and SarbaneseOxley require assessment and reporting of
incidents.
It seems from the studies that learning activities primarily
include personnel from the incident response team, although
this is not always stated directly. The most detailed descrip-
tion of the learning process is that of the high-impact in-
cidents at FinanceOrg. For these incidents, the review process
consists of at least threemeetings. The ﬁrstmeeting is a brain-
storming meeting that involves only technical people. The
same technical people later join in a second meeting where
causal factors are examined and potential mitigations iden-
tiﬁed. The participants and the goals of the third meeting are
not explained. The output of the incident review process is a
post-incident report that contains the causal analysis, a new
risk assessment of the affected system, and a list of tasks that
multiple parties must complete.
Dissemination of incident information and lessons learnt
seem to happen in varying extent and by different means in
the organisations studied. In the study by Hove and Tårnes
(2013), one of the companies receives monthly incident re-
ports from the suppliers, and arranges monthly meetings
where incidents are discussed. In addition, they have a
quarterly meeting of their security board, where also infor-
mation security incidents are discussed. At FinanceOrg
(Ahmad et al., 2012), information on low-impact incidents is
included in formal reports to management, where the focus is
on technical means and statistical information. These reports
therefore contain only generalised learning information. In
addition, informal communication channels are used for
dissemination of incident knowledge. There is however a lack
of formal policies on what should be disseminated and which
information channels should be used. Few of the surveys
mention sharing incident information outside the organisa-
tion. The survey of the petroleum industry (Jaatun et al., 2009)
identiﬁed a lack of openness about incidents and a lack of
willingness to report incidents to the industry as a whole. One
of the companies in Hove and Tårnes' study reports on sharing
information on some speciﬁc incidents with trusted commu-
nities and partners, and points at the potential for using in-
cidents for increased awareness. The IT-manager is quoted:
“never waste a good crisis” (Hove and Tårnes, 2013).
Few report on a regular and successful use of metrics
related to incident management. One of the exceptions is
Cusick andMa (2010), who use indicators like Incident rates over
time andMean time to repair, and have achieved a better view of
where incidents are stemming from; which system domains
and particular applications are involved. Werlinger et al.
(2008) mention support for measuring to be one of many
reasons for setting up an IDS. Their study also shows that
reporting is an important feature of such a system, although it
is challenging to conﬁgure the IDS adequately. Ahmad et al.
(2012) found FinanceOrg to not have any follow-up
procedures covering costs of incidents, and Line (2013) states
that none of the companies in her study has implemented
metrics, but some are able to estimate the cost of reestab-
lishing regular operations after an incident occurred. Jaatun
et al. (2009) identiﬁed the need for measuring the efﬁciency
of the incident management process.
Several challenges are reported when it comes to learning
from incidents. Inadequate involvement of suppliers is
pointed out as a problem in the petroleum industry (Jaatun
et al., 2009). A focus on direct causes, rather than underlying
causal structures, is mentioned by Ahmad et al. (2012). They
also identiﬁed a strong focus on technical information over
policy and risk. For low-impact incidents in particular, a focus
on solving the problem as fast as possible seems to have
evolved into a dislike for “paperwork”. Incidents are efﬁciently
solved, and the team gathers a large amount of technical in-
formation in order to do this. Gathering additional data for
future learning is however not considered. For high-impact
incidents, there is an understanding of the importance of
identifying the root causes of an incident, including organ-
isational and human factors. However, they strugglewith how
learning should be done in practice. In particular, their high-
impact incident management process does not respond to
incident precursors,14 identiﬁed dissemination challenges
have not been addressed, and key areas such as policy and
risk do not beneﬁt from incident data.
Although learning from incidents has its challenges, the
incident statistics reported by FinanceOrg should motivate
more organisations to improve on this aspect. They claim that
their learning process for high-impact incidents has resulted
in a reduction of incidents of around 200 per month in 2002
down to only 16 at the time of the study.15 From this we may
surmise that learning from incidents has an important
contribution to preventive measures, as illustrated by Jaatun
et al. (2009) through the interaction with “external dynamics”.
Summary of reported practices in the lessons learnt phase:
 Perform assessment and evaluation after every incident (*)
 Disseminate incident information (*)
 Use of metrics for learning effects and tuning of technical
measures (*)
 Learn from incidents as a measure for reducing the num-
ber of incidents (*)
4.6. Collaboration and communication in incident
management
Studies in the petroleum industry (Jaatun et al., 2009) revealed
that the organisations usually had several plans covering
different aspects of the incident management process. It was
however found that suppliers were not adequately involved in
planning for incidents, although the operator would in many
cases depend on them during incident management.
Furthermore, individual information security awareness was
14 Deﬁned by Ahmad et al. as “a consequence of events that
have the immediate potential to cause a high-impact incident”.
15 The time of the study is not provided in the paper published
in 2012.
c om p u t e r s & s e c u r i t y 4 5 ( 2 0 1 4 ) 4 2e5 7 51
Table 2 e Summary of ﬁndings of the surveys and experience reports related to the recommendations of ISO/IEC 27035.
Phase ISO/IEC 27035 recommendation Identiﬁed practice
Plan and prepare Produce policy; deﬁne and document incident
management scheme
Having a plan was recommended. When not available this
was considered a weakness. (Ahmad et al., 2012; Metzger
et al., 2011)
Gain senior management commitment Ofﬁcial statements of the management are seen as
important for building a reporting culture (Metzger et al.,
2011).
Update security and risk management policies e
Establish ISIRT Deﬁning roles is considered important (Metzger et al., 2011).
Some, but not all, organisations had established an ISIRT.
Establish relationships with relevant organisations Clearly deﬁned roles are essential in cases where IT
operations are outsourced (Hove and Tårnes, 2013).
Implement technical and other support mechanisms Technical tools are useful, but using them efﬁciently
requires training and speciﬁc competence of the technology
as well as how the organisation uses ICT (Werlinger et al.,
2010; Metzger et al., 2011). Improved efﬁciency can be
achieved through automation (Metzger et al., 2011).
Awareness and training Mentioned related to reporting culture (Ahmad et al., 2012;
Line, 2013; Metzger et al., 2011; Hove and Tårnes, 2013).
Awareness activities and training are prioritised in some of
the companies (Hove and Tårnes, 2013).
Test incident management scheme Rehearsals are valuable for improving incident
management (Hove and Tårnes, 2013) but few studies
mention this.
Detection and reporting Detection of security vulnerabilities and events
(monitoring systems,
user reports, external parties)
Manual reports (internal/external) are very important,
although a lot of effort is put into monitoring tools
(Werlinger et al., 2010; Line, 2013; Metzger et al., 2011;
Koivunen, 2010; Hove and Tårnes, 2013). Identiﬁed problems
are the usability of tools (Werlinger et al., 2008, 2010;
Metzger et al., 2011) and the high number of false positives
(Werlinger et al., 2010), reliance on tacit knowledge
(Werlinger et al., 2010), and problems of receiving reports
(Werlinger et al., 2010; Jaatun et al., 2009; Metzger et al.,
2011; Koivunen, 2010).
Collection of information Use various tools. May require communication among
stakeholders (Werlinger et al., 2010). Challenging in
distributed organisations (Hove and Tårnes, 2013).
Reporting and documentation Documentation begins when incidents are reported. The
use of a central system for collection, correlation, and
analysis of all data is recommended (Metzger et al., 2011).
Quality of documentation is a potential problem (Kurowski
and Frings, 2011; Cusick and Ma, 2010).
Assessment and decision Decide if security incident Veriﬁcation of incident may require collaboration with
external organisations (Werlinger et al., 2010; Koivunen,
2010). Also requires knowledge of what is normal in the
system (Werlinger et al., 2010).
Classify incident Classiﬁcation of incidents is central in several of the cases
described (Ahmad et al., 2012; Metzger et al., 2011; Hove and
Tårnes, 2013).
Decide on actions and distribute responsibilities;
provide formal procedures
Classiﬁcation is important for what happens next, including
who is responsible (Ahmad et al., 2012; Hove and Tårnes,
2013). Distributing responsibilities can be challenging when
different suppliers are involved (Hove and Tårnes, 2013).
Responses Immediate responses: assign resources, determine
if incident is under control
Main goal: keep in touch with the reporter and ﬁnd a way to
restore the system (Werlinger et al., 2010; Hove and Tårnes,
2013). For common and less severe incidents, response may
be fully automatic (Metzger et al., 2011).
Later responses Monitoring of system afterwards (Werlinger et al., 2010).
Forensic analysis, if required A possible challenge is the lack of personnel with expertise
on forensic tools (Metzger et al., 2011). Some have
procedures for handling electronic evidence (Hove and
Tårnes, 2013). Companies may rely on external parties for
this (Hove and Tårnes, 2013; Johnston and Reust, 2006).
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not at a satisfactory level. Finally, andmaybemost disturbing,
the study revealed a “deep sense ofmistrust” between process
control engineers and ICT network administrators.
The identiﬁed issues can be interpreted as symptoms of
unsatisfactory collaboration and communication when it
comes to information security and incident management in
particular. This is disturbing since incident management is
collaborative in nature. This is exempliﬁed by Werlinger et al.
(2010), who found that:
 conﬁguration of monitoring tools for incident response
requires extensive knowledge of issues that are rarely
explicitly documented and obtaining this knowledge may
involve external stakeholders
 the complexity of the IT systems, and also the lack of re-
sources for monitoring, cause incident detection to rely on
notiﬁcations from various stakeholders, including end-
users
 veriﬁcation that there actually is an incident e not a false
alarm e may require collaboration with external
organisations
 managers often need to be involved in decision making.
The importance of collaboration and communication is
reﬂected in the procedures for responding to high-impact in-
cidents at FinanceOrg (Ahmad et al., 2012). Technical and
business conference calls are set up in order to gather
knowledge and communicate progress; in general, the man-
agement of the incident relies heavily on communication via
teleconferencing, phone, e-mail and the helpdesk system. It is
not without reason that Werlinger et al. (2010) list communi-
cation as one of the ﬁve key skills required for diagnosis work.
Hove and Tårnes (2013) emphasise the challenge of infor-
mation collection and dissemination during the incident
handling process. For organisations with distributed organ-
isational structures there are many sources of information.
Knowing howmuch information to share can be difﬁcult. Too
little information could lead to wrong decisions due to an
erroneous overview of the situation, while too much infor-
mation can be overwhelming and cause delays in decision-
making. This is also supported by Ahmad et al. (2012) where
an information security manager states that the sharing, or
rather the ﬁnding, of information was one of the most chal-
lenging parts of her job. de Souza et al. (2011) found that
people were the most important sources of information in
working with complex incidents. In only 33% of the cases was
the information from the incident tool sufﬁcient.
In cases where IT operations are outsourced, collaboration
during incident management is even more challenging. Even
minor incidents can be problematic if all assume the incident
to be someone else's responsibility. As pointed out by one
supplier, “It is also a political ‘game’. Who will pay for it?” (Hove
and Tårnes, 2013). Moreover, customers and suppliers often
handle different parts of the incident (Hove and Tårnes, 2013).
Jaatun et al. (2009) revealed that information security was
viewed merely as a technical issue. This technical focus was
also found in the study of FinanceOrg (Ahmad et al., 2012).
For low-impact incidents in particular, the emphasis was on
technical information, over policy and risk. For high-impact
incidents there was an understanding that it was important
to identify root causes that goes beyond the technical issues
(e.g. gaps in the underlying processes). However, the learning
process also for high-impact incidents involved only tech-
nical personnel in the ﬁrst phases. Reporting from incidents
was technical. Based on the low-impact incidents, several
reports were produced for management. This was typically
statistical information with a focus on the technical aspects.
From the high-impact incidents, the reports were more
detailed and a bit broader in scope, but dissemination to non-
technical personnel was not performed satisfactorily. There
was a lack of formal policy on how information should be
disseminated. Furthermore, the silo structure of the organi-
sation was a hindrance for effective sharing of experiences.
The practice can probably be summarised by a ﬁnding by
Werlinger et al. (2010), where the representative from one of
the organisations studied explained that security incidents
Table 2 e (continued )
Phase ISO/IEC 27035 recommendation Identiﬁed practice
Communicate internally and externally Need for communication. Use incident tracking systems,
conference calls, phone, and email. May involve technical
and business staff. Knowledge of who to contact is essential
(Hove and Tårnes, 2013).
Escalate, if necessary Escalation mentioned as one of the response activities
(Werlinger et al., 2010; Hove and Tårnes, 2013).
Lessons learnt Further forensic analysis e
Identify lessons learnt Incident statistics created (Ahmad et al., 2012; Hove and
Tårnes, 2013); (periodic) review of incidents (Ahmad et al.,
2012; Werlinger et al., 2010; Line, 2013; Metzger et al., 2011;
Hove and Tårnes, 2013); informal discussions (Ahmad et al.,
2012); creation of post-incident reports (Ahmad et al., 2012).
Update relevant databases; share results with
trusted community
Learning activities mainly include technical personnel,
although reports may be created for management (Ahmad
et al., 2012). Lack of willingness to share incident
information outside the organisation (Jaatun et al., 2009).
Limited sharing with external parties in speciﬁc cases (Hove
and Tårnes, 2013).
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were discussed weekly so that security practitioners could
learn about new threats and assist in solving challenging
incidents.
5. Discussion
The empirical studies and the experience reports provide
important insights into current practice when it comes to
incident management (Research question 1 and 2). Below we
discuss how the ﬁndings from the surveys and experience
reports relate to the recommendations of ISO/IEC 27035
(Research question 3). We then describe some of the identiﬁed
successful practises that may serve as inspiration for others,
before going on to discuss particularly challenging practices
and how these challengesmay be addressed. Finally, based on
the challenges we identify future research needs.
5.1. Practice vs. the ISO/IEC 27035 standard
Table 2 provides a summary of the recommended activities of
ISO/IEC 27035 related to the identiﬁed practice in the surveys
and experience reports. The main impression is that what the
studies consider to be good practice is in line with the rec-
ommendations of the standard. However, the studies and
experience reports document that several of the recommen-
dations are not easy to perform in practice, as elaborated
further in Section 5.3.
For some of the recommendations, there is no or only
limited identiﬁed practice in the surveys and experience re-
ports. Note that this does not necessarily mean that the ac-
tivity is not performed, only that it is not documented in the
papers.
5.2. Inspirational examples
The surveyed literature identiﬁes examples of good practice
that can motivate and inspire organisations to improve their
own way of performing incident management.
 It is recommended to have a simple plan: Simple plans can
be quickly explained and followed without difﬁculty
(Cusick and Ma, 2010).
 Using automation as a means to improve efﬁciency:
Automation16 seems to be best practice for dealing with
common and low-risk incidents (Metzger et al., 2011).
 Documenting incidents provides beneﬁts: Documentation
should start as soon as an incident is reported or detected
(Metzger et al., 2011). An incident tracking system should
be used (Metzger et al., 2011), and it is recommended to
collect all data related to the incident into one single sys-
tem (Metzger et al., 2011). Cusick andMa (2010) reported on
high beneﬁts of starting using a tool for information
sharing on incidents, where anyone with permission could
request notiﬁcations in case of new events or changes.
They said: “This capability has been a boon to communications
around production incidents and has even reduced the frequency
of status requests by management […] This has freed up the
support team to focus on incident resolution […] This feature
alone has made our entire IRT [Incident Response Team] process
worth the effort of creating, deploying, and maintaining.”
(Cusick and Ma, 2010)
 Learning from incidents is worth the effort: FinanceOrg
(Ahmad et al., 2012) has experienced a drastic reduction in
incidents, something which is considered a result of the
learning process that hey have implemented.
 Metrics can provide increased understanding: Cusick and
Ma (2010) report that a positive side-effect of implement-
ing the incident management process was that they could
collect incident statistics automatically and identify Key
Performance Indicators, like incident rates over time or Mean
Time To Repair. They claim that this “has been extremely
useful in understanding the failure patterns, durations, and im-
pacts” (Cusick and Ma, 2010).
5.3. Incident management challenges
The studies and experience reports identify some aspects that
seem particularly challenging, where additional support and
concrete guidance is needed. This is not to say that more
standards are called for, but rather identiﬁes a need for more
tools and domain-speciﬁc guidelines in some areas.
 Creating plans and classiﬁcations of incidents: Some of the
organisations report on a lack of plans (Line, 2013), or the
need for improved or simpler plans (Jaatun et al., 2009;
Hove and Tårnes, 2013).
 Gaining senior management commitment: All agree that
this is important, but it seems to be difﬁcult in practice.
One reason for this may be optimistic bias on part of the
management, as documented by Rhee et al. (2012) e senior
managers are less likely to focus on incident management
if they do not perceive incidents as a problem.
 Involving all employees: As information security concerns
everyone and current trends show that attacks are now
targeting employees directly, not necessarily only the tech-
nical systems, all employees should be aware and well
trained in recognising and reporting incidents (Hove and
Tårnes, 2013). Current incident management standards
describe training activities for incident handlers only,
although other publications such as NIST SP 800-16 (Wilson
et al., 2008) recommend not only security awareness, but
also security basics training for all employees. Despite the
focus ondetection tools,manual reporting seems to be a key
when it comes to detection of incidents (Hove and Tårnes,
2013; Koivunen, 2010; Line, 2013; Metzger et al., 2011;
Werlinger et al., 2010). Organisations would beneﬁt from
advice on how to motivate reporting of incidents, how to
make it easy to report incidents (both for internals and ex-
ternals), andhowtoverify reports.HerathandRao (2009)has
documented that employees who have a good understand-
ing of threats demonstrate better compliance with security
policies, and it is reasonable to extend this to expecting that
higherawarenesswill contribute tobettermanual reporting.
16 Note, however, that this requires some mechanism to classify
incidents as either high-risk or low-risk, which in turn is prone to
false positives and false negatives.
c om p u t e r s & s e c u r i t y 4 5 ( 2 0 1 4 ) 4 2e5 754
 Coping with the existing tools and their lack of usability: A
lot of the studies mention a high number of technical tools
that are used for incident detection and response.
Although highly useful, they generally seem to suffer from
a lack of usability, a high number of false positives, and a
need for very precise and rarely documented information
(Metzger et al., 2011; Werlinger et al., 2010, 2008).
 Quality of incident registrations: Although organisations
have incident tracking systems in place, incidents may still
not be registered. This is a problem for low-impact incidents
in particular (Cusick and Ma, 2010; Kurowski and Frings,
2011). Moreover, the quality of the registrations may be a
problem, as technicians may only register the absolute
minimum of information required (Cusick and Ma, 2010).
 Collaboration among teams and across disciplines: It
seems that collaboration within the team works satisfac-
torily, but that communication with externals and also
collaboration including both technical and business staff
are more challenging (Ahmad et al., 2012; Hove and Tårnes,
2013; Werlinger et al., 2010). The impression is that
response and learning activities mainly include technical
staff. Still, the business units affected and management
have an important role to play e particularly for severe
incidents.
 Practising incident management in outsourcing scenarios:
In cases were IT is outsourced, deﬁnition of clear re-
sponsibilities is highly important. Problems arise if a sup-
plier does not want to take responsibility for dealing with
an incident. Evenminor incidents can cause problems if all
assume someone else has the responsibility for dealing
with the issue (Hove and Tårnes, 2013).
 Motivating learning activities:Organisations seem to agree
that learning from incidents is important. It is however
considered difﬁcult by some (Jaatun et al., 2009). Learning
from low-impact incidents also seems not to be prioritised
(Ahmad et al., 2012; Hove and Tårnes, 2013). It has been
claimed that “most breaches do not happen immediately, but
take place over time” (Scholl and Mangold, 2011). Thus, by
detecting initial or early events, it is possible to prevent
incidents. For the same reason, learning from low-impact
incidents and security events should not be omitted
(Ahmad et al., 2012).
 Sharing lessons learnt: It seems that lessons learnt and
other incident information is often available only to some
selected few, although there may be several other in-
dividuals or departments in the organisation that would
beneﬁt from such information (Ahmad et al., 2012).
5.4. Approaches to addressing the challenges
Although current standards and guidelines for information
security incident management provide good recommenda-
tions for companies, the identiﬁed challenges when it
comes to implementing the recommendations of ISO/IEC
27035 point to a need for additional guidance. This guid-
ance would in many cases need to be more concrete than
what is expected from standards, and should rather be
directed towards speciﬁc industries or speciﬁc types of
organisations and take the form of examples and more
concrete advice. Examples of additional guidance that may
be needed are:
 Templates and examples of incident management plans
 Examples of successful approaches and practical advice
when it comes to gaining seniormanagement commitment
 Inspiration for campaigns directed towards training of
employees in recognising and reporting incidents
 Examples of successful approaches to receive and verify
manual incident reports
 Introduction to common tools used for incident detection
and response, and an overview of their pros and cons
 Examples of successful approaches to increasing motiva-
tion for incident documentation among incident
responders
 Recommendations on which roles should somehow be
involved in incident management, and the beneﬁts of
including them
 Practical advice on dealing with the challenges of incident
management in outsourcing scenarios
 Motivational examples, as well as practical advice, on how
learning activities could be extended to include non-
technical staff
In addition there is clearly a need for improved tools for
incident management. Tools that are used for incident
detection and response need better usability and must pro-
duce fewer false positives. This has also been pointed out for
system administrator tools in general (Barrett et al., 2004).
5.5. Research needs in incident management
Of the 15 papers included in this study, four are experience
reports. This leaves 11 studies. Several of these studies have
limitations when it comes to academic rigour. In particular,
this applies to some of the surveys, like one of the included
papers that only had two respondents per questionnaire
(Ismail et al., 2011). Interviews seem to be the preferred data
collection method, as more than half of the resulting papers
are interview studies. The challenge of performing empirical
research on information security in organisations is however
discussed by Kotulic and Clark (2004). They claim that there
will usually be a generalmistrust to any outsider whowants to
obtain data on internal information security issues. To cope
with this they suggest that such research studies focus on a
few selected organisations, where trust can be mutually built
between the researcher(s) and the involved employees/de-
partments. They point out that some information collection
strategies might be better suited than others for such conﬁ-
dential data, and that one of the factors for successful studies
is that the organisation(s) studied is allowed to be involved in
discussing and approving the results. This can explain the
wide use of interviews as collection method among our
identiﬁed studies, as the interviewees feel a certain control of
the situation and misunderstandings may be solved right
away (Robson, 2011).
Based on the material we have identiﬁed, we claim that
there is a need for more empirical studies in this ﬁeld. The
material contains a few case studies that go deep into how
information security incident management is performed in
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one or a few organisations. The study of Ahmad et al. (2012) is
a good example in this respect. These types of studies are
highly useful in increasing the understanding of what works
well and what is challenging, as well as understanding the
rationale behind current practice. However, in order to know
more about how a wider variety of organisations practice
incident response, more such studies are needed. It would be
useful with more longitudinal studies and the use of addi-
tional data collection methods such as observations. The
material contains a few studies that collect responses from a
higher number of organisations. These provide broader per-
spectives. The best examples of this type of study in the ma-
terial are however either not speciﬁcally considering
information security incidents (de Souza et al., 2011) or are not
speciﬁc enough on the context of the organisations (Werlinger
et al., 2010). Because of this, it is not fully clear how the results
can be reasonably transferred to information security incident
management in other organisations. Thusmore studies of this
type are needed to improve understanding of important as-
pects of information security incident management.
In general, the studies show a limited use of theory to
frame their research and ﬁndings. Ahmad et al. (2012) use
organisational learning theories to explain the ﬁndings; as do
Jaatun et al. (2009). Findings are to some extent related to
previous ﬁndings in other studies (Ahmad et al., 2012;
Werlinger et al., 2010, 2008; de Souza et al., 2011). Future
studies should to a larger extent compare their ﬁndings to
other studies in the ﬁeld and use theories to shed light on the
ﬁndings. Studies could also seek to evaluate the relevance of
established theories from related domains.
Based on the above-mentioned challenges and the inspi-
rational examples, a number of distinct research needs in this
space can be identiﬁed.
 Better tools: There is a need for tool development and
evaluation of the developed tools in order to assess
whether or not the tools provide improved usability and
accuracy. In addition, research should delve into the un-
derlying question of why do the tools suffer from low us-
ability and what can be done to improve development of
such tools in general.
 Tacit knowledge: There is a need for a better understand-
ing of the role of tacit knowledge and implementation and
evaluation of strategies for dealing with the current
dependence on tacit knowledge.
 Identifying root causes: Current learning activities are
focused on technical aspects and identiﬁcation of direct
causes, but the root cause may well lie in policies, pro-
cedures, lack of competence, or other underlying aspects
(Ahmad et al., 2012). To increase the learning outcome
from incidents, organisations should receive more support
for learning activities so that they are able to include
relevant types of personnel in the analysis and ask ques-
tions that will help reveal underlying causes. In this
respect, it is necessary with improved understanding of
learning processes for incident management. Research in
this ﬁeld should take relevant theory into account.
 Outsourcing: There is a need for improved understanding
of the challenges of incident response in outsourcing sce-
narios in order to identify strategies that are successful.
This particularly concerns cases where several suppliers
are serving the same customer.
 Metrics: Metrics seem to be used to a very limited extent
when it comes to incident management, although organi-
sations report on beneﬁts from performing measurements
on incidents. Research is needed in order to identify useful
metrics and investigate how they can be meaningfully
applied in different organisational environments.
 Obstacles to improvement: The lack of plans regarding
information security incident management in some orga-
nisations points to the need to study which policies,
organisational dynamics, and economic incentives prevent
signiﬁcant improvements in incident management and
limit the adoption of guidelines.
6. Summary and conclusions
We have summarised recommendations for incident man-
agement documented in standards documents and have
provided an overview of documented experiences in litera-
ture. We argue that the ISO/IEC 27035 standard is a good
starting point for organisations when it comes to incident
management. Implementing this standard, with all its rec-
ommendations and activities, is however not straightforward.
While there are several inspirational success stories, the
studied practices and experiences documented in literature
have led to identiﬁcation of challenging aspects that should be
given particular attention when developing additional sup-
port in form of guidelines, best practice descriptions or tools.
We have identiﬁed areas of further research on information
security incident management, and ﬁnd that in addition to
speciﬁc research needs for tools and mechanisms, there is a
need for more empirical research to answer the fundamental
question of why the challenges remain, and how they can be
resolved.
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Abstract
This paper reports on an interview study on information security incident management that has been conducted in organizations
operating industrial control systems that are highly dependent on conventional IT systems. Six distribution service operators from
the power industry have participated in the study. We have investigated current practice regarding planning and preparation activities
for incident management, and identiﬁed similarities and differences between the two traditions of conventional IT systems and
industrial control systems. The ﬁndings show that there are differences between the IT and ICS disciplines in how they perceive
an information security incident and how they plan and prepare for responding to such. The completeness of documented plans
and procedures for incident management varies. Where documentation exists, this is in general not well-established throughout
the organization. Training exercises with speciﬁc focus on information security are rarely performed. There is a need to create a
more uniﬁed approach to information security incident management in order for the power industry to be sufﬁciently prepared to
meet the challenges posed by Smart Grids in the near future.
Index Terms
Industrial control systems, Information security, Information technology, Incident management, Power industry, Smart grids
I. INTRODUCTION
Information technology (IT)1 is permeating all levels of industrial control systems (ICS)2. The two traditions of IT and ICS
differ in several aspects, like terminology, security culture, security requirements, and technologies used [1]. As an example, if
a computer is infected by malware, the most common response is to disconnect the computer from the network and reinstall it.
The priority is on removing the malware, sacriﬁcing the availability of the computer. In an ICS, availability is the top priority.
Shutting down a component may have a signiﬁcant economic cost.
Industrial control systems (ICS) are frequently used for controlling physical objects, such as oil installations, railway signalling
systems, or power production systems. An ICS is often safety-critical, as a malfunctioning ICS may have severe consequences
for the physical environment [2]. In the near future, if not already, ICS will consist mainly of ”regular” IT components. The two
traditions of IT and ICS will then need to collaborate in order to ensure continuous operation of the systems and uninterrupted
power supply. The information security incident management process should therefore be integrated with safety procedures
and procedures for responding to industrial accidents at the installation.
An information security incident management process consists of different phases; preparations, responding to an incident, and
post-incident evaluations and improvements [3]. Beneﬁts of a structured approach to infomation security incident management
include [3] an overall improvement of information security, reduced impact of incidents, improved focus and better prioritization
of security acticities, and better and more updated information security risk assessment efforts.
We have performed a study to investigate how information security incident management is performed in organizations
operating industrial control systems, more speciﬁcally in distribution system operators (DSOs) in the power industry3. DSOs
own and manage the power distribution grid4. They are selected as the domain of study due to the advent of the Smart Grid,
which causes the integration of IT and ICS to take several steps further [1]. For consumers, the most obvious aspect of the Smart
1in many contexts also referred to as Information and Communication Technology (ICT)
2Several terms are used interchangably to denote such systems: industrial control systems (ICS), Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA),
process control systems, automation systems. Throughout this paper the term control systems and/or ICS will be used.
3This work is funded partially by the Norwegian Research Council through the DeVID project, grant no 217528, and partially by the Norwegian University
of Science and Technology through the project Smart Grids as a Critical Infrastructure
4The distribution grid is low voltage part of the power grid, the part that transports power into every single household and power consumer.
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Grid is the introduction of smart meters, but the DSOs are faced with many other IT challenges that include and go beyond
the Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI). The increased reliance on conventional IT systems in this sector represents a
paradigm shift in that personnel who have traditionally focused on safety aspects of power electronics, and ensuring sufﬁcient
delivery of electricity to consumers, now also have to worry about information security of their newly internet-enabled control
systems.
The following research questions were deﬁned for this part of our study:
• How are planning and preparatory activities for information security incident management performed by organizations
depending on successful cooperation between IT systems and ICS?
• What differences can be found in how the planning and preparatory activities are performed for IT systems compared to
ICS?
Identifying the practices both for the IT systems and the control systems is valuable to see which practices should be
strengthened and further developed in a collaboration. People working with these systems have different experiences and
competence, and it would be reasonable to think that there should be synergy effects by achieving increased cooperation.
Preliminary results from this study were presented by Line [4]. This paper is more comprehensive in all sections compared to
the previous conference paper; a larger number of empirical studies are referred to as background, and the method is described
in more detail, especially the industrial case context. The preliminary results were written up before a thorough analysis was
performed. This analysis now forms the basis for the Findings and Discussion sections in this paper. However, the ﬁndings
presented are related to the planning and preparation activities only, as opposed to the preliminary results, which covered all
phases as described in ISO 27035. In this paper, a discussion of the ﬁndings and potential threats to validity is included as
well.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the background for our study; standards, guidelines, and related work.
The research method is described in Section III. Findings from the interviews are summarized in Section IV and discussed in
Section V. Section VI provides some concluding remarks and suggests further work.
II. BACKGROUND
In the following we provide an overview of important standards and guidelines for incident management in this context, as
well as an overview of relevant experiences documented in literature. Based on this, we outline our expectations before the
interviews.
A. Recommendations in standards and guidelines
The information security incident management process covers the complete lifecycle of an incident. ISO/IEC [3] describes
this process as consisting of ﬁve phases, as illustrated in Figure 1. The Plan and prepare phase runs continuously, while the
next four phases are triggered by the occurrence of an incident. Other guidelines which describe the incident management
process quite similarly exist as well; although the number of phases may vary, the main ideas and activities included during
the lifecycle generally resemble the ISO/IEC standard. NIST [5], ENISA [6], and SANS [7] are among the providers of the
most well-known guidelines.
An organization that is about to establish its response capabilities has to perform several preparatory activities. ISO/IEC [3]
provides a rather detailed description of these activities. An information security incident management policy should be created
and integrated into other corporate policies, and this policy should reﬂect the organization’s need for incident management
and how the organization will beneﬁt from adopting a structured approach to this. Then the information security incident
management scheme should be described, which demonstrates the speciﬁc organization’s approach to incident management -
including all procedures for responding to incidents, roles and responsibilities, communication structures and reporting lines,
and all other activities belonging to the complete incident management process. Establishing a speciﬁc information security
incident response team (ISIRT) is one of the recommendations from ISO/IEC, as such a team will be specially trained for
resolving incidents, and coordinating and communicating with both internal and external stakeholders. The size and structure
of this team should be adjusted according to the needs of the organization. Awareness and training of all personnel should be
performed, as all employees should be able to recognize an incident and report accordingly. Last, but not least, the ISO/IEC
27035 standard recommends regular testing of the incident management scheme in order to check whether the established
procedures and tools function appropriately. This phase of planning and preparations is a continuous process as there is an
ever-present need for updates, changes, and maintenance of policies, procedures, and practices. Incident management scheme
testing and training of personnel are important in order to reveal such needs for changes, and lessons learned from actual
incidents will usually also contribute in the same way.
The ISO/IEC 27035 standard addresses corporate systems in general and hence does not contain any considerations speciﬁ-
cally related to power automation systems or industrial control systems in general. The recently published ISO/IEC TR 27019
[8] is speciﬁcally tailored for process control systems in the energy industry, but provides no additional recommendations related
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to incident management beyond ISO/IEC 27002 [9]; which leaves ISO/IEC 27035 as the most comprehensive recommendations
from the ISO/IEC. NIST describes a set of high-level requirements for incident response for a smart grid information system
in their Guidelines for Smart Grid Security (NISTIR 7628) [10]. However, all requirements are on the governance, risk and
compliance level, and are therefore more high-level than what ISO/IEC provides. They contain no speciﬁcs related to the
co-operation of corporate systems and control systems. In part 3 of their Guidelines [11] NIST points out the need for research
on incident response for the cross-domain of IT and power systems. More speciﬁcally, the issues of response and containment,
intrusion detection and prevention, and event and impact prediction are emphasized.
B. Relevant experiences documented in literature
Experiences from literature provide more details on how planning for incident response management can be performed in
practice. This literature can be used as inspiration, but also as input on which aspects of incident management are challenging
and need to be given more attention. Several studies and experience reports are available, where some also provide insight to the
planning phase [12]–[18]. Below we provide an overview of important ﬁndings in this literature. We organize the presentation
of these ﬁndings according to the main activities recommended by ISO/IEC 27035, namely the establishment of a policy, an
incident management scheme and a response team, the awareness and training activities, and the scheme testing.
The importance of establishing a team and supporting policies and documentation is emphasised also in the real world
experiences documented in the literature, and detailed explanations of how this can be done are available. Metzger et al.
[12] present experiences from LRZ-CSIRT5 where a holistic approach to incident management based on ISO/IEC 27001 [19]
has been implemented. They state that an efﬁcient and effective approach for incident management is achieved through a
successful combination of various reporting capabilities, automatic analysis and response, and process-oriented intervention.
Recommendations from this case include the need for establishing a security incident response process and deﬁning what a
security incident is, in order to distinguish it from other types of failures and errors. Hove and Ta˚rnes [13] point out the need
for deﬁning responsibilities, especially in organizations where IT operations are outsourced or several parties are included
in operations and incident response. In complex systems it may be difﬁcult to deﬁne such responsibilities, and it may also
be difﬁcult to know where a speciﬁc incident actually originates and thus determine who is responsible for responding [13].
Having a simple, short and common plan for incident management is recommended [17], [18]. This was considered a strength
when present, and a need when not present. Without it, the approach to incident management could appear scattered and
randomly structured [17].
Activities on awareness, training and incident management scheme testing seem less elaborate in existing experience literature,
however the literature clearly points out the need for such activities. Flodeen, Haller, and Tjaden [14] studied an ad-hoc group of
incident responders to see how a shared mental model for decision making can be developed through training. Such a shared
mental model increases the performance during an incident handling process because the team manages to cooperate with
limited and efﬁcient communication. They will know where the others are in the process, the next steps, and the information
required to complete the incident handling without wasting time on frequent recapture. Werlinger et al. [15] found that incident
response is a highly collaborative activity, and that the diagnosis work is complicated by the practitioners’ need to rely on
5The incident response team at Leibniz Supercomputing Centre
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tacit knowledge, as well as usability issues with security tools. Hove and Ta˚rnes [13] also found that plans and procedures
are needed as a basic structure, but experienced incident handlers are much more valuable in an emergency situation. This
ﬁnding aligns with theory within resilience engineering, as discussed by Parie`s in Hollnagel et al. [20]. Hove and Ta˚rnes
discuss challenges of training for incident management [13]; ensuring realistic training scenarios and that the training actually
provides value in real situations.
Scholl and Mangold [16] claim that a “well-developed incident response process should be a driver for continuous improve-
ment of enterprise security” and that attending to small security events and early warnings can prevent major security disasters.
The latter claim is in line with theory on high-reliability organizations (HROs) as described by Weick and Sutcliffe [21] and
requires awareness among all employees and a reporting culture.
Most of the above identiﬁed literature considers general IT systems. The only exception is Jaatun et al. [17] who describe
an incident response management process for the oil and gas industry, focusing particularly on the learning process after an
incident. They found that although integrated operations in the North Sea were highly dependent on IT, there was still a
great deal of mistrust between traditional process control engineers and IT personnel. Furthermore, since few cyber security
incidents in this sector were systematically reported, there was a low level of awareness among upper management of, e.g., the
importance of doing cyber security training drills. It seemed that some control system engineers even refused to acknowledge
that their systems contained vital IT components. Jaatun et al. also found that existing reporting tools used for Health, Safety
and Environment (HSE) incidents were poorly suited to reporting of cyber security incidents.
In other respects, there is a lack of studies on incident management in an operating environment with automation systems
and IT systems co-functioning. Current practices, compliance to standards and/or need for changes in standards, challenges
and reasons for such, and future research needs should be investigated and examined in order to provide contributions to
organizations facing the reality of closely integrated IT and automation systems.
C. Expectations before the interviews
We expected to reveal weaknesses in the overall information security management system; documented policies and rules
not being well-established throughout the organization, and lack of training on information security incident response. These
expectations were based on our general knowledge of information security priorities in several organizations. When everything
goes well, nobody offers it a thought, and it is hard to argue that more focus and investments are needed for such matters
[22]. Training and improvements need to be performed on a regular basis. When everything goes wrong, it is much easier to
obtain more resources, but this is rarely the time to perform training - recovery is much more important at that time to ensure
business continuity. Right afterwards, someone will claim the need for training on such and similar scenarios in the future, but
the everyday tasks have a tendency to receive higher priority.
We also expected to ﬁnd differences between IT and control systems on several issues:
• Perceptions on what is an information security incident
• Experience in handling incidents
• Perspectives on relevance and possible consequences of different incidents
These expectations were based on the fact that there are differences between the traditions of IT and ICS, as introduced in
Section I. The history of control systems, where they have been operated quite isolated from other networks, would indicate
that information security incidents is an issue that they have not had to deal with before.
III. RESEARCH METHOD
The study is based on semi-structured interviews and review of documentation [23], [24]. Six distribution system operators
(DSOs) in the power industry participated in the study. They all serve more than 50.000 power consumers and are considered
large in a Norwegian context.
A. Data collection
Semi-structured interviews are based on a predeﬁned set of questions contained in an interview guide, but allow for the
interviewer to add unplanned questions based on the responses provided by the interviewee [24]. Our interview guide was
inspired by the ISO/IEC 27035 standard [3], and was intended to cover all phases, cf. Appendix A. However, as the interviewees
are mainly managers, their responses reﬂected the management level perspective, and we realized during the study that we did
not receive as much detailed information on the response activities as we ﬁrst expected.
The interviews were carried out June-December 2012 at the various DSOs’ premises respectively. All interviews were voice
recorded and transcribed. The study was registered at the Data Protection Ofﬁcial for Research6 and all interviewees signed a
consent agreement according to the privacy regulations. One test interview was carried out in DSO B, without the use of voice
recording. This interview is not included in the data material, but used as a test of the interview guide and training for the
6http://www.nsd.uib.no/personvern/en/index.html
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TABLE I
THE DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM OPERATORS (DSOS) INCLUDED IN OUR STUDY
DSO Role of interviewees Documentation received IT operations
outsourced
Required
NDA
A IT, IT sec, IT operations, control systems Information security instructions, Plans for prepared-
ness in IT systems
yes no
B IT, IT sec, control systems no no no
C Corporate IT, IT in branch company, control
systems
no yes no
D IT, IT sec, control systems no yes yes
E IT, IT sec, control systems Information security instructions, Plans for prepared-
ness in control systems
no yes
F IT sec, control systems, quality & risk Information security policy, Information security
events (quarterly report Q2-2012)
yes yes
interviewer. The test interviewee was not interviewed again, but he is included in the mailing list of interviewees who receive
information and updates from the study.
Data triangulation is a way of enhancing the rigour of the research [24], which means using multiple methods for data
collection. In addition to the interviews, we thus asked the DSOs for the following types of documents:
• Information security policy
• Information security instructions
• Plans for continuity and preparedness
• Plans for information security incident management
• Periodical reports on information security incidents
• Other related documents they may have
Three of the DSOs provided us with some documentation (c.f. Table I). Conﬁdentiality issues prevented the other three DSOs
from sharing documentation. Non-disclosure agreements and encrypted electronic transfer were not sufﬁcient instruments for
overcoming the conﬁdentiality issues7.
B. Data analysis
The analysis followed an integrated approach, which combines the inductive development of codes with a start list of
categories in which the codes can be inductively developed [26], [27]. It was mainly performed by one researcher due to
conﬁdentiality restrictions posed by three of the participating DSOs (D, E, F, c.f. Table I)8. Two fellow researchers were
involved in discussing coding categories and ﬁndings, and writing up this report. They had access to the transcriptions from
the interviews conducted in the other three DSOs (A, B, C, c.f. Table I). The software tool NVivo9 was used for the data
analysis.
C. Industrial case context
Six DSOs are included in the study, and they were selected for being among the largest DSOs in the country, as well as
being partners in the national research project DeVID. Three different roles from each DSO were interviewed; IT manager, IT
security manager, and manager of control systems. One exception is DSO F, where the IT manager was unable to participate,
and we talked to the manager for quality and risk instead. In one of the DSOs we also interviewed one member of the technical
IT staff in addition to the IT manager. In total, 19 interviews were carried out. As we address incident management from the
information security management perspective, only managers were included in the interview study. If we were to investigate
in further detail the technical response activities performed when an incident occur, we would have had to include technical IT
staff and preferably also representatives from external IT suppliers in the cases where the DSOs have outsourced large parts
of their IT operations. In order to get the whole picture of IT and power automation, we included managers from both areas.
More DSOs than these six are partners in the national research project DeVID and could hence easily have been included.
However, after the completion of the planned interviews in the six DSOs, saturation was reached [28]. For the perspectives
7It must however be noted that just the day after my request for documentation, the authorities sent an e-mail to all units that are part of the national
emergency preparedness organization for power supply, which all the DSOs in this study are part of, encouraging them to be critical to all requests for
sensitive information. The authorities state that information sharing is not prohibited, but should be carefully considered in each case. As information security
researchers we should appreciate such caution regarding sharing of conﬁdential documents, although it poses limitations to the data triangulation. Kotulic et
al. [25] point out this challenge of obtaining sensitive data as limiting to research on information security management in general and recommend focusing
on a few selected companies. This opens for building trust between the company and the researcher, which will ease collection of sensitive data. Also, the
companies in focus can be more involved in discussing and approving the results.
8All DSOs are partners in the DeVID project. Some considered the conﬁdentiality agreement for the project consortium to be sufﬁcient for this interview
study, while others required the signing of an additional non-disclosure agreement (NDA) for the interviewing researcher.
9http://www.qsrinternational.com/
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TABLE II
DISTRIBUTION OF INTERVIEWEES PER ORGANIZATION
DSO IT manager IT Security Manager % IT security
Parent co Branch Outsourced Parent co Branch Outsourced of full position
A xa xa 5%
B xb xb 100%
C xb xa
D xa xb 10-20 %
E xa x 100%
F x a 50%
a Only administrative system
b Both IT and ICS
of IT managers and IT security managers, saturation was actually reached before all the planned interviews were completed,
as their responses were fairly aligned. The need for information from control room managers still called for completing the
interviews in all six DSOs.
All the DSOs are organized as a corporation where the power supply infrastructure is taken care of by one branch company.
Other branch companies may be within power production and broadband. Four out of six have outsourced their administrative
IT services to an external supplier, but all these external suppliers are 100% owned by the DSOs respectively, due to their past
as an internal IT department. The other two operates the administrative IT systems themselves. Control systems are operated
internally by all the DSOs.
All the control system managers belong to the branch company10. They are responsible for the daily operations of the
control systems, including information security issues. Even in the cases where IT managers or IT security managers are said
to be responsible for this, it is the managers of control systems who in practice execute this authority. A brief overview of
the participating organizations is presented in Table I, and roles and placement of interviewees within each organization is
explained in Table II.
IV. FINDINGS
A. Dependency on IT
The responses indicate that the DSOs can better endure unforeseen downtime in their power automation systems than in the
administrative IT systems. All the IT managers and IT security managers claim that their organization is 100%, or close to
100%, dependent on IT systems. The business may run for some days without IT systems, but several challenges will occur
quite soon. Planning, follow-up, and maintenance will be impossible. If maps of the distribution grid are not available, no
digging can be done in a certain area, which again may stop construction work. If invoicing is impossible, the cash ﬂow will
stop; this is when the IT breakdown really manifests itself.
The control system managers also state a 100% dependency of IT, although they add that unavailable IT systems do not
automatically cause power failure for customers. The distribution grid can be operated manually even if the control room or
other parts of the SCADA systems are unavailable, as this is a requirement in the national regulations. However, the customers
will be the most important failure detection mechanism and the DSOs will face the challenge of making the right prioritizations
based on information from the customers, as opposed to having functioning monitoring systems that automatically detect failures
and provide richer background information on the failures. The length of the period that the DSOs are able to operate manually
depends on available personnel for ﬁxing failures, but two-three days would be manageable. If the amount of failures is too
high, they are not able to keep up, which might result in a considerably reduced quality of service for customers. With a
smaller amount of failures, manual operation may be possible for a long time.
The term IT systems is interpreted differently among the interviewees dependent on their work position. IT managers do not
necessarily include SCADA systems in their deﬁnition. For control room managers, IT systems equal SCADA systems.
B. Deﬁnition of an incident
The responses indicate that IT managers and IT security managers have a much more uniform comprehension of the concept
of information security incidents than control room managers. There are large variations among control system managers when
they are asked to deﬁne an IT security incident. None of them provide a clear deﬁnition, and they all state that this term is
not deﬁned in the organization. One (A) thinks of it as malicious attacks, while he considers unavailability due to digging or
technical failures to be outside the scope of information security. Four respondents think of it as unwanted occurrences in the
IT systems, including breaches of policy or procedures, computer viruses and intrusions, and the last one (E) explains it more
speciﬁcally as an occurrence that can affect functionality and/or compromise sensitive information.
10The one from E belongs to a the branch company for power production where the IT operations are located, same as for the IT security manager from E.
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Only the IT manager in C used the terms conﬁdentiality, integrity and availability when deﬁning an IT security incident. The
others have similar perceptions, without providing a clear deﬁnition. Examples of incidents are mentioned, like disclosure of
conﬁdential information to unauthorized persons, breach of procedure, intrusions, sabotage, computer viruses, both malicious
and accidental occurrences.
”Good question. I have never thought of that.”
— IT manager (A) when asked to deﬁne an IT security incident
Among IT security managers only the one from F uses the terms conﬁdentiality, integrity and availability. All the others
claim that their organization does not have a clear deﬁnition of what comprises an incident, but like the IT managers, the IT
security managers also provide several examples of IT security incidents, like hardware thefts, hacking, viruses and sabotage.
This aligns with the documentation studied. The information security policy from F states a clear deﬁnition as provided by the
IT security manager, and also authentication is included in the written policy. The information security instructions from A and
E do not contain any deﬁnition. However, several examples of information security incidents are listed in the documentation
we received, as reﬂected by several of the informants.
A common impression among control room managers is that IT incidents have never occurred in their systems. IT security
managers, to the contrary, claim that several incidents occur every week. Control room managers claim they have never
experienced disruptions in power supply due to information security incidents. The power automation systems are extremely
robust and resilient towards incidents involving individual components. Physical damage due to stormy weather may occur,
but they do not refer to this as an information security issue.
C. Worst case scenario
Almost all interviewees state that the worst incident they can imagine is if someone hacks the power automation system,
gains control of power switches and can control the power distribution system. Attackers could cause outages in large cities
in a few minutes if they have the right access. They could also do the opposite; switch the power on in a part of the grid
that is without voltage due to maintenance and hence cause physical harm or death to maintenance workers. This is especially
mentioned by the control system manager in D. Even though several security mechanisms are in place to prevent such and
similar scenarios, it is stated by the interviewees that they might still occur, even though the probability is quite low. Also, as
the control system manager in F states, the attack force obtained through a combination of foreign governments and criminal
actors exceeds the response capabilities of most organizations.
Other worst case scenarios mentioned include compromised customer databases with large amounts of personal information;
complete deletion of databases (and all related backups) containing all information on the physical power grid; minor errors in
the billing system for a long time such that rollback is impossible when the errors are ﬁnally detected; compromised information
on power distribution that could be used to attack certain customers; misuse of the disconnection function in smart meters that
could result in outages without the SCADA system being involved; and ﬁre or natural disasters that destroy buildings where
the control room is located.
The IT security manager from E points out that sensitive information is not handled satisfactorily. He believes that cloud
services are widely used, without this being approved as acceptable and secure storage. Employees require availability of
information and ﬂexibility in when and where to work, and take with them information without considering possible implications
on information security. Such breaches may have large ﬁnancial consequences to the organization if for example tender
documents have been compromised.
The IT security manager in F states that the combination of incidents is the worst thing, for example a hacking attack and
really bad weather causing logical errors and physical damage at the same time.
D. Documentation of plans and procedures
Three of the four DSOs that have outsourced their administrative IT systems (A, C, D), lack plans for responding to incidents
and seem to rather expect the IT supplier to have such plans in place11. The information security instructions from A contains
only reporting procedures for users. However, some DSOs (A, B, D) are currently working on documenting their plans and
procedures for the ﬁrst time, both for IT and control systems. They have been trusting their employees to know what to do,
but have realized that they also need a certain documentation base in place. It is however not clearly stated who will actually
develop uniﬁed plans that take both IT and control systems into account. The ISO/IEC 27001 standard is mentioned as being
used for identifying issues to be documented. The other DSOs do have reporting procedures and/or continuity plans in place.
One IT security manager (F) states that his organization has an information security policy and procedures for incident
management in place. This was also among the documentation we received. However, the control room manager from the
same organization is not familiar with the existence of this documentation. The control room manager in B is aware of the
11Whether this also goes for the fourth DSO in the same outsourcing situation is unclear, as the IT manager was not among the interviewees, and the IT
security manager belongs to the external IT supplier.
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existence of such plans in his organization, but they originate from the IT department and do not consider automation systems
speciﬁcally. He would like to have similar documentation for his systems as well. He does not seem to be aware of the
procedures currently being prepared as reported by the IT security manager.
In E they have clearly deﬁned procedures for the administrative systems and security instructions for the power automation
systems. Their control room manager states that documentation needs to be combined with highly competent personnel, because
it is impossible to write detailed procedures for any possible incident.
Several interviewees admit that plans are not commonly used, either because they are non-existent or because incidents occur
quite rarely. The one from IT operations in A however says that they practice quite frequently and mentions that employees are
invited to hand in their laptop during summer holiday for a clean-up. Then the technical personnel familiarize themselves with
the computers, analyze them and are able to test different tools. The purpose is not to reveal any breaches by the employees
but to practice and experience technical support and maintenance issues.
The ISO/IEC 27035 standard is not mentioned by any of our informants. We did not ask speciﬁcally whether they were
familiar with it, but it was never brought up during any of the interviews. This may indicate that the standard is not used by
the organizations. It might be the case that the informants did not ﬁnd an opportunity to mention it among all the questions
that were asked, although this does not appear as the most plausible explanation, as the use of such a standard is closely linked
to the existence of plans and procedures, which was a topic in all interviews.
”This I have never asked for, to see the procedures for responding to an information security incident. Maybe I
should.”
— IT security manager (D)
E. Preparedness for worst case scenarios
Three IT managers (B, D, E) claim that they will be able to respond satisfactory to a worst case scenario, due to their
well organized and planned emergency preparedness in general, although they have some weaknesses related to IT-speciﬁc
preparedness. They are currently working towards a more systematic IT security preparedness as well, and one (B) is planning
a physical backup site, having identiﬁed this as a need in order to be better prepared. The IT security manager from B supports
his IT manager in this view of them being prepared to respond to a worst case scenario. The IT security manager from D is
more reluctant to claim that they are well prepared; he says that they lack practice and well established procedures. However,
he feels conﬁdent that they will be able to improvise. He is not worried about the control systems in case of an incident, as this
can be disconnected and operate ofﬂine. The IT security manager in E agrees with his IT manager in that they are prepared,
although it should be noted that they present quite different scenarios to be the worst cases to occur (compromised sensitive
information vs. sabotage/natural catastrophe/hacking attack).
The other IT managers assume that their organization will not be able to respond appropriately to a worst case scenario.
As reasons they state that there are too few preparedness training drills, and that those that are performed have a too limited
scope. Some perform dry runs from time to time.
The control system manager from D believes that their current procedures and practices would sufﬁce if the worst case
scenario should occur. However, as he states, it will be a future task to consider whether the response was appropriate or poor.
Several of the interviewees state that the control systems can be disconnected from the outside world and continue operation,
something they perceive as an efﬁcient response to incidents where the control systems are hacked. One (A) however points
ut that this does not solve anything; it would stop the attack, but it would prevent you from further investigating the incident
with respect to who is behind it and what could be the consequences.
F. Training
None of the IT managers or IT security managers report that they perform regular training exercises where an information
security incident creates the basis for the scenario. But the authorities initiate general emergency preparedness exercises from
time to time, and in some cases the scenario is based on such an incident.
The IT security manager in A expects their external IT supplier to perform training. However, the IT manager in A, who
is the manager of this external IT supplier, claims that they never perform such training. The IT manager from C (branch
company) states the same; that training for incident management is never performed. The corporate IT manager in C supports
this fact that training is not performed, but he adds that they have had their share of incidents. He would like to see more
training drills instead of the real incidents. Some IT security managers (D, E) agrees that training should be performed more
often. ”Fumbling and hubbub” constitute the most useful exercises, as put by the IT security manager from E.
”We are not good at post-evaluating real incidents and consider them as training exercises, we are too solution-
oriented.”
— Corporate IT manager (C)
Different reasons are given for the lack of training: training activities have not been prioritized, other tasks receive higher
priority, and training involves a certain cost.
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”There are too many other tasks, so we haven’t had the time for it. Maybe that’s wrong, not to prioritize it.”
— Control system manager (C) on training exercises
The IT security manager in F argues that training is assigned a low priority due to the fact that real incidents rarely occur,
hence they do not feel the need for being better prepared for responding efﬁciently. Still, their information security policy
states that the plan for emergency preparedness is to be tested regularly, and that IT/infrastructure should be included.
In B they run comprehensive preparedness exercises internally in addition to the ones initiated from the authorities, as
reported by their IT manager and IT security manager. These are not speciﬁcally related to IT security incidents, but there
have been scenarios that include such elements, like ﬁre in a building where the data centre and/or communication systems
are located. Both dry runs and more realistic drills are performed.
Among the control room managers, the experiences with training vary. In E they manage to look at real incidents as training,
adding some effort to the response activities; hence feeling more conﬁdent afterwards that their systems function as intended.
The control room manager in F reports that they perform regular exercises on responding to communication breaches in the
control systems. This aligns with the requirements in their plan for emergency preparedness as well. They have never considered
training for information security incidents, but during the interview he realizes that the consequences, and hence the response
activities, could be similar for those two scenarios. Hence, their regular training does strengthen their information security
incident response capabilities as well as their general emergency preparedness. On the other hand, the other control room
managers (A, B, C, D) state that they do not perform training for information security incident management. Reasons provided
include merging of companies, moving, cost, time, and workload. Also the number of incidents experienced is quite low, so
the need for training has not been identiﬁed in all DSOs. All these four interviewees feel that their training efforts are not
satisfactory, but only one (C) states that they intend to improve in this area. The personnel operating the control systems would
beneﬁt from training on scenarios like ”what do we do if the control systems break down?”, reports the control manager from
C.
V. DISCUSSION
This paper set out to identify how planning and preparatory activities for information security incident management were
performed in organizations that depend on successful cooperation between people working on conventional IT systems and
ICS (Research Question 1). It also set out to identify differences in the planning and preparatory activities performed in these
two disciplines (Research Question 2). The results show that current planning and preparatory activities are limited, at least
compared to the recommendations in current standards and guidelines. ISO/IEC 27035 recommend activities related to the
following: establishment of a policy, an incident management scheme and a response team, awareness and training, and scheme
testing. In the following we summarize current practice on activity areas recommended in ISO/IEC 27035, before outlining the
differences identiﬁed between the practices of IT and ICS staff. Then we move on to discussing the validity of our ﬁndings.
A. Current practice
We expected to ﬁnd that documented policies were not widely established throughout the organizations, as well as a lack
of training on information security incident response. These expectations were conﬁrmed in the interviews.
In general, responsibilities in information security incident management seem to be inadequately established. This seems
especially to be the case when IT system maintenance is outsourced. Documented plans and procedures for incident management
in the IT systems do not widely exist. Where such plans do exist, some informants state that they do not sufﬁciently consider
ICS. Just as often as answering yes/no to the question on whether plans exist, the interviewees started describing their plans.
This suggests that the personnel most frequently involved in incident management have tacit knowledge and experience in the
necessary actions to be taken in case an incident occurs. In daily practice this can be sufﬁcient, as long as this personnel is
available when incidents occur. Some DSOs have however found that they cannot solely rely on tacit knowledge for this, and
are in the process of creating plans. Still they are aware that you cannot document everything, and have to rely on competence
of personnel in addition to documentation.
Although the DSOs are highly dependent on the availability of competent personnel should an incident strike, they only
report on limited awareness and training activities on information security incident management. In cases where procedures are
documented, these do not seem to be well established or, in some cases, even known by staff expected to work according to the
procedures. Any training activities performed seldom take information security incidents into account. Some of the activities
reported as training in the interviews are also not really tailored to incident management, but are rather part of general computer
maintenance. The reported reasons for not performing more training on information security incident management include cost
and time issues, but in general it does not seem that they see the need for more focus in this area. Currently they experience
a limited number of incidents.
Clearly, training activities seem to be difﬁcult to prioritize. Whether training is also difﬁcult to carry out is not clear. The
interviewees who report that they perform drills from time to time do not report on speciﬁc challenges related to planning
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them or going through with them. However, training might be continuously postponed due to the lack of knowledge on how
to plan and/or accomplish such trainings.
Incident management scheme testing seem not to be performed by the DSOs. This can also be related to the unavailability
of a scheme to test. But despite a general lack of plans for handling information security incidents, and a lack of training on
this, quite a few DSOs still seem to have a relatively high degree of conﬁdence that they can handle even a worst case scenario.
They trust the competence of their employees and their ability to improvise and ﬁnd solutions if an incident should occur.
They also rely on their ability to disconnect their most critical systems from the outside world in case of a serious incident.
The ﬁndings in this survey seem to be in line with documented experiences in literature (see Section II-B), although the DSOs
seem to lag behind on the establishment of policies, an incident management scheme and a response team [12], [13], [18].
Hove and Ta˚rnes [13] documented speciﬁc challenges relating to outsourcing, and also the importance of having experienced
incident handlers over a strict reliance on documentation. Lack of training for incident response is also identiﬁed in previous
studies and experience reports. The challenges identiﬁed by Hove and Ta˚rnes [13] when it comes to training (realistic scenarios,
value for real situations) did however not come up in the performed interviews.
The relatively high trust in own abilities to handle worst case incidents can probably be explained by unrealistic optimism
in risk perception in the information security domain, as documented in the study by Rhee et al. [29]. In order to mitigate
this optimistic bias, they suggest that organizations perform more security awareness training and apply a more systematic
approach to information security management. Such an approach seem to be currently lacking in the DSOs taking part in this
study. The awareness by some of the interviewees on the importance of competence and ability to improvise is in line with
resilience theory [20], but there seem to be a lack of understanding of what actions need to be in place in order to improve
resilience in an organization, including risk awareness, response capacity and support [30].
B. Differences between IT and ICS
Table III presents a brief overview of the ﬁndings from our study of DSOs. A previous study in the oil and gas industry
[17], where the implementation of integrated operations was in progress at the time, revealed similar gaps between IT and ICS
as our recent study in the power industry. This gives us reasons to believe that similar organizations in other industries as well
would report along these lines, given that the integration of IT and ICS has reached the same stadium as in the power industry.
We expected to ﬁnd differences between IT and ICS staff when it came to perceptions of what an information security
incident is, experience in handling incidents, and in the percieved consequences of incidents. As Table III shows, we were
correct in our expectations when it comes to deﬁnitions and percieved consequences of incidents. From an IT perspective, such
incidents happen frequently, and are concerned with compromise of information. From an ICS perspective the understanding
of what an information security incident is seem to be more unclear, and they are mainly concerned with consequences for
power supply. Variations existed among control room managers, and they commonly claim that information security incidents
have never occurred in the control systems. IT managers and IT security managers are much more aligned, which could be
explained by their common background and experience with the same type of IT systems and the same kind of information
security threats. Control room managers give mixed responses on the relevance of minor information security incidents, but
they all suggest malicious hacker attacks where the hacker gains control of power switches as the worst case scenario. This
indicates that they have a fairly good understanding of the vulnerabilities and existing threats to their control systems in the
situation of dependency of conventional IT systems. As such, they are aligned with the IT managers and IT security managers.
Also regarding experience in handling incidents, the ﬁndings resemble our expectations. Information security incidents occur
frequently in the administrative IT systems in the DSOs, while rarely, if ever, in the control room. However, they do experience
incidents in the control room as well, like component failures and communication breach, but these incidents are not deﬁned as
being information security incidents. Still, the consequences posed by all these examples might be quite similar. This suggests
that control room managers and their operators might be better prepared for responding to information security incidents than
the ﬁrst impression might indicate. However, as the deﬁnition of an information security incident is not all clear, the biggest
challenge of incident response in the control room might be to actually recognize such an incident and be able to determine
the most appropriate ﬁrst steps for the response phase.
Procedures for general emergency preparedness are usually well established and well practiced among control room operators,
as reported by control room managers. The DSOs are required to perform exercises regularly, as a measure for ensuring
continuous power supply. Traditional exercises have however rarely been based on incidents caused by IT systems. IT and ICS
are viewed as two separate parts of the organization, and there has been limited collaboration between the two.
C. Threats to validity
Construct validity concerns whether a study measures what it sets out to measure [24]. Interviewees may be biased, either
consciously or unconsciously [31]. The topic being information security incidents could increase this bias as well; their
conscious or unconscious desire to make their organization and themselves look good from the outside. Our impression is that
they were being honest in their reportings as several of the interviewees did not report a perfect situation, rather lackings in a
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TABLE III
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
IT systems Control systems
Dependency on IT Claim to be 100% dependent, can endure for
some days, until cashﬂow stops.
Claim to be 100% dependent, but can operate
power grid manually without control room. En-
durance of manual operation is determined by
number and severity of failures that occur.
Deﬁnition of incident Conﬁdentiality, integrity, availability mentioned
by some. Both malicious and accidental occur-
rences - unwanted. Occurs frequently.
No common deﬁnition exist in the organiza-
tions. Malicious attacks, unwanted occurrences
in the system. Occurs rarely, if ever.
Worst case scenario Compromised/deleted databases with customer
information and/or information on the physical
power grid
Malicious hacker attacks in control systems,
gaining control of power switches, causing out-
ages.
Documented plans Not widely established. In progress in some
DSOs.
Established in one DSO, otherwise in progress
or non-existing.
Preparedness for worst
case
Various perceptions: Well-organized and
planned general emergency preparedness,
and/or ability to improvise. Also reported
doubt on own preparedness due to lack of
training.
Current practice and competence is perceived
as sufﬁcient. Disconnecting the control room is
highlighted as the most appropriate and plausi-
ble measure towards worst case scenario (mali-
cious hacker attack).
Training No regular drills based on information security
scenario. Regular general emergency prepared-
ness exercises; occasionally, these deal with
information security/IT incident.
Regular general emergency preparedness ex-
ercises; information security never forms the
basis.
number of areas. Some even expressed their gratitude for us performing this study, as it gave them an opportunity to discuss
these issues internally. Being able to point to us as external, independent researchers, strengthened their message.
All interviewees belong to a management level in the organization. The IT security manager often reports to the IT manager,
but there are still employees on lower levels performing a large part of the daily tasks within incident management. Not
including such employees as interviewees is an obvious limitation of this study, as the managers might provide information
on how things should be done, not just on how things actually are being done. However, it was necessary to make such a
limitation due to time constraints. Also, the planning and preparations activites, as this paper reports, are the responsibility of
the managers. So for this part of the study, the selection of interviewees appears appropriate.
An alternative strategy would be to study only one or two organizations in depth, and then include more employees from
each organization as interviewees. This would probably make us better able to say something about differences between written
plans and procedures and actual daily practice. However, we wanted to cover a larger number of organizations in order to see
what is widespread current practice.
Data triangulation [23] increases the quality of data as it allows a phenomenon to be studied from different perspectives.
Interviews and documentation provides two different views on incident management, as the interviewees would describe their
practice as they know it, while documentation will show the planned procedures. We did not distribute the interview guide
in advance, as we did not look for the ”correct” answers, but rather the interviewees’ perceptions, understandings and actual
practice. Then we studied the received documentation to see whether there were any signiﬁcant differences between the two.
A third source of evidence was considered, but has unfortunately not been feasible: participating in a post-incident evaluation
meeting at a speciﬁc DSO. This would have provided us with detailed information on how an actual incident was responded
to. The DSOs have expressed willingness in including us in such a meeting, but we have not been able to follow-up on this
as it would require us to be actively asking for it regularly; we would not expect them to call us.
We did not interview the IT manager in DSO F as he was not able to make it, even though we did schedule the interview in
advance. We instead got to talk to the Manager for quality and risk. We asked each DSO for speciﬁc roles and described the
purpose for this, but we could not control in detail who were identiﬁed by each DSO to participate. As most of the interviews
required travelling and hence planning ahead, we were not able to go back to the DSOs in order to meet the most appropriate
person if he was not present on the agreed time and date. We asked the IT manager in DSO F to respond to our questions in
writing, because that would give us a richer data material than no response at all. However, we never received anything from
him.
All interviewees were provided with a draft of this paper, and hence given the opportunity to comment on the results. This
is referred to as member checking [24], and is a strategy for reducing researcher bias. In our study where one researcher
did most of the analysis, this was especially important. It also shows that we value the contributions of our informants. We
received feedback regarding the case context description, which we updated accordingly.
External validity refers to the degree to which the ﬁndings from a study can be generalized to other settings [24]. Our
study is restricted to large DSOs and the roles of the requested interviewees were clearly deﬁned. We have provided a detailed
description of the industrial case context (cf. Section III, which is of great importance when considering whether our results
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are transferrable to a given setting. As our expectations regarding ﬁndings were generally met, it may be assumed that the
participating DSOs do not stand out in any particular way compared to similar organizations. There is a lack of similar studies12
on incident management in organizations depending on successful collaborations between IT and ICS, hence we believe that
our study should be repeated for similar and slightly different case contexts than ours. Generalizability will be strengthened
by increasing the number of studies.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS AND FURTHER WORK
This paper has presented ﬁndings related to the planning and preparations activities for information security incident
management. There are differences between the IT and ICS disciplines in practice, as we expected beforehand. As the Smart
Grids emerge, IT will be permeating the control systems even more than today; more commercial off-the-shelf products, more
connectivity, and more integration [1]. Further studies are required to investigate how these differences should be addressed
for a uniﬁed approach to incident management to be achieved.
”The greatest challenge is that they don’t understand how IT intensive their new world will be.”
— IT manager on control room operators and the future with Smart Grids
Training for IT security incidents is reported as challenging; especially being able to prioritize it among several pressing
tasks. However, general emergency preparedness exercises are frequently performed. Future work should investigate why
training for IT security preparedness is more difﬁcult and how knowledge could be transferred from the areas of general
emergency preparedness exercises, industrial safety training and resilience, in order to design and implement training programs
for organizations where IT and SCADA systems and staff need to collaborate.
”The big proﬁt for the industry will be in accomplishing successful interaction between IT and power. That will also
gain information security in smart grids.”
— IT manager
The ISO 27035 was not brought up in any of the interviews. This calls for an investigation on the knowledge of this standard
and to which extent it could assist DSOs and similar organizations in improving their information security incident management
process.
Activities performed during and after an incident were also covered in the same interviews, and these ﬁndings will be
presented and discussed in a follow-up paper. We have recently performed additional interviews in small DSOs, where small
is deﬁned as supplying less than 10.000 power consumers. The follow-up paper will also summarize ﬁndings from these
interviews, including a comparison of large and small DSOs on their approaches to incident management.
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APPENDIX A
INTERVIEW GUIDE
Individual
1) How many employees are there in your organization?
2) Which position and/or role do you have?
3) For how long have you had this position?
4) Which systems and procedures are within your responsibility?
5) Can you describe how your position connects to the work related to security, ICT and automation systems?
ICT security incidents
6) To which degree does the organization depend on ICT?
7) How would you deﬁne an ICT security incident?
8) Can you describe your latest ICT security incident?
• How was this incident responded to?
• How well did the response work?
• Why did the response work as it did?
9) What is the worst ICT security incident your organization could experience?
10) If you think about how the latest ICT security incident was responded to, would this be sufﬁcient to handle the worst
possible ICT security incident?
• Would you have done the same if it was a targeted hacker attack?
11) How frequently do you experience ICT security incidents?
• If you have never experienced ICT security incidents, what could be the reasons for that?
12) What kind of ICT security incidents do you experience?
• What kind of consequences are typical for this kind of incidents?
Responding to ICT security incidents
13) Which plans exist for ICT security incident management?
14) Are the plans used in practice?
• If not, why not?
15) Do you perform training on incident management?
• If yes, how? (Scenarios, exercises, courses?)
• If not, why not?
16) How are ICT security incidents usually detected? (Automatic tools? Intrusion detection systems? Firewalls? Users?
Manual audit of logs?)
17) How are ICT security incidents initially reported?
18) Who is involved in responding to ICT security incidents?
19) Do you experience challenges related to cooperation on responding to incidents?
• If yes, what kind of experiences? (Are they related to communication? Terminology? Responsibilities? Knowledge
and experience? Procedures?
20) What kind of supplementary work is performed when regular operation is restored?
21) How are ICT security incidents registered and reported afterwards?
22) Is information on incidents reported to top management?
23) Is information on incidents disseminated to end-users, internally or externally?
24) Do you report ICT security incidents to the police?
25) Are the experiences from ICT security incidents used as input to further risk assessments and improvements of procedures
afterwards? (Or is incident response mainly ”‘ﬁreﬁghting”’?
• If yes, which parts of the organization are involved in this process?
26) Do you have any numbers for the costs of ICT security incidents?
• If yes: How frequently and how are these followed-up? Who is responsible?
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27) Did you establish any other indicators or measurements for ICT security incidents? (E.g., downtime due to incidents,
number of incidents per month)
• If yes: How frequently and how are these followed up? Who is responsible?
Possible improvements
28) What are the most important actions performed in order to restore regular operation and limit the consequences from an
ICT security incident?
29) Do you see any possible improvements to how you respond to ICT security incidents?
• If yes, which?
30) The Smart Grid leads to a closer integration of ICT and automation systems in the future. How do you think this will
affect ICT security incident management?
31) Is there any cross-organizational cooperation in the industry regarding information security? (Work groups, seminars,
regular meetings?)
• If yes, to which degree is ICT security incident management on the agenda?
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Abstract
Through an interview study, we have surveyed current practice regarding information security
incident management among large and small distribution system operators (DSOs) in the electric
power industry in Norway. Our ﬁndings indicate that current risk perception and preparedness
is low, in particular for small DSOs. Further, small DSOs rely heavily on their supplier should
an incident occur. At the same time, small DSOs in particular are conﬁdent that they will be
able to handle also worst case scenarios in their systems. This paper documents these current
perceptions and discusses to what extent they are likely to hold given the transition towards
smarter grids. Based on the ﬁndings and this discussion, a set of recommendations are provided.
Small DSOs should strengthen the collaboration with their IT supplier and other small DSOs.
DSOs in general should establish written documentation of procedures, perform preparedness
exercises, and improve detection capabilities in the control systems.
Keywords: Incident management, Incident response, Industrial control organizations,
Information security
1. Introduction
Industrial control organizations are currently going through a major modernization, as exem-
pliﬁed by the Integrated Operations in the oil and gas industry, and Smart Grids in the power
industry. Functionalities such as monitoring, automatic failure detection, and remote control
are being implemented in the industrial control systems, supporting more eﬃcient operation and
management. This modernization requires introduction of new technologies and leads to in-
creased connectivity and complexity. ‘Regular’ IT components – hardware, ﬁrmware, software –
replace proprietary solutions. These technological changes introduce threats and vulnerabilities
that make the systems more susceptible to both accidental and deliberate information security
incidents [1]. As industrial control systems are used for controlling crucial parts of a society’s
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critical infrastructure, incidents may have catastrophic consequences to our physical environment
in addition to major costs for the organizations that are being hit [2].
Well-known attacks like Stuxnet [3, 4, 5] and NightDragon [6], and statistics presented by
ICS-CERT [7] demonstrate that industrial control organizations are attractive targets for attacks.
According to these statistics, 59% of the incidents reported to the Department of Homeland Se-
curity in 2013 occurred in the energy industry. ICS-CERT [7] expresses an explicit concern for
vulnerable control systems being accessible from the Internet and for unprotected control de-
vices. It is however worth noting that the reported incidents do not only occur in the control
systems. Other parts of the organizations are also susceptible to attacks, i.e., for exﬁltration of
sensitive information. Hence, the technological changes in the industrial control systems pose
new challenges for the whole organization. These emerging threats are creating the need for a
well established capacity for responding to unwanted incidents. This capacity is inﬂuenced by
organizational, human, and technological factors. Beneﬁts from a structured approach to infor-
mation security incident management include an overall improvement of information security,
reduced impact of incidents, improved focus and better prioritization of security activities, and
better and more updated information security risk assessment eﬀorts [8].
We have studied current practice for information security incident management among elec-
tric power distribution system operators (DSOs)1. They are in the middle of the modernization
process due to their current eﬀort on implementing smart meters, which is the ﬁrst step toward the
goal of a smart grid. Besides, they represent the class of industrial control organizations that is
the most attractive target for attacks according to the statistics from ICS CERT. The perspectives
of both industrial control systems and corporate IT systems were investigated in order to cover
the organizations’ response capabilities as a whole. Furthermore, we aimed at including middle-
level managers rather than operators in our study, as they were assumed to have a more thorough
overview of the complete incident management process. Our study is thus mainly concerned
with management aspects of information security incident management.
In Norway, there are about 150 DSOs. About two thirds of these are categorized as small,
serving fewer than 10.000 power consumers. In our study we have included both small and
large DSOs to get insights into the current state of preparedness and incident response practices
in the sector. In the analysis and presentation of the ﬁndings from the study, the size of the
DSO is taken into account. Results from this study on planning and preparatory activities among
large DSOs were presented by Line et al. [9]. In this paper we present related ﬁndings among
small DSOs as well, and identify similarities and diﬀerences between small and large DSOs.
Furthermore, we provide prioritized recommendations to DSOs on how they could improve their
response capabilities for the new and emerging threats that they will be, or already are, exposed
to. Understanding the diﬀerences between small and large DSOs is a prerequisite for the tailoring
of these recommendations.
This paper is structured as follows. Related work is summarized in Section 2 together with
the most acknowledged standards and guidelines. Section 3 describes the research method used
in our study. Findings from our interview and documentation study are presented in Section
4, while Section 5 discusses the ﬁndings and compares the practices in large and small DSOs.
Section 6 oﬀers concluding remarks and identiﬁes further work.
1This work is funded by the Norwegian Research Council, grants no 217528 and no 234644/F11, and by the Norwe-
gian University of Science and Technology through the project Smart Grids as a Critical Infrastructure.
2
Plan and prepare 
Policy, plan and procedure creation 
Management commitment 
Establishment of incident response team 
Prepare for incident handling (establish 
technical and other support) 
Prevent incidents, perform risk 
management 
Incident management awareness 
briefings and training 
Incident management scheme testing 
Detection and reporting 
Detection 
Collection of information 
Reporting 
 
Lessons learnt 
Further forensic analysis, if required 
Identify lessons learned 
 
The bomb indicates the occurrence 
of an incident. 
Responses 
Notification/communication 
Responses 
Recovery 
 
Assessment and decision 
Analysis 
Documentation 
Classification and prioritization 
Figure 1: The complete incident management process (ISO/IEC 27035).
2. Background
A number of standards and guidelines provide recommendations regarding the general infor-
mation security incident management process, including ISO/IEC 27035 [8], NIST 800-61 [10],
ITIL [11], and ENISA [12, 13]. The process is commonly described as a set of phases: planning
and preparatory activities, detection, analysis, response, and post-incident evaluations. However,
none of these documents concern industrial control systems in general. Figure 1 illustrates the
ﬁve phases as described by ISO/IEC, including the main activities related to each phase.
In part 3 of their Guidelines for Smart Grid Security (NISTIR 7628) [14], NIST points out
the need for research on cross-domain incident response for IT and power systems. More specif-
ically, the issues of response and containment, intrusion detection and prevention, and event and
impact prediction are emphasized.
Tøndel et al. [15] performed a systematic review of published experiences and practices re-
lated to information security incident management. In total 11 studies and 4 experience reports
were included in the review, and they cover several sectors, including ﬁnance, acedemia, energy
and national CERTs. Only two of the studies, Jaatun et al. [16] and Line [17], considered organi-
zations with industrial systems, the latter of these being a publication of preliminary results from
the study presented in this paper. Available documentation of experiences from information secu-
rity incident management in control systems is thus limited in academic literature. Experiences
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from other sectors can however be of use for industrial contexts as well. The previous studies,
as well as the inspirational examples and prominent challenges identiﬁed in the review, serve
as important input for understanding and improving incident management in DSOs. Especially
relevant for this study, as it focuses on the management aspects, are the beneﬁts but also chal-
lenges of creating a simple plan, and establishing eﬃcient practices for learning from incidents
and sharing lessons learnt throughout the organization. DSOs are also likely to experience chal-
lenges related to senior management commitment, collaboration among teams and disciplines,
and practicing incident management in outsourcing scenarios [15].
Based on the systematic review, activities on awareness, training and incident management
scheme testing seem less elaborated in the existing literature, although the need for such ac-
tivities is clearly pointed out [15]. Flodeen et al. [18] studied how a shared mental model for
decision making in a group of incident responders could be created. A shared mental model has
the potential to increase the performance during an incident handling process because the team
manages to cooperate with limited and eﬃcient communication. The actors involved will know
where the others are in the process, the next steps, and the information required to complete
the incident handling without wasting time on frequent recapture. Incident response is a highly
collaborative activity and the diagnosis work is complicated by the practitioners’ need to rely on
tacit knowledge, as well as usability issues with security tools [19]. Hove et al. [20] found that
plans and procedures are needed as a basic structure, but experienced incident handlers are much
more valuable in an emergency situation. This ﬁnding aligns with theory within resilience engi-
neering [21]. Challenges of training for incident management, such as ensuring realistic training
scenarios and that the training actually provides value in real situations, were discussed by Hove
et al. [20].
The future of smart grids, with the integration of IT and industrial control systems raises
the need for DSOs to be prepared for the accompanying, emerging information security threats.
Knowledge and understanding of current practices and related challenges for incident manage-
ment in DSOs today are needed in order to provide valuable contributions to the DSOs in this
process. Findings from other industries, as presented above, are useful, but there is a need to
explore whether there are speciﬁc challenges in industrial control organizations and how these
should best be met.
3. Research method
Our study was guided by the following research question: How is information security inci-
dent management diﬀerent in small DSOs compared to large DSOs? We conducted interviews
and collected documentation in nine distribution system operators (DSOs) in the electric power
industry [22, 23].
3.1. Data collection
Semi-structured interviews are based on an interview guide and allow for unplanned ques-
tions [23]. Our interview guide was inspired by the ISO/IEC 27035 [8]2. We revised the interview
guide from the study of large DSOs before interviewing the small DSOs: some questions were
2The interview guide is to be found at the bottom of this page: www.item.ntnu.no/people/personalpages/phd/maria.b.line/start.
The interview guide used for large DSOs can be found as an appendix in Line et al. [9].
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added (6, 17, 30, 31, 33, and 34) and one was removed3. The added questions mainly aim at
capturing the interviewee’s reﬂections on own practices; whether they have practices that work
particularly well, which challenges are worth emphasizing, and how the fact that they are a small
DSOs aﬀects the area of incident management.
The large DSOs were interviewed in June-December 2012, and the small DSOs were inter-
viewed in December 2013; at their respective premises4. All interviews were voice recorded and
transcribed. The study was registered at the Data Protection Oﬃcial for Research5. One test
interview was carried out in DSO B.
We asked each of the DSOs for the following types of documents:
• Information security policy
• Information security instructions
• Plans for continuity and preparedness
• Plans for information security incident management
• Periodical reports on information security incidents
• Other related documents they may have
Five of the DSOs provided us with some documentation (c.f. Table 1). Conﬁdentiality issues
prevented three of the other DSOs from sharing documentation, and one DSO never replied to
our request. Non-disclosure agreements and encrypted electronic transfer were not suﬃcient
instruments for overcoming the conﬁdentiality issues6.
3.2. Data analysis
The analysis followed an integrated approach, which combines the inductive development of
codes with a start list of categories in which the codes can be inductively developed [25, 26].
This was performed by one researcher due to conﬁdentiality restrictions posed by four of the
participating DSOs (D, E, F, Z)7, c.f. Table 1. Two fellow researchers were involved in discussing
coding categories and ﬁndings, and writing up this report. They had access to the transcriptions
3It concerned the most important actions in the response phase, but the question was too vague and was interpreted
very diﬀerently by interviewees in the large DSOs.
4There was one exception: the last interview at DSO Y was for practical reasons carried out over the telephone. The
need for including this interviewee was identiﬁed during the ﬁrst interview at this DSO, when the researcher visited their
premises, and it was diﬃcult to arrange for a re-visit due to time restrictions.
5http://www.nsd.uib.no/personvern/en/index.html
6It must however be noted that just the day after our request for documentation from the large DSOs, the authorities
sent an e-mail to all units that are part of the national emergency preparedness organization for power supply, which all
the DSOs in this study are part of, encouraging them to be critical to all requests for sensitive information. The authorities
stated that information sharing is not prohibited, but should be carefully considered in each case. As information security
researchers we should appreciate such caution regarding sharing of conﬁdential documents, although it poses limitations
on the data triangulation. Kotulic and Clark [24] point out this challenge of obtaining sensitive data as limiting to
research on information security management in general and recommend focusing on a few selected companies. This
opens for building trust between the company and the researcher, which will ease the collection of sensitive data. Also,
the companies in focus can be more involved in discussing and approving the results.
7The large DSOs (A-F) are partners in the DeVID project, the small DSOs (X-Z) are not. The DSOs B and C
considered the conﬁdentiality agreement for the project consortium to be suﬃcient for this interview study, while the
other DSOs (A, D, E, F) required the signing of an additional non-disclosure agreement (NDA) for the interviewing
researcher.
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DSO Number
of inter-
viewees
Documentation received Size Adm.
IT out-
sourced
Req.
NDA
A 4 Information security instructions,
Plans for preparedness in IT systems
large yes yes
B 3 no large no no
C 3 no large yes no
D 3 no large yes yes
E 3 Information security instructions,
Plans for preparedness in control
systems
large no yes
F 3 Information security policy, Infor-
mation security events (quarterly re-
port Q2-2012)
large yes yes
X 2 Security mechanisms in data centre small yes no
Y 3 no small yes no
Z 2 Information security policy, Infor-
mation security instructions, Form
for reporting incidents internally,
Form for reporting incidents to au-
thorities, NDA form, Agreements
with IT supplier: NDA and security
instructions
small yes yes
Table 1: The distribution system operators (DSOs) included in our study
from the interviews conducted in the other DSOs (A8, B, C, X, Y, c.f. Table 1) and reviewed the
codes that emerged during the analysis. The software tool NVivo9 was used for the data analysis.
3.3. Industrial case context
Nine DSOs were included in the study. The DSOs A-F are considered to be large in a Norwe-
gian context as they serve more than 50.000 power consumers, and they were selected for being
partners in the national research project DeVID. They constituted the ﬁrst phase of the study, as
presented by Line et al. [9]. The second phase included three small DSOs (X-Z)10, each which
serve less than 10.000 consumers. An overview of the participating organizations is presented in
Table 1, while roles and responsibilities of all the interviewees are shown in Table 2.
We asked to interview three diﬀerent roles from each of the large DSOs: IT manager, IT
security manager, and manager of control systems. The IT manager in DSO F was unable to
participate, and we interviewed the manager for quality and risk instead, as was suggested and
arranged for by that DSO. In DSO A we also interviewed one member of the technical IT staﬀ
8DSO A required an additional NDA to be signed, but this NDA allowed for all the three researchers to have access
to the data material.
9http://www.qsrinternational.com/
10Denoting the small DSOs G, H, I would be the obvious choice following the large DSOs A-F, but by using X, Y, Z
instead, the reader will ﬁnd it easier to distinguish the small from the large DSOs.
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in addition to the IT manager on their request, as the IT manager was fairly new to his role. In
the small DSOs we interviewed two roles: the IT and IT security manager, as these roles were
assigned to one person, and the one responsible for control systems operation. In DSO Y we
also interviewed the ﬁnance manager, as he was responsible for the contract with their external
IT supplier11. In the small DSOs, it was common for one person to have several roles. In total,
26 interviews were carried out: 19 in large DSOs and 7 in small DSOs.
DSO Interviewee
1 2 3 4
A Manager of IT sup-
plier.
Owner of control
systems, member
of branch company
management staﬀ.
IT manager and
IT security man-
ager in branch
company.
Employed by IT
supplier, respon-
sible for network
infrastructure for
both IT and control
systems.
B Corporate IT man-
ager. Responsi-
ble for all IT sys-
tems and network
infrastructure, and
IT security.
Control room op-
erations, operating
the power distribu-
tion grid.
IT security man-
ager for all IT sys-
tems, but in prac-
tice not for control
systems.
–
C IT manager in
branch company.
Manager of the
group that is
responsible for
daily operations
of control systems
and all network
infrastructure for
corporation.
Corporate IT man-
ager.
–
D Daily responsible
for information
security in corpo-
ration, approval
of changes, point
of contact for IT
supplier,
Responsible for
daily operations
of, and informa-
tion security for,
control systems.
IT security man-
ager in branch
company.
–
E IT manager, re-
sponsible for
administrative IT
systems in cor-
poration. Overall
responsible for IT
security as well.
Responsible for
daily operations
of, and informa-
tion security for,
control systems.
Corporate IT secu-
rity advisor.
–
11It became evident during our interviewee with their IT manager that the IT responsibilities were divided between him
and the ﬁnance manager. The IT manager was acting as internal IT support, while the ﬁnance manager was responsible
for the service agreements with their IT supplier.
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F Quality & risk
manager, reviews
both administra-
tive and control
systems.
Control room op-
erations, operating
the power distribu-
tion grid.
Corporate IT secu-
rity advisor. Em-
ployed by IT sup-
plier.
–
X IT manager, ﬁ-
nance manager,
responsible for IT
security, energy
salesperson.
Manager of control
systems.
– –
Y IT manager and IT
security manager,
but in practice: in-
ternal IT support.
Manager of control
systems.
Finance manager,
responsible for
contracts with ex-
ternal IT supplier.
–
Z IT manager, IT
security manager,
and manager of
energy sales, in-
cluding AMI and
invoicing.
Manager of control
systems.
– –
Table 2: Roles and responsibilities of all the interviewees
4. Findings
This section provides an overview of current incident management practices as reported by
the interviewees from both small and large DSOs. The ﬁndings are presented according to the
structure of ISO/IEC 27035, as shown in Figure 1. For the Plan and prepare phase, the section
emphasizes ﬁndings from small DSOs, as planning and preparatory activities in large DSOs were
presented previously by Line et al. [9]. Table 3 shows a summary of all incident management
activities as they are performed in large and small DSOs respectively, and the main diﬀerences
are emphasized in italics.
For the small DSOs, the term IT manager denotes the interviewees representing the perspec-
tives of administrative systems in the small DSOs, although they are responsible for both IT and
IT security.
4.1. Plan and prepare
Planning and preparing for information security incidents include understanding what inci-
dents may happen, creating plans, and performing tabletop and functional exercises. The ﬁndings
for the plan and prepare phase are structured similarly to the presentation of ﬁndings from large
DSOs [9]: We describe the DSOs’ perceived dependency on IT, their understanding of what an
information security incident is and what they consider to be a worst case scenario, documented
plans and procedures, their perceived preparedness for a worst case scenario, and their practices
when it comes to preparedness exercises.
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4.1.1. Dependency on IT
Both large and small DSOs state that they are more dependent on the administrative systems
than the control systems. Small DSOs seem however to be less dependent on control systems than
large DSOs. Small DSOs serve limited geographical areas, the distances between the critical
nodes in their network are short, and, according to DSO Z, the operators know quite well where
these nodes are. The distribution grid can be operated manually, and recovering from failures is
manageable. However, without functioning control systems the automatic failure detection will
not work, and they will depend more on customers contacting them about failures.
In both large and small DSOs, the administrative systems are important for cash ﬂow. Further,
they contain detailed maps of the grid. Hence, all DSOs report the dependency on these systems
to be high. The control room manager in DSO X said that if the administrative systems are
down for more than 48 hours, they will need more personnel for manually ﬁnding paper-based
information. This will represent a considerable cost compared to having functioning systems.
4.1.2. Deﬁnition of an incident
Among the small DSOs, none of the interviewees provided a clear deﬁnition of an IT se-
curity incident. The terms conﬁdentiality, integrity, and availability (CIA) were not mentioned
speciﬁcally by any of the interviewees from the small DSOs. These terms were however used
in the received information security policy and instructions from DSO Z. Despite the lack of a
clear deﬁnition, all interviewees provided relevant examples of incidents. This is in line with the
responses from the large DSOs.
4.1.3. Worst case scenario
Both large and small DSOs considered unauthorized control of power switches to be the worst
case scenario. However, their view on this scenario is quite diﬀerent: Small DSOs do not consider
themselves attractive targets. Furthermore, they consider the consequences to be quite limited
compared to large DSOs. The control manager in DSO X explained that the substation is not far
away from their main oﬃce, so they would be able to get there quite fast, disconnect the remote
control system, regain control of the switches, and turn the power back on. The control manager
in DSO Y did not see that anyone would be interested in causing such harm to their power grid.
He believed that a larger DSO, covering larger areas and more signiﬁcant industries, would be a
much more attractive target for hacker attacks. Those who could be interested in causing harm to
the small DSOs, would not be able to do it due to lack of knowledge of their particular systems,
he claimed. This view was also supported by the control room manager in DSO Z. DSO Y does
not have remote control systems, which greatly limits the technical possibilities of performing a
hacker attack.
Just like the large DSOs, the small DSOs also identiﬁed worst case scenarios for the ad-
ministrative systems. Hacking of the customer database with the purpose of selling personal
information was mentioned as a more realistic scenario than a power outage attack. Other threats
perceived as realistic included virus attacks and physical failures. Further, two IT managers
(DSOs Y, Z) added that the issue of having a non-functioning backup would make this scenario
even worse. It would be quite costly to restore systems without an up-to-date backup.
4.1.4. Documentation of plans and procedures
The interviews with the large DSOs revealed that responsibilities and plans regarding infor-
mation security incidents were not widely established. This was particularly the case when IT
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operations were outsourced. The small DSOs showed the same tendencies. None of the doc-
umentation that we received from the small DSOs contained any information about procedures
for incident management. However, all the small DSOs explained that they have some plans
regarding the handling of information security incidents. The control manager in DSO X stated
that they have a collaborative plan with their IT supplier for incident management.
Though the small DSOs stated that they have some documentation to support them if an
incident should occur, the awareness of the existence of this documentation seems to be lim-
ited. In addition, the knowledge of the content of the documentation seems to be lacking. The
IT manager in DSO X stated that he did not know whether procedures for IT security incident
management were described in the emergency preparedness plan. The control manager of DSO
X admitted that the emergency preparedness plan was probably not well-known among the em-
ployees, partly due to new hirings, but they were about to have a meeting on this quite soon. In
DSO Y, the IT manager had not learnt about the incident management documentation from their
IT supplier. They have a diﬀerent supplier for their control systems, and the control manager
claimed that they have not seen the need for documenting any procedures for incident manage-
ment so far. If they experience any problems, they would just call their supplier. This applies
to the administrative IT systems as well, as stated by the ﬁnance manager. In DSO Z, the con-
trol manager did not know about the plans and procedures referred to by the IT manager, but he
also stated that there has never been a need for such. This was supported by the IT manager.
Documented or improved plans and procedures were suggested by both large and small DSOs as
possible improvements in their own organization.
4.1.5. Preparedness for worst case scenarios
All interviewees from the small DSOs claimed that their organization would be able to re-
spond appropriately to a worst case scenario. Thus, small DSOs appear to be more conﬁdent in
their own preparedness than large DSOs, who were more diverse in their responses. The control
room managers of the small DSOs, who viewed hacking into the control systems as the worst
scenario they could imagine, all stated that they would be able to disconnect the remote control
system and manually operate the power grid for quite a long time if such a scenario should occur.
The control room manager in DSO Z pointed out that the critical time period would be from the
beginning of the attack until they managed to disconnect their systems.
Though all the DSOs are in general conﬁdent in their own ability to handle also worst case
incidents, the IT manager in DSO Y said he did not know how much time they would need to
achieve a complete recovery. The IT manager in DSO X expressed the importance of having a
professional, large, and competent IT supplier on which they can rely in such situations. Some
of the large DSOs were concerned about few preparedness training drills and the limited scope
of the performed drills.
4.1.6. Preparedness exercises
The responses from small DSOs indicate that training receives an even lower priority than
among large DSOs. Reasons for the lack of training were similar; it has not been on the agenda,
other tasks receive higher priority, and training has a certain cost. In addition, the small DSOs
assigned a low probability for IT attacks to occur, and they claimed to be able to operate the
power grid manually for a long period of time. Where some of the large DSOs see the need to
improve their training activities, small DSOs thus do not see the need to perform training for this
in the near future.
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All DSOs performed general emergency preparedness exercises regularly, but they were usu-
ally based on bad weather, ﬁre, sabotage, and similar incidents. In small DSOs, IT-based sce-
narios were never used for such exercises, except for one tabletop exercise in the control room
for DSO Y. The IT manager in DSO Z stated that protecting the physical grid and the produc-
tion process from ﬁre and similar incidents are viewed as more important than protecting the IT
systems in order to ensure continuous power supply. The IT manager in DSO X emphasized the
importance of having a competent supplier to assist during actual incidents. Still, he had never
considered the need for performing a collaborative preparedness exercise on IT-based scenarios
with this supplier. None of the other interviewees had discussed the possibility of performing
such collaborative exercises with their suppliers either. The IT manager in DSO Z saw it as rea-
sonable to include the supplier in such an exercise, but he had not given this any thought before
the interview.
4.2. Detection and reporting
The seven DSOs that have outsourced their IT operations (A, C, D, F, X, Y, Z), rely on their
supplier to detect incidents and notify them if something occurs. The other two DSOs (B, E)
claimed to have monitoring and detection mechanisms in place. All respondents, except from
DSOs X and Y, pointed out that employees are an important part of the sensor network for de-
tecting irregularities. There are large variations between the DSOs regarding monitoring and
detection systems for the control systems, but the size of the DSO seems to be irrelevant. DSOs
B and E reported that the power automation network is fully monitored and failures will trigger
alarms. The other DSOs said that incidents would be discovered accidentally by an operator
noticing that something is not working satisfactorily, as there are limited, if any, detection mech-
anisms in place for the control systems.
Any irregularities in either the control or administrative IT systems are reported through
the oﬃcial channels: control room manager and control system manager or IT and IT security
manager, supplier, corporate manager, authorities; the severity of the incident determines how
far the reports go. The authorities are to be notiﬁed only if there are potential consequences for
the electric power supply.
4.3. Assessment and decision, and Responses
None of the DSOs reported on having experienced any serious information security inci-
dents. For administrative systems, the IT and IT security managers in large DSOs reported on
experiencing the well-known: vulnerabilities in software requiring patches, malware infections,
breaches of procedures like users not locking their PC when leaving their oﬃce, and uninten-
tional mishaps. None of the DSOs had experienced any deliberate information security incidents
in the control systems. Technical failures occur occasionally, but they never cause any disrup-
tions for the power supply. One virus infection was mentioned, and this happened to a control
system for power production in DSO B. They did not know the cause of this virus infection,
but there was no antivirus running in these systems, and no patching regime was in place either.
The incident caused control system computers to run slowly and required an extensive eﬀort for
clean-up, but it did not cause any damage. The small DSOs reported that they had never detected
any information security incidents at all in their control systems. Furthermore, among the small
DSOs the IT manager in DSO Z was the only one to report an information security incident in
the administrative systems, as they experienced an extensive malware infection two-three years
ago that caused the need for reinstalling all their computers. The IT managers in DSOs X and Y
attributed their lack of incidents to the excellence of their IT supplier.
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As none of the DSOs had experienced any major incidents in their ICT systems, their ex-
periences regarding response was also limited. The need for collaboration during response was
however discussed in the interviews. Several parties were mentioned to be included in this work:
operators, managers on diﬀerent levels, one or more suppliers, consultants. Several of the in-
terviewees reported that this works well and that both the DSO and the supplier(s) beneﬁt from
successful and smooth collaborations. The small DSOs stated that because they are small, sev-
eral persons are assigned more than one role, and the same persons tend to meet and cooperate
on many diﬀerent tasks. The distances between key personnel are short. However, large DSOs
have also established close connections that are useful during response. The IT security manager
in DSO A explained that they have close collaborations between the diﬀerent departments, as
the organization is fairly small, despite being among the largest with respect to the number of
power consumers. Still, some collaborative challenges were pointed out: gaps in competence
and understanding of information security (DSOs A, C), and central IT operations department
not familiar with local implementations (DSO B). As one IT manager put it, referring to the IT
staﬀ on one hand and the control room operators on the other hand:
“There is a large gap in maturity when it comes to information security.”
— IT manager (C, branch)
A lack of formally deﬁned responsibilities was reported by the IT manager in DSO B, but
despite of that, they have not experienced any speciﬁc problems. The interviewee suggested that
the reason might be that they have not experienced any worst case scenarios yet.
In general, the large DSOs would like to improve the collaboration between IT and control
system staﬀ. Furthermore, DSO Z would like to improve the ﬂow of information with their
supplier of administrative IT systems, and the IT manager in DSO D would like their supplier
to be more in front in making decisions, as they are the ones to hold the most competence
on information security. These challenges were however related to everyday tasks rather than
incident management in particular.
4.4. Lessons learnt
All respondents stated the need for thorough evaluations after an incident: identifying the
root causes, extracting lessons learnt, and identifying improvements to risk assessments, organi-
zational procedures, and technical systems. The type and severity of the incident determine who
should participate in such an evaluation. Some DSOs stated that they have never evaluated any
information security incidents, as they have never experienced them. They still considered learn-
ing activities to be an obvious part of the aftermath. DSOs do this for other types of incidents
and saw no reason why information security incidents should be treated diﬀerently.
All DSOs reported that they have some kind of general discrepancy reporting. At the same
time, none of the DSOs had a systematic approach to measurements related to information se-
curity incidents. The IT security manager in DSO E clearly expressed that this would be quite
useful for communication with the top management:
“Maybe it would be easier to argue for solutions that we ﬁnd necessary.”
— IT security manager (E)
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Some interviewees stated that they are able to estimate costs from some incidents, as their
employees register work hours assigned to a dedicated project when they are not able to perform
their regular work due to unforeseen downtime. Furthermore, some DSOs register the duration
of unforeseen downtime per month as well. Such records might indicate a trend upwards or
downwards and allow for the DSO to initiate actions if necessary. The control manager in DSO
Y stated that the cost for one incident could be estimated based on records of work hours, invoice
from supplier, loss of production, and not-delivered power12. The need for regular reporting of
incidents and procedures for this and increased awareness among management were expressed
by large DSOs.
Large DSOs Small DSOs
Dependency on
IT
100% dependent on both adm. IT
and control systems. Can endure for
some days without adm. IT, until
cashﬂow stops. Can operate power
grid manually without control room
for a limited period.
100% dependent on adm. IT sys-
tems, can endure for some days, un-
til cashﬂow stops. Do not consider
availability of the control systems as
critical.
Deﬁnition of in-
cident
No common deﬁnition among con-
trol staﬀ. Some IT/IT sec. staﬀ used
the terms conﬁdentiality, integrity,
availability.
No common deﬁnition, but relevant
examples were provided. One secu-
rity policy used the terms conﬁden-
tiality, integrity, availability.
Worst case sce-
nario
Malicious hacker attacks in con-
trol systems resulting in outages.
Compromised/deleted databases
with customer information and/or
information on the physical power
grid.
Compromised and sold customer
database. Malware attack or failure
in adm. IT sys. Malicious hacker at-
tacks in control systems resulting in
outages was viewed as possible, but
very unlikely.
Documented
plans
Established in one DSO only,
in progress in some DSOs, non-
existing in others. Reliance on
suppliers, but no collaborations on
plans.
One DSO has collaborative plans
with their IT supplier. Otherwise
some plans documented, but not well
established and known.
Preparedness
for worst case
Various perceptions: Trust their
well-organized and planned gen-
eral emergency preparedness, and/or
ability to improvise. Some reported
doubt on own preparedness due to
lack of training.
Conﬁdent with own and/or supplier’s
response capabilities.
Training Regular general emergency pre-
paredness exercises, but they are
rarely based on IT security incidents.
Regular general emergency pre-
paredness exercises, but they are
rarely based on IT security incidents.
Receives lower priority than in the
large DSOs due to the perception
that attacks are unlikely.
12The cost of not-delivered power is well-deﬁned in the Norwegian power industry.
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Detection of in-
cidents
Mainly rely on suppliers of IT and/or
own employees. Monitoring of con-
trol systems implemented by some
DSOs.
Rely heavily on suppliers of both IT
and control systems, unless incidents
are easily detected by internal em-
ployees.
Initial reporting Oﬃcial channels: middle and top
managers, suppliers, authorities.
Depends on severity of incident.
Oﬃcial channels, but shorter dis-
tances between key personnel than
in large DSOs. Same personnel in-
volved in all kinds of incidents.
Common in-
cidents and
consequences
Adm. IT: malware, unintentional
breaches of procedure, etc. Con-
trol systems: few incidents (only one
virus infection mentioned).
Adm. IT: no major incidents, ex-
plained with well-functioning mon-
itoring. Control systems: no infor-
mation security incidents.
Collaborative
challenges dur-
ing responses
Competence gaps, lack of formal-
ized responsibilities. Still, works
fairly well in practice. Successful
collaborations with suppliers.
No challenges related to responses
mentioned, but would like to im-
prove communication with supplier
in general.
Post-incident
evaluations
Would identify lessons learnt and
necessary improvements. Manage-
ment and suppliers would partici-
pate. DSOs do this for other types
of incidents.
Would include key personnel, top
management, and possibly supplier,
depending on type of incident.
Registration and
metrics
All have quality systems, but IT mat-
ters are not registered by all. No sys-
tematic approach to metrics for in-
formation security incidents in par-
ticular.
Some have their own quality system,
other leave this to supplier. No sys-
tematic approach to metrics for in-
formation security incidents in par-
ticular.
Table 3: Established practices for incident management activities in large
and small DSOs.
5. Discussion
Our ﬁndings from the interviews and the documentation study show a number of diﬀerences
between large and small DSOs:
1. Small DSOs do not see themselves as possible targets for targeted attacks. They believe
that the large DSOs are more attractive targets. Preparedness exercises based on IT security
incidents therefore receive even lower priority in the small DSOs than in the large DSOs.
The large DSOs are more aware of their own position as possible targets for worst case
scenarios.
2. The small DSOs depend little on the control systems. A shutdown of the control room
will not cause nearly the same inconvenience to the small DSOs as compared to the large
DSOs. Consequently, small DSOs consider the consequences of malicious hacker attacks
against the control systems to be rather limited.
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3. Despite the fact that small DSOs give preparedness exercises based on IT security incidents
a low priority, they are conﬁdent in their ability to respond to the worst case scenarios.
Large DSOs realize the need for better preparations.
4. The distances between key personnel are short in small DSOs, which simpliﬁes communi-
cation and collaboration during a crisis. Large DSOs are more likely to suﬀer from orga-
nizational dividing lines, a lack of dynamic collaborations across these lines, and unclear
responsibilities in some areas.
5. Small DSOs depend heavily on their IT supplier. They rely on the supplier to have the
necessary plans, procedures, exercises, competence, equipment and the ability to respond
appropriately to incidents. Large DSOs show the same tendency, but to a much lesser
degree, and they have more IT and IT security competence in-house.
In the following, the diﬀerences between large and small DSOs and their implications on the
incident management process are discussed in more detail. Further, a set of recommendations
are provided, both for small DSOs speciﬁcally and for DSOs of all sizes. Finally, we discuss
threats to validity for our study.
5.1. Risk perception
An individual’s risk perception is inﬂuenced by technical/formal risk assessments and her
own personal risk assessments, combined with perceptual factors such as fear [27]. Hence,
there might be a gap between risk perceptions and the actual level of risk. As individual risk
perceptions aﬀect risk behavior, they might also inﬂuence the risk perception in an organization
[28]. For exercises and other preparatory activities to be performed, the top management needs
to show commitment. Senior management commitment is key to successful information security,
but is perceived as quite challenging to achieve, as reported by Tøndel et al. [15]. Rhee et al.
[29] showed that management tends to be optimistically biased in that they underestimate their
organization’s vulnerability and overestimate their ability to control the security threats. This
indicates that the eﬀort towards the management should be less on general security awareness
and more on the actual threats and possible consequences to the speciﬁc organization.
The small DSOs believed that malicious attackers who want to cause power outages, would
rather target larger DSOs. Furthermore, they considered the consequences of attacks to the con-
trol systems as limited, as these systems are not of crucial importance in the process of maintain-
ing continuous power supply to the customers. The information security risk was perceived to be
lower among the small DSOs than among the large DSOs. In the following, we discuss whether
or not the small DSOs’ perception that they are not a target, is likely to be true. In addition, we
discuss whether or not their perception of low dependency on control systems is likely to still
hold given the development towards smarter grids.
5.1.1. Attractiveness as a target
It is reasonable to believe that attackers would look for larger areas where major organizations
within ﬁnance, energy, media, and public authorities operate, in order for an attack to have
a certain impact and/or receive a certain amount of attention. However, certain cornerstone
enterprises and several military installations are located in smaller towns where the power grid
is operated by a small DSO. A small DSO may not be the target by itself, but it might serve
customers that are attractive targets for attacks. The small DSOs in our study had not considered
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this before the interviews. Besides, one small DSO might not be attractive alone, but striking
several small DSOs at the same time might be easier than attacking one large DSO. Attackers who
would want to harm the country as a whole might consider this as a strategy. The consequences
of a power outage attack should be considered beyond the eﬀects for one single DSO.
In addition to power outages, industrial espionage is a possible motivation for attacks against
the power industry – obtaining access to conﬁdential corporate information. It is reasonable to
assume that striking larger organizations would be more rewarding, as their contracts typically
involve more money. A third main motivation for attacks these days is collection of personal
information [30]. This was mentioned as a possible worst case scenario by both large and small
DSOs. The probability of such a compromise depends on the level of protection of data and ease
of accomplishment rather than the size of the organization.
5.1.2. Dependency on the control systems
The degree to which a DSO is dependent on the control systems seems to be determined by
the DSO’s ability to maintain continuous power supply to their customers without the control
systems. The geographical area served by a small DSO is typically limited. The operators know
the area well, and there are short distances between the main oﬃce and the substations. The
grid contains fewer substations and fewer components than the grids operated by larger DSOs,
and this limits the attack surface as well. Small DSOs are responsible for the local distribu-
tion grid only, while some of the larger DSOs operate regional or transmission grids in addition.
These were reasons provided by the small DSOs for why they could operate successfully with
unavailable control systems. However, there is a large diﬀerence between unavailable control
systems and minor, undetected errors in the information provided by the control systems. We are
concerned that only the property of availability was considered by the DSOs when asked about
dependency. None of the interviewees mentioned breaches of integrity or conﬁdentiality. We be-
lieve that an integrity breach in the control systems could potentially have severe consequences,
as erroneous information could make operators perform unfortunate actions and cause overload
in the grid, possibly with physical damages as a result. Such minor errors can be invisible to the
human eye and only be detected by automatic monitoring systems, which are not yet widely used
for control systems, at least not among small DSOs.
The emergency preparedness regulations require DSOs of all sizes to be able to manually
operate the power grid [31]. The large DSOs however stated that manual operation would not
be possible for a long period of time. The number and severity of occurring failures determine
how long they can manage, due to the need for having a suﬃcient amount of personnel. With the
smart grids being implemented in the future, it is reasonable to believe that the complexity of the
IT and control systems will increase and that the DSOs, including the small DSOs, will depend
more heavily on these systems for eﬃcient operation.
”The greatest challenge is that they don’t understand how IT intensive their new
world will be.”
— IT manager (DSO B) on control room operators and the future with Smart Grids
5.2. Collaborations during incident response
Employees in small DSOs know each other well and their oﬃces are in the same corridor,
which enables close collaborations, as opposed to in a large DSO that is divided into departments,
and responsibilities are clearly deﬁned for each department. Communication between personnel
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in diﬀerent departments tends to be more limited. This diﬀerence aﬀects information sharing, ad-
hoc collaborations, and lines for alerting and reporting. During a crisis situation it is important
to have an overview, see connections, and make the right decisions. The IT manager in DSO X
claimed this to be much easier in a small organization. Sharing, rather than ﬁnding, information
was stated as challenging by Ahmad et al. [32], but this seems to be less of a challenge in small
DSOs. On the other hand, as personnel in the small DSOs have more than one role, some tasks
may be given low priorities due to other, more pressing tasks. This puts the onus on the top
manager to communicate the appropriate prioritizations.
We would expect the IT staﬀ to be able to share expertise, as hacker attacks towards adminis-
trative IT systems have been around for several years. That being said, knowing how to prepare
for, and appropriately respond to, such attacks is not straigthforward, but a combination of gen-
eral knowledge of attackers’ strategies and detailed knowledge of the control systems should be
a reasonable starting point. There are some distinct diﬀerences between administrative IT and
control systems, such as availability requirements and consequences from an attack [33]. Re-
sponse strategies are therefore not directly transferrable. Still, there should be synergy eﬀects
from collaborations between IT and control system operators.
All the DSOs rely on their suppliers of control systems, and in most cases also their suppliers
for IT systems, for support in case an incident occurs. Small DSOs expect the suppliers to
have appropriate security measures in place, in addition to plans and response capabilities. The
existence of plans or having a response team in place seem to have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the
feeling of preparedness according to Witchalls and Chambers [34].
Documented experiences on incident management from other sectors show that eﬃcient and
successful incident management requires collaboration between several parties [15]. This is also
the case for DSOs. However, DSOs seem relatively conﬁdent that collaboration will be smooth
in case an incident occurs, while the literature shows that collaboration tends to be challenging,
particularly in outsourcing scenarios [15]. Hove et al. [20] speciﬁcally identiﬁed the challenge
of determining who owns an incident, an issue that could not be exactly documented in written
procedures. Hesitations and delays in the early stages of the response phase could make the cost
of the incident much higher than necessary.
All the three small DSOs have outsourced their IT operations, and outsourcing relieves the
DSO of several practical tasks, which are more eﬃciently solved by large-scale professional sup-
ply organizations. Still, the DSOs need to be knowledgable about threats to be able to formulate
appropriate requirements to their supplier. This is in fact also stated in national requirements13.
A small DSO is, however, just one out of several customers for the IT supplier, and might feel
that they are not in the position of making demands. Therefore, they tend to accept what the
supplier has to oﬀer and assume that this is suﬃcient. The security level of the administrative IT
systems is then in the hands of the suppliers. One of the large DSOs actually pointed out their
concern about the supplier of control systems being attacked and the consequences this could
pose to the DSO. The supplier has several employees with extensive competence and knowledge
about their systems and remote access into the core of the control systems.
In addition to formulating requirements, the DSOs should make sure that all collaborations
are well documented, including plans and procedures for incident management. The existence
of such plans was limited among both large and small DSOs, and particularly among those who
had outsourced their IT operations. The lack of such documentation does not imply unsuccessful
13All organizations licensed according to Energiloven (Energy Act) must have in-house expertise for all tasks covered
by the license.
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incident management by the supplier, as they might have their own well-functioning procedures
without the DSO being aware of this. However, documentation is the ﬁrst step on the way to
successful collaboration as it forms a basis for further clariﬁcations and exercises. DSO X had
collaborative plans with their supplier, a practice that we would like to recommend to all the
other DSOs as well.
Small DSOs have the same duties and obligations as large DSOs, but not the same amount of
ﬁnancial resources and personnel. Collaborations with other small DSOs are valuable, according
to DSO X. Sharing knowledge and competence compensates for not having the same capabilities
as the larger ones.
5.3. Awareness and training
It was stated by both large and small DSOs that a malicious attack could easily be stopped
by disconnecting the control room from the network. The IT operator from DSO A’s IT supplier
was the only one who pointed out the challenge of investigating an incident and its consequences
if just pulling the plug was the response strategy. Our major concern regarding this strategy and
the fact that this was the number one strategy suggested by everyone, is that it requires the attack
to be detected. Targeted attacks tend to be designed with the aim of not being easily detected and
might be in progress for a long time before the consequences become evident. A power outage
is indeed a notable consequence, but an attacker might just as well perform slight modiﬁcations
for a longer period of time. This might cause serious damage one day in the future, but do not
necessarily result in sudden consequences, as was the case with Stuxnet [3, 4, 5].
The responses showed that no targeted attacks have been detected so far and that the number
of IT security incidents in the control systems in general is rather low. This means that the
operators get very little practical experience in recognizing and responding to such incidents,
which indeed are likely to occur at some point, as indicated by current threat statistics [7]. The
smart grid future is likely to involve higher connectivity and integrations between IT and control
systems, also for the small DSOs. This demonstrates the importance of performing preparedness
exercises, as they should expect IT security incidents to occur at some point. The need for
training is supported by the fact that experienced incident responders are considered to be of
higher value than documented plans and procedures when an emergency situation occurs [20].
General emergency preparedness exercises are well-known and regularly performed by all
the DSOs, but the scenarios are usually related to physical damage. Deliberate hacker attacks
in the control systems or other IT security incidents are rarely part of drills. Such exercises are
given an even lower priority among the small DSOs than among the large DSOs. Two main
reasons were stated for general preparedness exercises being performed regularly: the national
regulations require this, and interruptions in the power supply have considerable costs for a
DSO. Norwegian authorities have already realized the need for requiring IT security incidents to
be trained for, as they included IT security incidents among recommended training scenarios in
the national regulations in July 201314.
The fact that a large number of IT services, particularly administrative IT systems, are out-
sourced, calls for the need for collaborative preparedness exercises with suppliers. The practical
response activities will typically be performed by them, and there are a number of factors that de-
termine whether an incident is responded to in the best possible manner. Collaborative exercises
could reveal unclear responsibilities and other grey areas.
14The interviews with large DSOs were performed before this date. It remains to be seen how long it will take them to
adopt the recent recommendations.
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5.4. Recommendations
We hereby provide a set of prioritized recommendations to DSOs with the intention of im-
proving preparedness for information security incidents. For small DSOs we speciﬁcally recom-
mend the following:
1. Improve the collaboration with the IT supplier. Discuss risk perceptions, security mech-
anisms, reporting and response procedures, and exercises. Ensure that requirements are
written in accordance with performed risk assessments.
2. Initiate/maintain a dialogue with other small DSOs. Exchange experiences and concerns
related to information security incidents and incident management practices. Existing ini-
tiatives for information sharing and analysis could be used as inspiration, such as FS-ISAC
[35].
Additionally, we recommend the following to both small and large DSOs:
1. Document plans and procedures for incident management. Include both IT and control
systems suppliers in this process, use ISO/IEC 27035 as a checklist, make sure that key
personnel are aware of their roles and responsibilities.
2. Perform preparedness exercises on information security incidents in the control systems,
including targeted attacks and the worst case scenarios. Perform collaborative exercises:
with suppliers, other DSOs, the largest customers.
3. Implement automatic monitoring and detection mechanisms in the control systems.
4. Establish and/or improve collaboration between control system operators and IT staﬀ. Ed-
ucate control room operators in information security and strengthen their ability of detect-
ing malicious activity in the networks. Educate IT staﬀ in control system properties and
diﬀerences from IT systems.
5.5. Threats to validity
Construct validity: Interviewees may be biased [36], and they might have a conscious or un-
conscious desire of giving a good impression of themselves and their organization. We perceived
the interviewees to be honest in their responses as they reported shortcomings in a number of
areas rather than a perfect situation. Some even expressed their gratitude for us performing this
study, as it gave them an opportunity to discuss these issues internally, they gained new insights
during our interviews, and they appreciated that their area receives additional attention.
“The way you presented the questions... it made me learn something, too.”
— Control manager (Z)
We limited our study to include interviewees from the management level in the organizations.
This also limited the level of detail we were able to bring to light regarding the practical tasks of
detecting, interpreting, and responding to incidents, as these tasks are performed by employees
on lower levels and/or by supplier organizations. It would have strengthened this study to include
such operational personnel, but our limitation was due to time and resource constraints.
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Data triangulation: The quality of data increases when a phenomenon is studied from diﬀerent
perspectives [22]. We used interviews and documentation as information sources, as they provide
two diﬀerent views on incident management. The interviewees would describe their practice as
they know it, while documentation would show the planned procedures.
All interviewees were provided with a draft of this paper, and hence given the opportunity
to comment on the results. This is referred to as member checking [23], and is a strategy for
reducing researcher bias. In our study where one researcher did most of the analysis, this was
especially important. It also shows our informants that we value their contributions.
External validity refers to the degree to which the ﬁndings from one study can be generalized to
other settings [23]. Our study is restricted to DSOs, and both the DSOs and the participating in-
terviewees were thoroughly described in Section 3. This description of the industrial case context
is of great importance when considering whether our results are transferrable to a given setting.
There is a lack of similar studies15 on incident management in industrial control organizations.
We believe that more empirical studies like ours should be carried out within a broader spectrum
of such organizations. Generalizability will be strengthened by increasing the number of studies.
After the completion of the planned interviews in the large DSOs, saturation was reached
[37]. For the perspectives of IT managers and IT security managers, saturation was actually
reached before all the planned interviews were completed, as their responses were fairly well
aligned. The need for information about the control systems still called for completing the inter-
views in all the six large DSOs. The small DSOs were included in the study for the purpose of
investigating how, if at all, current practice diﬀers between them and the large DSOs. It could be
argued that more than three small DSOs should be explored, but we still felt that saturation was
achieved after completion of the seven interviews conducted in the small DSOs. The responses
reﬂected similar practices and hence constituted a suﬃcient amount of empirical data for us to
compare with the practices in the large DSOs.
6. Concluding remarks and further work
Our study shows that there are a number of diﬀerences between large and small DSOs in
their information security incident management practices. The risk perception tends to be lower
among small DSOs, and their feeling of preparedness is accordingly higher than in the larger
DSOs. Both large and small DSOs have weaknesses in their practices that need to be addressed
in order for the industry to meet the emerging threats.
None of the DSOs had ever experienced any targeted attacks to their IT systems nor their
control systems before our study. After we completed this study, the power industry in Norway
was hit by a hacker attack [38]. We followed up by sending three questions by email to each
DSO, asking about how this attack aﬀected their approaches to information security, independent
of whether they were hit by the attack or not. Six DSOs responded. The responses indicate that
the top managers are now more concerned about information security incidents and preparednes
exercises in particular. All the DSOs claim that they would be able to respond appropriately
to such an attack, although it would depend on the complexity of the attack and how quickly
the attack was detected. After this attack, the trend seems to be that preparedness exercises for
information security incidents are given higher priority, reviews of documentation are performed,
15With the exception of the related work of Jaatun et al. [16].
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and the understanding of threats and of the importance of monitoring and analysis of incidents
has been improved.
The power industry, and DSOs in particular, are implementing smart grids, and they will be
experiencing large technological changes in the near future. Even though everything seems to
go well so far, the DSOs foresee the possibilities of malicious attacks being performed, also in
the control systems as of today. The worst case scenarios are considered real, although not very
likely. These scenarios have not been included in training and drills. Based on our ﬁndings, we
claim that there has been a mismatch between anticipation and preparation. The recent major
attack clearly served as a wakeup call for a number of organizations, and top management in
particular. Such attacks typically increase awareness, but this eﬀect is usually short-lived. Con-
tinuous preparations and improvements to the information security incident management process
is required in order for the power industry to be prepared for the future.
Research eﬀorts should be put into preparedness exercises for IT security incidents: design
and evaluations of collaborative exercises, both tabletop and more functional exercises, where
participants represent both IT and control systems, DSO and suppliers. Both low-impact and
high-impact incidents should form scenarios to be trained for.
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Abstract. IT security preparedness exercises allow for practical collab-
orative training, which in turn leads to improved response capabilities
to information security incidents for an organization. However, such ex-
ercises are not commonly performed in the electric power industry. We
have observed a tabletop exercise as performed by three organizations
with the aim of understanding challenges of performing such exercises.
We argue that challenges met during exercises could aﬀect the response
process during a real incident as well, and by improving the exercises
the response capabilities would be strengthened accordingly. We found
that the response team must be carefully selected to include the right
competences and all parties that would be involved in a real incident
response process, such as technical, managerial, and business responsi-
ble. Further, the main goal of the exercise needs to be well understood
among the whole team and the facilitator needs to ensure a certain time
pressure to increase the value of the exercise, and both the exercise and
existing procedures need to be reviewed. Finally, there are many ways
to conduct preparedness exercises. Therefore, organizations need to both
optimize current exercise practices and experiment with new ones.
Keywords: Information Security, Incident Management, Preparedness
Exercises, Training, Decision-making, Self-managing Teams
1 Introduction
Preparing for information security incident management requires training. Basic
structures such as well documented procedures and clear deﬁnitions of roles and
responsibilities need to be in place, but during an incident, there is no time
to study documentation in order to ﬁgure out the most appropriate response
strategies; involved personnel needs to be well trained and well experienced, and
hence able to make the right decisions under pressure [1]. Wrong decisions may
cause the incident to escalate and lead to severe consequences.
The electric power industry is currently implementing major technological
changes in order to achieve smart grids. These changes concern new technolo-
gies, higher connectivity and more integration, which increase the attack surface
and the potential consequences of attacks [2]. At the same time, current threat
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reports show that targeted attacks are on the rise, and critical infrastructures
are attractive targets [3]. However, recent studies of the electric power industry
show that preparedness exercises for IT security incidents are not commonly per-
formed [4, 5] though guidelines exist for how to plan and perform such exercises
[6, 7]. Reasons for not performing such exercises seem to relate to their percep-
tion of the probability of being attacked and their understanding of potential
threats and consequences, and that more pressing tasks receive higher priority.
Still, personnel from both the IT staﬀ and the industrial control staﬀ express
conﬁdence in their organization’s incident response capabilities.
Motivated by the importance of collaborative training for responding to in-
formation security incidents, and the evident problem of adopting such training,
the following research question is deﬁned for our study:
What are the challenges of performing tabletop exercises for IT security in-
cidents?
We will discuss how these challenges might aﬀect the incident management
process during a real-life incident and provide recommendations for how to re-
duce these challenges in the setting of an exercise, as that should positively aﬀect
a real-life incident management process as well.
The paper is structured as follows. Related work on preparedness exercises are
described in Section 2. The research method and our case context are presented
in Section 3, while Section 4 sums up the observations made during the case
study. Challenges are discussed in Section 5 along with recommendations for
preparedness exercises, and Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Background
The purpose of an emergency preparedness exercise is to strengthen the response
capabilities of an organization by training personnel in responding to situations
that deviate from normal operations. A certain baseline of written plans and
procedures should be present. However, during an emergency there is a need
for a more dynamic process that requires coordination and improvisation, and
where exceptions and violations are managed, and experienced incident handlers
are valued. Relying on predeﬁned documentation is what Hale and Borys refer to
as Model 1 in the use of safety rules and procedures [8], while allowing for rules
to be emerged from practical experience is referred to as Model 2. Exercises are
a way of developing Model 2. In the following we elaborate on tabletop exercises
speciﬁcally, and coordination and improvisation in the incident response process.
2.1 Tabletop exercises
Tabletop exercises prepare personnel for responding to an emergency situation.
They allow for discussions of roles, responsibilities, procedures, coordination, and
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decision-making, and are a reasonably cost-eﬃcient way of reviewing and learn-
ing documented plans and procedures for incident response. Tabletop exercises
are usually performed in a classroom without the use of any speciﬁc equipment. A
facilitator presents a scenario and initiates the discussion. According to the Na-
tional Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), a tabletop exercise should
consist of the following four phases; Design the event by identifying objectives
and participants, Develop the scenario and guides for the facilitator and the
participants, Conduct the exercise, and Evaluate by debrieﬁng and identifying
lessons learned [6]. As a training method it suﬀers from the weakness that it
does not provide practical demonstrations of the eﬀects of an incident or the
emergency management’s true response capabilities [9].
In his study of preparedness exercises initiated by the Norwegian Water and
Energy Directorate (NVE), G˚asland [10] found that there is a positive attitude
for participating in exercises and an understanding that collaboration is impor-
tant in problem-solving processes. He still found that exercises compete with
daily tasks for prioritization, and he considered it to be an obstacle to learning
if exercises are not used as a means of making improvements afterwards. Further,
he emphasized the importance of making exercises as realistic as possible. How-
ever, creating realistic scenarios is challenging [11], and even though a scenario
is successfully responded to in an exercise, it does not give any guarantees that
a real emergency situation will be successfully responded to [12].
2.2 Coordination in preparedness exercises
Coordination of work and making collaborative decisions are important aspects
of the incident response process and hence also of preparedness exercises. Re-
sponding to an IT security incident usually implies personnel from diﬀerent
parts of an organization collaborating on solving complex problems. “Coordina-
tion is management of interdependencies between activities” [13] and coordina-
tion mechanisms are the organizational arrangements, which allow individuals
to realize a collective performance [14]. Interdependencies include sharing of re-
sources, synchronization of activities, and prerequisite activities. Coordination
challenges in incident response are functions of the complexity, such as processes
and technology.
Further, responding to an IT security incident is creative work, as there
might not be one correct solution and a number of both uncertainties and inter-
dependencies need to be taken into account. In creative work progress towards
completion can be diﬃcult to estimate [15] because interdependencies between
diﬀerent pieces of work may be uncertain or challenging to identify. This makes
it diﬃcult to know who should be involved in the work, and whether there is a
correct order in which parties should complete their own specialized work [14].
Further, in creative work it is essential to improve the knowledge transactions be-
tween team members. This is captured in a transactive memory system (TMS), a
shared cognitive system for encoding, storing and retrieving knowledge between
members of a group [16]. TMS can be understood as a shared understanding of
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who knows what and also on the degree to which individual knowledge sets are
diﬀerentiated.
Coordination can be either predeﬁned or situated [17]. Predeﬁned coordina-
tion takes place prior to the situation being coordinated and can be understood
as what Hale and Borys refer to as Model 1 [8] and an incident response scheme
as described by ISO/IEC 27035 – Information security incident management
[18]. It typically consists of establishing written or unwritten rules, routines,
procedures, roles, and schedules. Situated coordination, on the other hand, oc-
curs when a situation is unknown and/or unanticipated, such as when an IT
security incident strikes, and can be understood as Model 2 [8]. Those involved
in the situation do not know in advance how they should contribute. They lack
knowledge of what to achieve, who does what, how the work can be divided,
in what sequence sub-activities should be done, when to act, etc. Consequently,
they have to improvise and coordinate their eﬀorts ad hoc. In most collaborative
eﬀorts there is a mix of predeﬁned and situated coordination. Involved actors
may for instance already know the goal, but not who performs what, or they
may know who does what but not when to do it. To compensate for lacking
predeﬁned knowledge of how the actual unfolding of activities in an exercise will
be, the participants must update themselves on the status of the situation.
To handle a crisis, not only does the team need to coordinate their work;
they also need to take decisions together and be responsible for managing and
monitoring their own processes and executing tasks, i.e they need to be able to
self-manage [19].
3 Method
Since the goal of this research was to explore and provide insight into challenges
experienced during IT security preparedness exercises, it was important to study
such exercises in practice. We designed a holistic multiple case study [20] of three
IT security preparedness exercises in three diﬀerent organizations. According to
Yin, case studies are the preferred research strategy when a “question is being
asked about a contemporary set of events over which the investigator has little
or no control” [ibid p. 9]. In the following, we present the scenario used, the
organizations studied, and how data collection and analysis were performed.
3.1 Scenario
One scenario recently recommended by the authorities3 was used by all orga-
nizations in our study. This scenario describes an information security incident
that escalates through ﬁve phases:
1. Abnormally large amounts of data is sent to external recipients.
2. Two weeks later, the SCADA supplier wants to install a patch. The contact
is made in a diﬀerent way than what is regulated in the service agreement.
3 Norwegian Water Resources and Energy Directorate (NVE)
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3. Three months after the ﬁrst event, one area suﬀers from power outage. The
monitoring systems do not display any alarms.
4. Customers start calling as more areas suﬀer from power outage. The moni-
toring systems do still not display any alarms.
5. Mobile communications and Internet connections are down.
The participants had 20 minutes to discuss each phase before they were given
information about the next. For each phase the participants had to describe how
they would interpret the events and which actions they would take.
3.2 Case Context
The three organizations in our study are Norwegian Distribution System Opera-
tors (DSOs) and they are among the ten largest DSOs in Norway. For organiza-
tions A and B, this was their ﬁrst execution of such a collaborative exercise for
IT security. Organization C had performed a similar exercise once before, and
the Emergency Management Team performs preparedness exercises regularly for
a variety of incident types. In the following, we present the organizations and
how each of them set up their exercise, as well as all participants and their num-
ber of years of experience in the organization.
Organization A. Three groups of personnel were represented in this exercise: IT
operations, industrial control systems, and network infrastructure. Nine partic-
ipants were present, including the Preparedness Coordinator4, a representative
from external supplier of SCADA systems, and the facilitator, cf. Table 1.
Table 1. Participants in organization A
Role Exp.
IT production manager 5
IT security coordinator 25
Fiber networks manager >20
Senior engineer, ﬁber networks 5
Control systems manager 20
Special advisor, remote control units >30
Service engineer, supplier of control systems >30
Emergency preparedness coordinator >30
IT security coordinator for control systems (facilitator) 28
Organization B. Fourteen participants represented three diﬀerent areas of ex-
pertise: IT, control systems, and control room operations. They were divided
into three groups for the exercise, and there was one observer in each group, cf.
Table 2. “GO” indicates who was the group observer. The intention was to have
all three areas of expertise represented in each group, but last minute changes
due to sudden business-related events caused group 1 to not have anyone from
control systems. The HSE/Quality/Preparedness Coordinator, who has more
4 All DSOs are required to have this role assigned to someone.
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than 20 years of experience, visited all three groups and is therefore not listed
in the table in one speciﬁc group.
Table 2. Participants in organization B
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3
Role Exp. Role Exp. Role Exp.
Control operations eng. 10 Control operations eng. 25 Control systems engineer 6
IT infrastructures engr. 9 Control operations eng. >20 Control room manager 8
IT operations engineer 1 IT operations engineer 29 IT operations engineer >15
IT manager 4 IT operations engineer 8 IT operations engineer 8
Control sys. manager (GO) 1 IT business sys. manager >20 IT security manager (GO) 12
IT consultant 1
Control ops. manager
(GO)
>10
Organization C. Twelve employees took part in the exercise, cf. Table 3. Five
belonged to the Emergency Management Team and were called for when their
presence was needed. One person facilitated the exercise in close collaboration
with the IT security coordinator.
Table 3. Participants in organization C
Technical personnel Emergency Management Team
Role Exp. Role Exp.
Manager, Control room DSO 5 Main corporation, IT manager 3
Deputy manager, Control room DSO 34 Power production, CEO 19
Manager, Control systems 36 DSO Technical manager 28
IT operation manager 4 Emergency preparedness coordinator 30
IT network security engineer 6 DSO Manager, emerg. prep. manager 5
Marketing, Broadband, Tech. manager 8
3.3 Data collection and analysis
The ﬁrst author contributed to the planning of all the tabletop exercises. Before
the scenario was presented to the participants, they were asked about their
expectations for the exercise. A retrospective was facilitated after the exercise,
where all participants reﬂected upon what worked well and what could have been
done diﬀerently. Their expectations from beforehand were discussed; whether
they were fulﬁlled and why/why not.
For the analysis, we described the tabletop exercises and evaluations from
each organization to achieve an understanding of what was going on during the
exercises. Then we categorized interesting expressions and observations, before
we compared ﬁndings between the organizations.
4 Results
The three organizations carried out the preparedness exercises according to gen-
erally recommended NIST practices. Plans and goals of the exercise were estab-
lished in advance, and they all discussed the ﬁve phases of the scenario. While
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the three organizations used the same scenario and main agenda for the exercise,
they all had diversity in goals and the number and types of participants. Our
observations are hereby presented, as characterized by the following descriptions:
1. Knowledge exchange and process improvement (org. A)
2. Cross-functional self-managing groups (org. B)
3. Involvement of Emergency Management Team (org. C)
4.1 Knowledge exchange and process improvement
In organization A the IT security coordinator for control systems planned and
facilitated the exercise. He presented his goals for the exercise in the begin-
ning: knowledge exchange across organizational boundaries, obtaining a common
understanding of what is technically possible in todays’ systems, identifying tech-
nical and organizational improvements, and ideas for future exercises. The par-
ticipants were seated around one big table. The scenario was already known to
two of the participants; the ﬁber networks manager and the emergency prepared-
ness coordinator; as they had participated in this exact same exercise the week
before in a diﬀerent context. This was the only organization that included one
participant from their supplier.
A few participants dominated throughout the whole discussion and nobody
seemed to take charge of the group as a chair person responsible for involving all
participants and achieving consensus in the group. For the ﬁrst three phases the
IT security coordinator and the ﬁber networks manager appeared to be quite
sure of what would be the right choices of action. Still, they were open about
lacking knowledge of systems outside their own domain and asked questions
in order to get the whole picture. The facilitator later commented that he had
expected these two participants to dominate because of their roles, competences,
and personality. He added that in a real emergency situation, only four of the
participants would be involved in the crisis management group: the two most
dominant participants, the control systems manager, and himself.
The participants were satisﬁed with this exercise being performed, as they
see this as an important scenario for preparedness exercises and as lacks were
revealed that they need to work on to improve their own response capabilities.
Furthermore, they approved of the initiative of making diﬀerent parts of the
organization meet for an IT security exercise. However, some participants felt
that the discussion was a bit out of control, as they did not manage to keep the
focus on solving the actual problems presented in the scenario. They missed a
person facilitating the discussion. The facilitator, on the other hand, was satisﬁed
with the discussion, as he saw it as valuable knowledge exchange, which was one
of his main goals. At the same time, some participants would have liked to have
more time for discussions. Furthermore, some perceived the last phase of the
scenario to be unrealistic and unlikely.
One important insight obtained was that they would not be able to relate the
event in the third phase to the two events that occurred three months earlier.
Their main priority is usually to get the systems back to normal operations, while
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understanding why the incident occurred typically receives less focus, if any. A
number of improvements were identiﬁed, regarding both technical and organiza-
tional aspects, in order to strengthen the response capabilities for information
security incidents aﬀecting complex IT and control systems.
4.2 Cross-functional self-managing groups
The exercise in organization B was prepared by a group of three managers: of IT
security, control systems, and the control room. The former had participated in
a similar exercise before. The goal of the exercise was to practice collaboration
between the departments of industrial control and IT systems. The subgoals
were to get to know persons, tasks, and responsibilities across the two involved
departments and identify improvements to existing procedures for emergency
preparedness and information security in general. The three managers acted as
observers; one for each group of participants. They were responsible for present-
ing the scenario, making sure the group made decisions for each phase of the
scenario, and assisting the group in keeping the discussion going if necessary.
Each group was seated around one table in three diﬀerent meeting rooms.
The group observers reported that in general, the group discussions were
good and nobody seemed to dominate. In group 3 the control room manager
took to some extent on the role as a chair person for the group; the group
observer perceived this as natural based on his role in the organization. This
group observer further stated that the participants appeared curious on each
others’ competences and responsibilities as they lacked this insight in order to
get the big picture. The observer in group 1 would like to see more involvement
from the management level in preparedness exercises.
Each group was intended to be self-managing, with as little intervention from
the group observers as possible. Reﬂections from the group observers indicated
that it was diﬃcult to keep quiet, as they wanted to contribute. This was par-
ticularly challenging for the observer in group 1, as this group suﬀered from the
lack of control systems personnel, and he was the only one with this competence.
He still chose to remain fairly passive. All group observers reported that they
did not need to intervene in order for the discussions to keep going. They did
not need to push their groups into making decisions either, as the groups were
focused on solving the problems as described in the scenario. While all groups
made several decisions on what would be appropriate actions for each phase of
the scenario, they did not present clear solutions to all sub-problems.
There was some criticism to the scenario description: “It is stated here that
we reinstalled (...), but we would never have done that because (...)”. Some
pointed out that the scenario was not realistic because of how their systems are
integrated, while others found the scenario to be quite realistic.
The evaluation showed that the participants were overall satisﬁed with the
exercise. They appreciated the opportunity to meet and get to know colleagues
from other parts of the organization and to get insight into their areas of re-
sponsibilities and knowledge. The participants would have liked to have more
time than 20 minutes for discussions for some of the phases. Furthermore, they
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lacked the opportunity to hear how the other groups had solved the problems.
A separate meeting for this was arranged a couple of weeks later. One partici-
pant suggested they use the existing preparedness plans and procedures actively
during such an exercise. The group observers found the thorough evaluation pro-
cess to be very valuable, and they saw it as an advantage that it was lead by
an external (one researcher) as it made the participants put extra eﬀort into
contributing.
4.3 Involvement of Emergency Management Team
In organization C the exercise was planned by the IT security coordinator and
a facilitator from the communications department. The goal of the exercise was
awareness raising and practice in responding to IT security incidents that occur
in the control systems. The participants were seated around one big table. Five
representatives from the Emergency Management Team were present during the
introduction. Three of them left the room when the scenario was presented,
while two chose to stay as passive observers. The intention was that the com-
plete Emergency Management Team should be called for at a later phase of the
scenario, when the seriousness of the incident required them to be involved, in
order to resemble a realistic situation. They were called for twice.
When the ﬁrst phase of the scenario was presented, the IT operation manager
quickly claimed ownership of the incident. He said that he would be the one to get
the ﬁrst alert, and that he would be the one to initiate analyses and reporting to
other stakeholders in the organization. One issue that was thoroughly discussed,
was the reporting from IT to the control room: when would that be done, if at all;
is this relevant information for the control room staﬀ; and is this reporting line
documented. This was identiﬁed as a lack in the documented procedures when
one participant checked these during the discussion. The group still knew who
to contact. Another issue that received a lot of attention, was the question of
shutting down the control systems. The IT operation manager would recommend
this at the stage where the control room supplier calls and wants to install a
security patch in the control systems (phase two), as he was worried about
the malware infections spreading further into the systems. The control system
manager on the other hand claimed that shutting down the control systems has
extensive ﬁnancial consequences for the operations, as manual operations are
expensive. The Emergency Management Team decided to shut down the control
systems in the fourth phase of the scenario.
During the evaluation it was agreed that such an incident would pose a great
challenge for the organization. They still concluded that the situation was re-
solved satisfactorily in this exercise, and that they would be able to maintain
power production and distribution by manually operating power stations. The
facilitators felt that relevant assessments and decisions were made, and that the
Emergency Management Team was involved at the right points in time. The
Emergency Management Team contributed with thorough analyses and unam-
biguous decisions.
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5 Discussion
We have described a tabletop exercise as performed in three organizations. While
they all relied on the same scenario, they organized the exercise diﬀerently. In
the following we discuss the importance of preparedness exercises, along with
our results in the light of our research question: What are the challenges of
performing tabletop exercises for IT security incidents? Then we discuss how
observed challenges could aﬀect a real-life incident response process. Finally, we
provide recommendations for how to succeed with preparedness exercises.
Our study conﬁrmed the importance of conducting preparedness exercises. In
organization A they realized that in a real situation they would most probably
not be able to link the third phase to the ﬁrst two, i. e. events that occur three
months apart. By training they became aware that such links exist. Further, the
participants in organization B were not suﬃciently aware of each others’ needs for
information. They realized how the information ﬂow could be improved. In two
of the organizations in our study, A and B, the participants had diﬀerent views
on whether the scenario was realistic or not. This diﬀerence shows a need for
developing a common perception of possible threats and potential consequences,
which can be partly achieved by performing exercises.
A single best practice on organizing tabletop exercises does probably not
exist. However, we found a number of challenges that need to be understood in
order to succeed with such training.
Having one goal only. For a team to have good performance and to be able
to eﬀectively solve a complex problem, they need shared understanding of the
team goals [21]. Having several goals for the exercise might lead to the individual
members heading towards diﬀerent goals. In organization A the team focused on
solving the given problem while the facilitator was just as focused on knowledge
sharing and fruitful discussions. As a consequence they had problems staying
focused during the exercise. The main goal of an exercise should be to solve the
problem, while additional goals may rather be aimed for during the evaluation
afterwards, as was done in organization B.
Recommendation: Deﬁne only one main goal for the preparedness exercise.
Enabling self-management and growing team knowledge. For a team
to solve a crisis and make good decisions it needs to be able to self-manage.
Members of self-managing teams share decision authority jointly, rather than
having a centralized decision structure where one person makes all the decisions,
or a decentralized decision structure where team members make independent
decisions. Organization A had problems self-managing as two persons made most
of the decisions. It was later concluded that only a few of the team members
would participate in a real situation. The others should have been present as
observers to distinguish between who are part of the team and who are not.
Enabling self-management further requires the group to have the necessary
competence; otherwise the group will be training for solving the problem without
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having the necessary competence available. However, because handling incidents
is creative work, it might be challenging to identify everyone that should be
present in the training up front. One of the teams in organization B clearly
suﬀered from the lack of competence, and both organizations B and C lacked
personnel from their external suppliers. The training outcome would have been
better with the right personnel present.
In addition to the right competence, a shared understanding of who knows
what is needed to solve a crisis eﬀectively [16]. We found that in most teams
people did not have a good overview of what the others knew, however, the team
members became more aware of each others’ knowledge during the exercise.
Recommendation: Ensure the presence of all required competence in the
team, including personnel from external suppliers. Make it explicit who are part
of the team and who are observers. Include a facilitator to support the team
in making joint decisions and conduct exercises frequently to develop a shared
understanding of who knows what.
Availability of personnel. Business runs continuously and might require sud-
den and unforeseen actions, which in turn might cause personnel to cancel their
presence in the exercise. This will aﬀect the group composition as happened in
organization B, where last minute changes led to the lack of one type of com-
petence in one of the groups. Further, members of management groups tend to
have little time for exercises, but their presence is needed to have realism to the
exercise. Limiting the time spent on exercises would most likely make it easier
for key personnel to participate. All organizations experience turnover. Hence,
sudden absence of critical competence might be experienced during a real-life
incident as well.
Recommendation: Perform preparedness exercises frequently to make sure
that all personnel receive training regularly. Limit the time spent on each exercise
to make it easier for key personnel to participate.
Time management. Having 20 minutes for discussing each phase was per-
ceived as too short for some, while suﬃcient for others, depending on both the
participants and the complexity of the given problems. Creating a time-pressure
for making quick decisions was understood as making the exercise more realistic.
Still, according to FEMA [9] it is wise to take the time to resolve problems. A
facilitator needs to balance the amount of time spent on the diﬀerent phases
based on the progress and how well the team performs. Further, making time
for thorough reﬂections after the exercise is important to improve the beneﬁts
of the exercise, as was also recommended by NIST [6]. Both organizations A
and B spent 60-70 minutes on such reﬂections and stated that one large beneﬁt
was that of having an external facilitator for this, as the participants clearly put
more eﬀort into contributing than they would usually do during internal evalu-
ations. A similar evaluation was planned for organization C, but they ran out
of time and did not prioritize a thorough evaluation after the exercise. A short
around-the-table discussion was performed.
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Recommendation: Ensure time pressure by limiting the time for problem-
solving in the exercise. Allow for thorough reﬂections in a plenary session right
after the exercise is completed. If there is more than one group, add time for
reﬂection within each group as well, before the plenary session.
Use of existing documentation. None of the teams actively consulted writ-
ten plans and procedures during the exercise. Such plans were made available to
the team in organization C only. Although documentation needs to be in place,
situated coordination is more important because the scenarios in the exercise are
unknown. An organization therefore needs to rely on the individuals and their
knowledge when handling a crisis. In organization C, a lack in the reporting
procedures was identiﬁed, but the participants still knew who to contact and
when. It was stated that in an emergency situation there is no time for consult-
ing documentation. Exercises contribute to develop practical knowledge and the
knowledge of who knows what, which is essential to make good decisions when
handling an incident. Still, documentation would be available during a real sit-
uation, therefore it should also be available during an exercise. One of the main
goals with a tabletop exercise is to review plans and procedures [9], and this
should be performed shortly after the exercise.
Recommendation: Make existing written documentation available during the
preparedness exercise and review the documentation in retrospective if needed.
If the available documentation is not consulted, discuss why.
Involvement of business management. It is essential to involve those with
the authority to make decisions inﬂuencing business operations. IT security in-
volves more than IT personnel, as an incident might have severe consequences
for both the organization, its customers, and society at large. In an emergency
situation the goal from a business perspective is usually to maintain normal op-
erations as continuously as possible. However, there are diﬀerent strategies that
may be used for this: to resolve the incident with as little disturbances to the
operations as possible, to understand why the incident occurred, or to make sure
that the incident will not repeat itself. These diﬀerent strategies require slightly
diﬀerent approaches and priorities, and it is therefore crucial that the incident
responders have a common understanding of the overall preferred strategy.
Organization C seemed to succeed with their model where the team called
for the Emergency Management Team when severity of the incident required
them to. In organization C the IT personnel wanted to shut down the control
systems quite early, due to their fear of malware infections; the control room
manager wanted to wait, due to high costs of manual operations. These costs
were compared to the consequences of an uncontrolled breakdown. We found
that priorities among diﬀerent parts of the organization vary, which supports
the need for collaborative exercises and practicing joint decision-making, at the
same time as diﬀerent authority levels come into play.
Recommendation: Include all personnel that will play a role during a real-life
incident, including both technical personnel and business representatives.
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6 Concluding remarks and future research
For industrial control organizations to withstand and/or successfully respond to
attacks, personnel from diﬀerent parts of the organization need to collaborate:
IT, control systems, control room, networks/infrastructure, and business repre-
sentatives. These groups of personnel do not have a tradition for collaborating
with each other, as industrial control systems used to be isolated from adminis-
trative IT systems. A holistic view of the incident response process is needed so
that the whole organization is included in training, as it would be during a real
emergency situation.
There are many ways to conduct preparedness exercises. Therefore organi-
zations need to both optimize current exercise practices and experiment with
new ones. Regardless of how the exercises are conducted, there are a number of
challenges to be aware of, as identiﬁed in our study. Functional exercises should
be performed as a supplement to tabletop exercises in order to improve the
operational capabilities as well.
We studied organizations doing such exercises for the ﬁrst time. There is
therefore a need to study which challenges are met by organizations that are
more mature when it comes to performing preparedness exercises for IT secu-
rity incidents. Such a study should also investigate what good practices these
organizations are performing in their exercises. Further, challenges met during
real-life incident response processes should be investigated, in order to make
preparedness exercises even more useful.
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